





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THE
H I S T O R Y
OF THE
R E I G N
OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

By ROBERT WATSON, LL. D.

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREW'S.

A NEW EDITION.

VOL. I.

BASIL:

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MDCCXCII.



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THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK I.

PHILIP II. King of Spain, son of the Emperor Charles V. and of Isabella daughter of Emanuel the Great, King of Portugal, was born at Valladolid, on the twenty-first of May, one thousand five hundred and twenty-seven. He was educated in Spain under ecclesiastics, noted for their bigotry, who were appointed by his father to instruct him; and, by this circumstance, several of those features in his character were either formed, or greatly heightened, which were afterwards so conspicuous in his conduct.

BOOK
I.

Birth and
education of
Philip.

Charles, who was born in the Netherlands, and passed his early youth there, had, through his whole reign, entertained such a manifest partiality for that country, as was the source of much dissatisfaction to his Spanish subjects. But they were soothed by

BOOK

I.

the preference which they received from the young prince, and flattered themselves with hopes, which were not frustrated, of obtaining, under his administration, that share of the royal favor, which the Flemings had enjoyed under the emperor¹.

His character

Philip early displayed sagacity, prudence, and application: and discovered likewise a disposition wonderfully suited to the religious instructions which he received. His mind, being naturally serious and thoughtful, gave a ready admittance to all the sentiments of that illiberal superstition, which formed, at that time, the distinguishing character of the Spanish ecclesiastics.

His first marriage.

At the age of sixteen, he espoused Mary, a princess of Portugal; who died in less than two years after her marriage, in child-bed; when she was delivered of Don Carlos, whose unhappy fate will be related in the sequel.

He is called by his father to the Netherlands.

Philip continued to reside in Spain, and was intrusted with the administration of the kingdom, till the year one thousand five hundred and forty-eight. At that time he was called by his father into the Low Countries; where he arrived, in the beginning of the following year, with a numerous retinue of Spanish nobles. Upon his entrance into Brussels, as he was ever desirous to maintain the appearance of extraordinary piety, he went first to the cathedral church, to render thanks to the Almighty for his preservation; and then proceeded

¹ Haræi Annales Belgii, &c. p. 570. Cabrera Vida de Filippe II. lib. i. c. 1.

to the palace. After passing some days there with the emperor, who, in all his behaviour, discovered that fond affection, which is natural to a person in the decline of life, towards an only son, he set out to visit the principal cities in the Low Countries, accompanied by the regent, his aunt, the queen dowager of Hungary ².

Nothing could exceed the pomp with which he was every where received. In presents, entertainments, illuminations, and tournaments, immense sums were expended. The cities vied with each other in displaying that magnificence which their industry had enabled them to attain; and the people gave every where the strongest demonstrations of their attachment ³.

His reception
there.

But Philip, in the midst of those scenes of festivity which were exhibited for his amusement, and which were so well calculated to gratify a young, ambitious mind, could not conceal the natural austerity of his temper. The Flemings observed, with anxiety, that there was a striking contrast between the father and the son. Charles was courteous and affable, but Philip, they perceived, was distant, haughty and severe. The former could speak with facility the principal languages of Europe, and used to discourse familiarly with all his subjects; the latter had declined learning to speak any other but the Spanish tongue, conyerfed

His unpopu-
lar manners.

² Haræi Annales Ducum Brabantiae, &c. tom. ii. p. 653. Antwerpiae 1623. Lud. Guicciardini, lib. ii. p. 127.

³ Meteren, p. 9.

BOOK

I.

little with the inhabitants of the Low Countries, and was almost inaccessible to all, but the Spanish nobles. He lived in every respect as he had been wont to do in Spain, wore a Spanish dress, and refused to conform, in any thing, to the modes and customs of the Netherlands⁴.

Their effect on
the Flemings.

This behaviour, equally ungracious and impolitic, made a deep impression on the minds of the Flemings, and created in them a jealousy of the Spaniards, which they did not study to conceal. Charles having required the States to swear allegiance to Philip, as they had formerly done to himself, they rejected his request; and refused to acknowledge Philip's right of succession, till he engaged to exclude all foreigners from any share in the government of the provinces. And even to this nothing would have made them agree, but their respect for the emperor, and the awe in which they stood of his power; for, if the distemper under which Charles labored at this time, had proved mortal, it was believed, they would have excluded Philip from the sovereignty, and conferred it on Maximilian his cousin, son of Ferdinand king of Hungary and Bohemia⁵.

The emperor's
scheme for
procuring him
to be elected
King of the
Romans.

From the Low Countries the emperor carried his son into Germany, in order to facilitate the execution of a scheme, which he had lately formed, of having him elected King of the Romans. In the

⁴ Bentivoglio, Istoria della Guerra di Fiandra, p. 5. In Parigi 1645.

⁵ Mémoires de Ribier, tom. ii. p. 219. à Paris 1666.

year one thousand five hundred and thirty, Charles had procured that dignity for his brother Ferdinand; but having now a son grown up to maturity, of whose talents for government he entertained the most favorable opinion, he repented of what he had done in behalf of his brother; and resolved, in case he would not resign, to endeavour to persuade the electors to annul his election.

Aversion of
the Germans
from that
scheme.

But Philip's manners were not less disgusting in Germany, than they had been in the Netherlands; and served rather to alienate the affections of the Germans, than to conciliate their favor. His demeanour there was equally distant, reserved, and haughty. He suffered even princes of the highest rank to remain uncovered in his presence; and, in all his behaviour, affected a degree of state and dignity which the emperors themselves had never been accustomed to assume. The Germans dreaded the dominion of one whose behaviour, even when he was courting their favor, was so cold and distant. They refused to listen to the Emperor's proposal; and they were confirmed in their resolution of rejecting it, partly, by their remembrance of the calamities which they had suffered, from conferring the Imperial crown on Charles, whose power had proved almost fatal to their liberty; and partly, by their attachment to Ferdinand, joined with the affection which they bore to Maximilian, whose character and manners were entirely the reverse of those of Philip.

Charles was not of a temper to be easily diverted from his designs; and, being conscious of the great

B O O K

I.

superiority which he had lately acquired, from his triumph over the confederacy of Smalkalde, he doubted not of being able to compel the electors to make choice of his son, provided he could prevail on Ferdinand to resign. To effectuate this, he applied himself with all that earnestness and ardor which he commonly discovered in the prosecution of his schemes. Nothing but the intoxication of prosperity could have inspired a prince of so great sagacity as Charles, with the hopes of succeeding in so chimerical an attempt. Ferdinand himself was in the full vigor of life; and, considering the declining state of his brother's health, his prospect of the Imperial dignity was not distant: his son had been educated with the view of attaining the same exalted station after his father's death; and, from the great popularity of his character, he had just ground to entertain the most sanguine expectations of success. Charles might easily have perceived, that no arguments which he could employ would persuade either the father or the son to forego a prospect so alluring. Accordingly, although he had, on all former occasions, found his brother's behaviour towards him respectful and complying; and, to give greater weight to his present application, made use of the powerful intercession of his sister the queen dowager of Hungary, to whom his brother was indebted for the crowns of Hungary and Bohemia; yet Ferdinand withstood all his sister's entreaties, and rejected all the offers of compensation which were made to him. Charles had given his daughter in marriage to Maximilian,

and intrusted him with the government of Spain, during Philip's absence, in order to soothe him under the disappointment which he was preparing for him, and to remove him to a distance from Germany, when his father's affection was about to be put to the trial. This young prince was greatly alarmed when he heard of the design which was carrying on against him; and having left Spain, and returned to Germany, he omitted nothing in his power, to confirm his father's purpose, and to render it unalterable. Charles saw at last the necessity of dropping, for the present, the prosecution of his scheme: and Philip left Germany, much dissatisfied with the electors, and other German princes, but with none more than with his kinsmen⁶.

B O O K
I.

From Germany he returned to Spain, where he held the regency of the kingdom, and acquitted himself of his charge, in such a manner as led his subjects to form a favorable opinion of his prudence, his industry, and his capacity for government. But the contemporary historians have mentioned no particulars of his conduct during this period, that deserve to be recorded. He remained in Spain till his marriage with the queen of England, in the year one thousand five hundred and fifty-four.

Philip returns
to Spain.

No sooner was Mary, daughter of Henry VIII.

His marriage
with the
queen of
England.

⁶ Lud. Guicciardin. lib. ii. p. 128. Pallavicini Istoria del Concilio di Trento, lib. xi. c. 15. Thuanus, lib. vii. ab initio. Extrait des lettres de Marillac au Roi de France dans Ribier, July 22, 1550.

§ HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF

BOOK

I.

passion, towards the close of his reign, was to aggrandize his son, conceived the design of uniting England to his other dominions, by the marriage of Philip with the queen. Had Philip declined this match, it was believed, that Charles would have offered himself to Mary, rather than have lost so inviting an opportunity of augmenting his power. But the son was not less governed by ambition than the father; and readily consented, at the age of twenty-six, to marry a princess of thirty-seven, disagreeable in her temper and manners, homely in her person, and entirely destitute of every female charm⁷.

When Charles found that Philip was not averse to the marriage, he immediately dispatched a messenger to the court of London to propose it; and Mary hesitated not a moment in declaring her consent. Philip's bigotry, which made him unamiable in the eyes of others, recommended him to her. She was ever strongly attached to her mother's family; and she considered how much so powerful an alliance would enable her to execute her favorite scheme of extirpating heresy from her dominions.

Objections of
the English
against it.

Mary's subjects had not the same reasons with their sovereign to make them fond of this alliance. They had beheld, for more than thirty years, that restless ambition with which the emperor was actuated: and they now received a striking proof of Philip's inordinate thirst after power, by his agreeing so readily to the intended marriage, to which

⁷ Ribier, tom. ii. p. 457.

there was nothing but motives of ambition that could allure him. They were all well acquainted with his private character, and the prejudices which his haughty demeanour had, a few years before, created against him in Germany and the Netherlands. They dreaded the consequences of having their queen, whose temper was naturally rigid and severe, united to a prince of so imperious a character. They trembled at the thoughts of the danger to which their liberty and independence would be exposed; and they were filled with the most disquieting apprehensions of falling under the dominion of the Spaniards; a nation noted for their violent use of power in the Netherlands and Italy, infamous for the barbarities which they had exercised over the natives of America, and distinguished, above all other nations, for their bigoted attachment to the church of Rome^s.

To quiet these alarms, Charles had recourse to different expedients. He prevailed on Mary to suspend her persecution of the Protestants; and to resume the title of Supreme Head of the Church, which she had laid aside some months before. He sent over immense sums of money to be distributed among the members of parliament; and he ordered the marriage articles to be drawn in terms the most honorable and advantageous to Mary and her subjects.

Charles labors
to remove
them.

By these articles it was provided, that Philip

^s Burnet's Hist. of Ref. part ii. p. 284; and Carte, vol. ii. p. 297.

B O O K should have only the name of King; while the
I. sovereign power should remain entire in the hands of Mary; that no foreigner should be admitted into any public employment; no innovation made in the laws and customs, and no violation offered to the rights or privileges of the nation; that England should not, in consequence of the marriage, be involved in any war between France and Spain; that the heirs of the marriage should not only inherit the Netherlands and England, but, in the event of Don Carlos's dying without issue, should succeed to the crown of Spain, and to the rest of Philip's hereditary dominions; and that if the queen should die without issue, Philip should have no claim to any share in the government of England, but the crown of that kingdom should devolve immediately to the lawful heir^a.

His success.

These concessions were not altogether without effect. They did not indeed entirely dispel the apprehensions that were entertained; and many persons thought that the more advantageous the conditions offered were, there was so much the greater reason for suspecting that Charles and his son had no serious intention to fulfil them. But they furnished the courtiers, and other partisans of the Spanish match, with specious arguments in its defence: and deprived those who still remained averse to it, of any plausible pretext under which they might have procured an association

^a Burnet's Hist. of the Ref. part ii. b. ii. p. 260. Carte, b. xvii.

against it. This was attempted by Sir Thomas Wiat and others, who succeeded so far, as to persuade several hundreds of the people to take up arms; but this inconsiderable and ill-concerted insurrection was quickly suppressed, and served only to confirm that power of the queen to dispose of herself in marriage, which the malecontents intended to have controlled ¹⁰.

Every obstacle being removed, and the articles of marriage ratified by parliament, Mary now employed herself in preparing for the reception of her future husband; for whom, although she had never seen him, she had conceived so violent a passion, as filled her mind with the most anxious impatience for his arrival. She was, at the same time, extremely mortified with his coldness towards her; and complained, that, although she had so readily consented to bestow upon him both her kingdom and herself, he had never vouchsafed to write her a letter on the subject, or to satisfy her as to the causes of his delay in coming to England. At length he sent the marquis De las Navas to inform her that every thing was in readiness for his leaving Spain. But before his departure, the Spanish historians relate, that, having visited the shrine of St. Jago in Galicia, he there heard mass with much devotion, kneeling on the ground, without allowing the monks to furnish him with a cushion; and recommending himself to the protection of the patron saint ¹¹.

¹⁰ Burnet, p. 262. Carte.

¹¹ Carte, b. xvii. p. 312. Cabrera, lib. i. c. 4.

B O O K

I.

Philip's arrival
in England.

He set sail from Corunna, in the beginning of July, one thousand five hundred and fifty-four, and arrived at Southampton, after a prosperous voyage, on the 19th or 20th of the same month. In a few days after his arrival, the marriage ceremony was performed at Winchester; where Philip received, from the emperor's ambassador, the investiture of Naples, Sicily, and Milan, together with the titular kingdom of Jerusalem; all which Charles resigned to him on this occasion, as a testimony of the joy and satisfaction which the marriage afforded him, and in order to render his son a husband more worthy of his royal spouse¹².

His behaviour
and manners.

Having brought with him a numerous train of Spanish nobility, Philip studied to dazzle the eyes of the English, by the pomp and splendor of his public appearances, and to gain their affections by his liberality. But he could not, with all his endeavours, hide the blemishes of his character. His natural reserve and haughtiness still appeared in all his demeanour. He was too much a Spaniard to relish any thing that was not Spanish. He could, on no occasion, comply with the manners of the English. He suffered even the chief nobility to remain in his presence without taking any notice of them; allowed no person to approach him without having previously obtained permission; and thus made himself difficult of access, even

¹² Burnet's Hist. of Ref. p. ii. b. ii. Carte, b. xvii. p. 313. Summonte Hist. di Napoli, libro 9no, p. 263.

to those whose favor he wished to conciliate or secure¹³.

He discovers
his ambitious
views.

It soon appeared, how little he was satisfied with that article of his marriage-treaty, by which he was excluded from the government. At his desire, and in order to gain his affections, which Mary regarded more than either the interest of her people, or even her own importance in the kingdom, she requested of the parliament to declare him the presumptive heir of the crown; and to commit the administration of the state into his hands.

Both houses had hitherto shown themselves extremely obsequious to her will; but they saw now the necessity of putting an end to their compliances. They easily perceived the spirit and tendency of her demands, and considered them as an indubitable proof of her determined purpose to gratify her husband's ambition, without regard to the fatal consequences that might follow. They rejected both her requests. Although they had consented to Philip's bearing the title of king, they would not agree to the ceremony of his coronation; and they obstinately refused to assist the emperor in the war which he was carrying on against France¹⁴.

To overcome the prejudices, which, from this

His artifice.

¹³ Burnet's Hist. of the Ref. v. ii. p. 288. Carte, b. xvii. p. 313.

"His carriage," says Bishop Burnet, "was such, that the acting him and his Spaniards was one of the great diversions of queen Elizabeth's court."

¹⁴ Carte, p. 315.

BOOK

I.

conduct of the parliament, Philip perceived were entertained against him, he resolved to curb his natural disposition, and to assume the appearance of moderation. With this design, he obtained from Mary the release of several persons of distinction, whom she had thrown into prison, on suspicion of their dissatisfaction to her government. But there was no part of his conduct better calculated to conciliate the favor of the English, than his protection of the lady Elizabeth; against whom Mary had given such proofs of jealousy and resentment, as rendered the nation extremely anxious with regard to the life of that princess. It was unfortunate, however, for Philip, that the favor which he showed towards Elizabeth admitted of an interpretation very different from what he expected would have been put upon it. Men were not inclined to ascribe to generosity, in a prince of his interested character, an action to which he must have been prompted by this political consideration, that if Elizabeth were cut off, and Mary to die without issue, England would be inherited by the queen of Scots: by whose marriage with the Dauphin, both the crowns of Scotland and of England would be united to that of France¹⁵.

Persecution
of the Protest-
ants.

Mary had, in order to ingratiate herself with the people, and to advance the views of her husband, suspended her persecution of the Reformers. But her zeal and bigotry were too violent to be

¹⁵ Burnet, vol. ii. b. ii. p. 287. Carte, p. 316. Camden's Apparatus.

long restrained; and Philip was not inclined, either from principle or temper, to oppose those sanguinary measures which she was now determined to pursue. Courts no less arbitrary than the Spanish Inquisition were instituted; and the same barbarous punishments, which that tribunal denounces, were inflicted on great numbers of persons, without distinction of either age or sex. No person doubted that Mary was of herself sufficiently prone to employ those dreadful severities which were exercised; but as all men knew how implicitly she was devoted to her husband's will, they could not help considering them as the consequence either of his advice or his approbation¹⁶. Philip was sensible of the odium to which he was exposed; and, in order to remove or lessen it, he had recourse to the ridiculous expedient of making his confessor, a Franciscan friar, deliver before him, a sermon in favor of toleration¹⁷. But notwithstanding this artifice, which was too gross to impose upon any person, and though Philip seldom

¹⁶ Philip's Historian Cabrera ascribes the persecutions to Philip as matter of praise, p. 28. lib. i. c. 7.

¹⁷ This sermon was delivered on the 10th of February; yet, on the 24th of May following, Philip joined with Mary, upon occasion of Bonner's declining to take all the odium of the persecution upon himself, in writing to that brutal prelate, requiring him to proceed in the execution of the laws against Heretics; so as that, through his good furtherance, both God's glory may be the better advanced, and the commonwealth the more quietly governed. Burnet's Collection of Records, N°. 20.

BOOK

I.

appeared openly to act a part in the administration, the prepossessions against him still remained. All his conduct was beheld with an eye of watchful jealousy and distrust; nor was it possible for Mary to obtain any higher concession from the parliament in his favor, than this, that if she should die, and leave issue behind her, Philip should be protector during the minority.

Philip leaves
England.

For several months, this concession was not deemed so insignificant as it afterwards proved. A belief prevailed throughout the kingdom, that Mary was with child, and Philip, and even Mary herself, believed it¹⁸. Philip remained in England while there was any reason to entertain hopes of so desirable an event; which might have realized that power at which he had aspired ever since his arrival in that kingdom. But when those appearances, which gave rise to the belief of Mary's pregnancy, were found to be nothing but the approach of a dropsy; when all prospect of her ever having children was annihilated, and her anxiety for offspring, joined with her natural sourness and jealousy, had preyed upon her health, and rendered her person, as well as her conversation,

¹⁸ On the 30th of April, a report was spread that she was actually delivered of a son. All the bells in London were set a-ringing. Bonfires were lighted up in every corner of the city. A Te Deum was sung in the cathedral of St. Paul's; and a priest indulged his credulity to such a height as to describe, with great particularity, the proportions and features of the young prince, whom he represented as the healthiest and most beautiful that had been ever seen. Carte, p. 317.

disagreeable;

disagreeable; Philip left England, after having staid in it fourteen months, and passed over to the Netherlands ¹⁹. BOOK
I.

There the emperor was preparing to execute a resolution which he had formed of resigning his dominions, in order to pass the remainder of his life in retirement. At the time of Philip's marriage with the queen of England, he had ceded to him the kingdom of Naples, and the dutchy of Milan; and had little reason to be satisfied with his son's behaviour towards him, after giving so strong a proof of his paternal affection and munificence. Philip, besides refusing to come over to Flanders, where Charles was desirous of seeing him, unless he were invested with some authority in that country, during his abode in it, insisted, that the grant of the Italian States should be absolute and unconditional; and no sooner had he entered upon the possession of them, than he displaced his father's ministers, in order to make room for creatures of his own. This undutiful behaviour of his son did not deter the emperor from resolving to resign to him all the rest of his dominions. On the contrary, it appears to have been his principal motive in forming this resolution; as it gave him a clear discovery of Philip's imperious temper, and showed that he had now reduced himself to the disagreeable alternative, of either contending with his son, or of yielding to him ²⁰. The emperor's resignation of his dominions.

¹⁹ Haræus, Carte, p. 317. Burnet, part ii. b. ii. p. 312.

²⁰ L'Evesque, p. 24, 25. Summonte, lib. ix. p. 263.

BOOK

I.

Had Charles enjoyed the same vigor, either of body or of mind, which he possessed some years before, it is probable that Philip's behaviour would have operated upon him very differently, and have determined him to abridge, rather than to augment, his son's power. But finding himself worn out, partly by the excruciating pain which he had long suffered from frequent returns of the gout, and partly by his incessant activity, and continual application to business, he perceived that he must, for the future, either trust to his ministers, which he had hitherto avoided; or sink ere long under the weight of the government of so many States as were subject to his dominion. It was therefore become necessary for him to disengage himself from, at least, a part of those cares which oppressed him. If his son's ambition had been more moderate, or his temper of mind more complying, Charles might have invested him with the chief branches of administration, and have still retained the supreme authority; or, after resigning to him the sovereignty of a part of his dominions, he might have reserved the remainder in his own hands; but he foresaw, that Philip's temper would, in either of these cases, have proved the source of continual uneasiness to him; and this he could not, with dignity, avoid by any other means, than by retiring from the world, and making an absolute cession of his whole dominions ²¹.

²¹ Ribier, p. 485.

Determined by these motives, he resigned the sovereignty of the Low Countries in October 1555, and that of Spain in the month of January immediately following. But he retained possession of his Imperial crown for several months longer, till he had made another fruitless attempt to persuade his brother to relinquish his claim to the empire, in behalf of Philip. Charles was retiring from the world under a conviction of the vanity of human greatness, yet he was as solicitous to secure an accession of that greatness to his son, as if he had believed that it constituted the supreme felicity of man. His own experience had furnished him with the strongest proof, that dominions so widely extended, conferred the appearance of power more than the substance or reality; that they are the source of continual and distracting anxiety; that they engage the possessor in enterprizes beyond his strength, and that the right government of them is a task above the capacity of any individual: yet he desired nothing so much, as to load his son with that burden, which he himself had found intolerable, and under which he had sunk long before the period when old age obliges men to quit the scenes of active life. Charles had long fostered that preposterous ambition of princes, which prompts them to the pursuit of power, without regard to the great end for which alone it is desirable, the happiness of their subjects: and it was become impossible for him entirely to divest himself of this passion, although he was determined never more to indulge it.

B O O K

I.

The truce of
Vaucelles.

With respect to another part of his conduct at this time, it is much easier to enter into the motives from which he acted. Previously to his abdication, he had been exceedingly desirous to have peace established with France, in order to give his son leisure to recover his dominions from that exhausted state to which his own continual wars, together with the sums transmitted to England, had reduced them. In this, however all his attempts had hitherto failed. But, having been detained in the Low Countries by the severity of the season, and his bodily distress, much longer than he intended, he had the satisfaction, before his departure, to employ his endeavours successfully in effectuating the truce of Vaucelles: and, before the expiration of that truce, there was ground to hope, that the several points of difference between his son and the French monarch, would be amicably adjusted. Soon after this, he set out for his retreat in Spain: where, having buried, in the solitude of a convent, all his schemes of glory and ambition, he seldom inquired, or even suffered his domestics to inform him, concerning what was passing in the world²².

²² Gianone, tom. iv. p. 198.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK II.

NOTWITHSTANDING Charles was disappointed in his scheme of transmitting the empire to his son, Philip was still the most powerful monarch of the age. In Europe, besides the united kingdoms of Castile, Arragon, and Navarre, he possessed the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, the dutchy of Milan, Franche-Comté, and the Netherlands; in Africa, Tunis, Oran, the Cape-Verd, and the Canary Islands; in Asia, the Philippine and Sunda Islands, and a part of the Moluccas; and in America, the empires of Peru and Mexico, New Spain and Chili, besides Hispaniola, Cuba, and many other of the American islands. The mines of Mexico, Chili, and Potosi, were, at the time of Philip's accession, a source of greater wealth than almost all the other princes in Europe

BOOK

II.

Philip's
power and
dominions.

BOOK

II.

were possessed of¹. His fleet was much more numerous than that of any other European power. His troops were better disciplined, and more accustomed to war and victory: and they were commanded by the ablest, and most experienced generals of the age.

Such extensive power, and such copious resources, could not but appear extremely formidable to the other European States; especially when they reflected upon the dark, imperious character of the prince to whom they belonged. For although Philip had neither his father's valor, nor his enterprising activity, yet he was plodding, industrious, and penetrating. He had already shown that his ambition was not less ardent than that of the emperor; and it was the more to be dreaded, as it was concealed under the cloak of fervent zeal for the interest of religion.

State of
Europe.

Of England.

But how much soever Philip's power and character were fitted to excite jealousy in the neighbouring states, there were few of them, at this period, in a condition to counteract his designs. The English had, since Mary's accession, lost much of that importance in Europe, which they had enjoyed for half a century before. Commerce was either neglected, or oppressed; their troops were undisciplined, and disused to war; and their navy was in the most languishing condition. During Philip's residence among them, they had given

¹ They brought him 25,000,000 of guilders yearly. Meteren.

proof of their native spirit of independence, by refusing to admit him to any share of the administration; but they had, in every thing else, shown themselves tamely submissive to the will of their weak, bigoted queen: and there was ground to apprehend, that, instead of opposing him, they would be compelled by her to support him, in the pursuit of any violent measures in which his ambition or bigotry might engage him.

BOOK
II.

He had no greater reason to expect opposition from Germany than from England. For whatever disgust his competition with Ferdinand for the Imperial crown might have created, there was no probability that it would ever occasion any violent dissension, or open rupture between them. Ferdinand was not yet fully settled in the possession of Hungary. He was disquieted with apprehensions that the Sultan would ere long renew hostilities against him in that kingdom; and, in order to provide against this event, and secure to himself that support, of which, in case it should happen, he would stand in need, he labored assiduously to establish concord among the several princes of the Germanic body, and to compose the animosities which the differences in religion had produced.

Of Germany.

Portugal had, at this time, reached the summit of its prosperity and glory. Those discoveries and conquests in the most distant regions of the globe, which had advanced that kingdom to a rank so much superior to what it held before, were almost completed. But John the Third, under whose government and auspices so great a number of

Of Portugal.

B O O K

II.

Denmark
and Swe-
den.Of the
Pope's do-
minions.

discoveries and conquests had been made, was now in the decline of life; beloved by his people; respected by his neighbours; and only solicitous to maintain peace, and to render his subjects happy.

The thrones of Denmark and Sweden were filled by Christiern the Third and Gustavus Vasa. Under the just and mild administration of the former monarch, Denmark was beginning to recover from that exhausted state to which civil dissensions, the calamities of foreign war, and the oppression of an odious tyrant lately dethroned, had reduced it: while the Swedes, who, under Gustavus, had thrown off the yoke of the neighbouring kingdom, and bestowed their crown upon their brave deliverer, were enjoying under him the sweets of liberty, and laying the foundation of that greatness to which they afterwards attained. Neither of these nations, however, were yet in a condition to take a part in the affairs of the European powers; and the patriotic princes who ruled over them, found sufficient employment in establishing tranquillity within their kingdoms.

In Italy, the dominions of the church, lately much diminished by the grant which Paul the Third had made of the dutchies of Parma and Placentia to Octavio Farnese his grandson, were shut up between the dutchy of Milan on the one hand, and the kingdom of Naples on the other. The sovereign pontiff, therefore, was more dependent on Philip, than upon any other prince, and was much more likely to find his interest in

courting that monarch's favor, than in promoting any scheme of opposition to his designs.

BOOK
II.

Cosmo di Medici, duke of Tuscany, had been greatly indebted to the late emperor for the sovereignty which he enjoyed; and his dominions were, by the emperor's favor and his own wise policy, become so considerable, that only the viceroy of Naples, or the governor of Milan, could give him any just ground of uneasiness. Both gratitude and interest seemed to call on that political prince to attach himself to the king of Spain, and to cultivate his friendship.

Tuscany.

Octavio Farnese, duke of Parma, had been deprived of the duchy of Placentia by the emperor; and Philibert Emanuel, duke of Savoy, had been stript, in his father's lifetime, both of Savoy and Piedmont, by the French. Without the favor of Philip, neither of these two princes had any prospect of recovering his dominions.

Savoy, Parma, and Placentia.

The republic of Venice, formerly so powerful and ambitious, had, after the league of Cambray, discovered the folly of their ambition; and they now adhered steadfastly to the cautious maxim, of maintaining a strict neutrality in all the quarrels of the European powers; whose friendship, and especially that of Philip, they were solicitous to secure, as the only means by which the invasions of their formidable enemy, the Turkish Sultan, could be repelled.

Venice.

From this view of the European States at the time of Philip's accession, it is evident there was no other counterpoise in Christendom to his power,

Of France.

BOOK

II.

but France : which was not indeed of so great extent as Philip's dominions, but possessed such advantages in its situation, in its people, and in its government, as made it at least the second kingdom in Europe, and qualified it to serve as a rampart of the general liberty, against the power of Spain. Although the frontier of this mighty monarchy did not reach so far as it does at present, yet it extended from the British Channel to the Mediterranean and Italy, and from the Pyrenees to Germany and the Netherlands; and, through all that space, was unmixt with the territories of any other state; lying between Philip's dominions in Spain or Italy, and the Netherlands; and in the time of war, rendering it difficult for his troops in one of these countries, to co-operate with those in the other.

Character
of the
French.

During the reigns of several princes, the French nation had been accustomed almost perpetually to the use of arms, and had never become sufficiently acquainted either with the arts, or with the sweets of peace, to be averse to war. The spirit of chivalry, the heroic valor, and romantic love of military fame, which, whilst the feudal government subsisted, proved the source of so many calamities to the kingdom, still animated in a high degree the French nobility; but having taken a different direction, instead of engaging them in hostilities against one another, it inflamed them with the laudable ambition of courting toil and danger in support of the glory of the nation and the Crown.

Henry the Second, who governed this warlike people, had already shown himself possessed of no inconsiderable share of that ardent and ambitious spirit by which his father was so eminently distinguished. He had not indeed the bold military genius of Francis; but this defect in his character was abundantly supplied by his generals; among whom were the marshal de Brisac, the conqueror of Piedmont; the constable of Montmorency, so much celebrated for his heroic valor, and Francis of Lorraine duke of Guise, who had lately acquired immortal honor by his defence of Metz against the emperor.

B O O K

II.

Henry II.

Henry was formidable, from his connexions with foreign powers, as well as on account of his internal resources. The queen of Scots having been educated at his court, and betrothed to his eldest son, her kingdom was likely to become a province of France. And, in imitation of his father, he had courted assiduously the friendship of the Swiss, and entered into a strict alliance with the Sultan; from the former of whom, he might, in case of a rupture with Spain, receive assistance by land, as he could, from the latter, by sea, on the coasts of Spain and Italy.

His allies.

It appeared almost from the beginning of Henry's reign, that he had thoroughly imbibed his father's passions, his ambition to recover possession of those Italian dominions which had occasioned so many bloody wars, and his jealousy of the Spanish or Austrian power and greatness.

Prompted by these passions, he had, in the year

BOOK one thousand five hundred and fifty - one, taken
 II. Octavio Farnese, duke of Parma, under his protection, in opposition both to the pope and to the emperor. And he had entered into a league against Charles, with the Protestant princes in Germany: than which, he could not have given a stronger demonstration of his jealousy of the emperor; since the principal end of this alliance was, to save from ruin in Germany, that religion, the professors of which he had persecuted in France with unrelenting rigor. The war which was the consequence of this alliance, continued with various success, till a stop was put to it, for a few months, by the truce of Vaucelles above mentioned. By this truce the contending parties were to retain possession of their conquests for five years, unless their respective claims were adjusted before the expiration of that term. This was the principal article; and, in virtue of it, not only Metz and Toul and Verdun, which rendered France secure on the German frontier, but almost the whole of Savoy and Piedmont, (the restoration of which the emperor was in honor bound to procure to the duke of Savoy) were to remain in the hands of the French. Charles would never have consented to this condition, which he had rejected when it was proposed in the preceding year, had he not thought it necessary that his son should enjoy some years of peace. Henry, on the other hand, had the highest reason to be satisfied; yet it was by him the truce was violated. Into this measure, of which he had much reason afterwards to repent, he was drawn, partly by that hereditary ambition, which had

impelled so many of his predecessors to gain a footing in Italy, and partly by the interested counsels of the family of Guise; but chiefly by the solicitations and importunity of the sovereign pontiff.

Paul the Fourth, one of the most singular characters of the age, and whose conduct furnished, at this time, a striking contrast to that of the emperor, had been lately advanced to the papacy; after having passed the greatest part of his life either in the study of the learned languages and scholastic theology, or in the austerities of a cloister. Born of the family of Caraffa in the kingdom of Naples, he had in his youth enjoyed several rich preferments, and been employed as a nuncio in Naples, in Spain, and in England. But having grown tired of this public life, he had relinquished the paths of ambition; resigned his benefices; instituted an order of Monks, and lived, for several years, in strict conformity to the rigid rules which he prescribed them. Paul the Third with difficulty persuaded him to quit his retirement, and accept of the dignity of cardinal: nor would he have been induced to comply with the pope's request, by any other motive, but the hope of contributing towards the extirpation of the Lutheran heresy; against which he had ever shown the most furious and bigoted zeal. He was the oldest cardinal when Marcellus died; and this circumstance had served not a little to promote his election; as it flattered the other competitors with the prospect of seeing, ere long, another vacancy in the papal chair.

But his advanced age had given him neither moderation nor prudence, nor any useful acquaintance

BOOK
II.

with the world. He talked perpetually of the power belonging to the successor of St. Peter, and of his superiority to princes, in terms that might have been suffered in the dark ages of the church, but which, from the revolution men's sentiments had lately undergone, appeared, even to his courtiers themselves, ridiculous and extravagant. In all his demeanour he discovered a degree of haughtiness, that astonished those who observed it; and he began his pontificate at the age of seventy-nine, with an impetuosity and violence seldom to be met with in the ardor of youth².

His Nephews.

He had long held a distinguished character for sanctity of manners, and disinterested zeal for the honor of the Holy see; but having now attained the highest dignity to which he could aspire, and having no longer any reason to disguise his sentiments, he devoted himself, with a blind attachment, to his nephews, and seemed to have no other aim, in the exercise of his pontifical power, than to advance their interests, and assist them in the execution of their ambitious designs. Unfortunately for the peace of Europe, their ambition could not be satisfied with the dignities, which, as supreme pontiff, he had the power of conferring; although he bestowed on count Montorio, his eldest nephew, the dukedom of Palliano, of which he had violently dispossessed Mark Antony Colonna; on the second, the government of Rome, with the county of Bagno, and the title of mar-

² F. Paul. lib. v. Onuphrii Panyinii vita Pauli IV. Thuanus, lib. xv. c. 12. Burnet's Hist. of the Ref. part. ii. b. ii.

quis of Montebello; and had made the youngest a cardinal, and legate of Bologna. But these men aspired at some sovereign or independent establishment, such as had been procured by Leo and Clement, for the Medici; and by Paul the Third, for the family of Farnese. They saw no other means of accomplishing their design, but by dispossessing the emperor and his son of their Italian dominions: and to attempt this, both Paul and his nephews were incited by motives of resentment, as well as interest. The younger Caraffa, formerly a soldier, and one of the knights of Malta, though now a cardinal, having, when he served in the emperor's army in Germany, challenged a Spanish officer to single combat, Charles had put him under arrest; and afterwards, when the pope had conferred on him the priory of St. Jerom in Naples, the emperor's viceroy had prevented him from entering upon the possession of it³.

Paul himself, during his residence as nuncio in Spain, having acquired the esteem of Ferdinand the Catholic, had been admitted by him into the council of state, and had retained his place there after the accession of Charles. But having, on some occasion, spoken with too much freedom in the consistory at Rome, Charles had testified his displeasure with him, by ordering his name to be struck out of the list of counsellors. Not satisfied with this, he had first opposed his being admitted to the archbishopric of Naples, to which Paul the

³ Pallavicini, p. 60. Father Paul, lib. v.

B O O K

II.

Third had presented him, and afterwards, though Charles was persuaded by Julius the Third to consent to his investiture, yet he had molested him in the exercise of his jurisdiction; and had exerted all his influence in the conclave to prevent his advancement to the papal throne⁴.

These injuries made a deep impression on the proud and fiery temper of the pontiff; nor was he solicitous to conceal his indignation. Even in the presence of the cardinals of the Imperial party, he used to inveigh bitterly against the emperor, and to join menaces to his invectives; and would sometimes add, that they might inform their master, if they pleased, of what he said.

Their artifices.

It is probable, however, that he would not have dreamt of having recourse to arms, had not his nephews, and particularly the cardinal, the most ambitious and intriguing, employed various artifices to deceive him. They gave him information of nocturnal assemblies held in Rome, by the partisans of the emperor, in which, measures were concerted prejudicial to his authority; they informed him of a detection which they had made, of persons hired by the emperor, to poison, or assassinate both him and them; and they carried him intercepted letters writ in cipher, from which, according to the cardinal's interpretation, it appeared, that some secret machinations were in agitation against him among the Imperial ministers.

⁴ Summonte, lib. x. p. 269. Pallavicini, lib. xiii. c. 14. F. Paul, lib. v.

By these and other means of the same nature, they at once roused his fears, and inflamed his resentment; and he at length resolved, in conformity with their advice, to endeavour to engage the French king, whose war with the emperor still subsisted, to enter into a treaty of alliance with him against the common enemy.

Having, with this view, called such of his courtiers as he confided in, to a secret conference, at which he desired the French ambassador, Avanson, to be present; he informed them of the several plots against him and his nephews, which had fortunately been detected, and lamented that, notwithstanding it had pleased God to appoint him to be the common father of Christians, yet his children, by conspiring to accomplish his destruction, had reduced him to the painful necessity of taking arms against them, in order to maintain that sacred dignity with which he was invested. And he concluded with saying, that his hopes of deliverance from the dangers which threatened him and the church, were founded principally on the power and zeal of his most Christian Majesty.

Avanson replied to this discourse, by assuring him that the king and kingdom of France would be ready to devote themselves to the defence of his sacred person, and the Apostolic See; and Paul dismissed the assembly, after observing that he hoped ere long to see *one* of the king's sons in possession of Naples, and another, of the dutchy of Milan.

Caraffa the cardinal, impatient of delay, im-

BOOK
II.

mediately set on foot a treaty between his uncle and Avanson; and having, without much difficulty, brought it to a conclusion, he transmitted it to the court of France⁵.

The most important articles were these, That the king of France should take upon himself the protection of the pope, and all the family of Caraffa: that the pope should furnish an army of 10,000 men; and the king the same, or a greater number, if necessary, to co-operate with the ecclesiastical forces, in restoring liberty to Tuscany, and in expelling the Imperialists and Spaniards from the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily. And that, in case their arms should be attended with success, the pope should immediately grant the investiture of these kingdoms to a younger son of the French monarch; reserving for the Ecclesiastical State, the city of Benevento, with its territory, and an annual tribute of 20,000 crowns; besides an independent establishment, in the kingdom of Naples, of 25,000 crowns, for the count Montorio; and another of 15,000 for Antonio de Caraffa⁶.

This treaty met with such a reception at the court of France, as Avanson had given reason to expect. Henry was allured by the prospect which it opened to him of acquiring those Italian domini-

⁵ From this treaty it is evident, that however solicitous Paul was to advance the ambitious and interested views of his nephews, he was not entirely under their direction, nor altogether regardless of the interest of the Holy See. Pallavicini, lib. xiii. c. 15.

⁶ Summonte, lib. x. p. 278.

ons, for which his predecessors had so often contended; and was of himself strongly inclined to comply with the pope's proposals. The constable Montmorency, ever bold, and often rash in action, but in counsel provident, circumspect, and cautious, employed several cogent arguments to dissuade him; and was warmly seconded by the cardinal of Tournon.

They observed, that, as the emperor was about to resign his dominions, it was highly probable, that either a peace, or a truce with Spain, might soon be established; they represented how pernicious all those enterprises in Italy had been, which Henry's ancestors had undertaken, in circumstances much more favorable than the present, when the nation was exhausted by a long succession of expensive wars. And they endeavoured to convince him of the imprudence of unnecessarily prolonging war with a prince possessed of so many resources as the emperor, depending on the feeble aid of a pope, at the age of eighty; after whose death, those very forces on which he now relied, might probably be ranged on the side of the enemy.

Henry, who had been long accustomed to pay the highest deference to the constable's opinion, would have yielded to these arguments, had they not been warmly opposed by the duke of Guise, and his brother the cardinal of Lorraine; who flattered the king's ambition, and thereby obtained an easy victory on this occasion over their rival. Whether there was ground for the suspicions which were entertained, that Guise had

BOOK
II.

formed a design on the kingdom of Naples, and the cardinal on the papal throne, it is impossible to decide; but, from the interested and ambitious characters of these men, there is reason to believe, that neither a regard to the welfare of France, nor the glory of the king, determined them to offer the counsel which they gave. They knew that the management of the war, and the conduct of all the negociations relative to it, would be put into their hands; and they hoped, if the event were prosperous, to enjoy in Italy, a more independent authority than they could expect to exercise in France, where they must submit to perpetual control from the presence of the king, or from their rivals in the court.

“ So fair an opportunity, said the cardinal, of recovering those dominions in Italy, which the crown of Spain has usurped, ought not to be neglected. It was from the sovereign pontiff, that the French monarchs had originally received their title to the Neapolitan kingdom; and it would not be difficult for the king to assert his claim with the assistance of the present pope, whose family would, by their credit and influence, engage the friends of France to stand forth in defence of a cause which their ancestors had so strenuously supported. And with regard to what had been said of peace with the emperor, as the prospect of peace was extremely precarious, so it was not to be supposed, that any benefit that would accrue from it, could be put in the balance with that

accession of glory, which the king, and the French nation, would derive from the proposed alliance."

This specious, but flimsy declamation, produced the desired effect on the improvident temper of the king. The cardinal of Lorrain, agreeably to his expectations, was immediately ordered to repair to Rome; and the cardinal of Tournon, though extremely averse from the measure adopted, was required to accompany him. Not long afterwards, the treaty was concluded in form, and both parties began secretly to prepare for putting it in execution.

But Henry soon forgot the obligations which he had brought himself under in this treaty; and, in less than two months after it was signed, agreed to the truce of Vaucelles. The cardinal of Lorrain was at that time in Italy; and the constable, taking advantage of his absence, represented to the king in so strong a light, the benefit which would arise from the truce, as overcame the resolution of that unsteady prince, and persuaded him to abandon those alluring prospects with which he had been dazzled and deceived. The cardinal, after his last audience of the pope, was about to set out from Rome, in order to solicit the duke of Ferrara and the republic of Venice to accede to the alliance; when intelligence was brought him from the court of France, that, in a conference held at Vaucelles for an exchange of prisoners, a truce, with the condition of leaving both parties in possession of their conquests, had been proposed by the Imperialists. But he thought it so exceedingly improbable that either the em-

Truce of
Vaucelles,
Dec. 15,
1555.

BOOK

II.

peror or Philip would consent to this condition, that he still persisted in his journey, and left his information with the cardinal of Tournon, to be communicated to the pope. It made no greater impression on Paul, than on the cardinal of Lorraine. He endeavoured to make Tournon believe, that such a truce would give him pleasure; but it was an event, he said, to be desired, rather than to be hoped for, or expected.

Consternation of Paul.

Not many days after, he received certain intelligence from his nuncio at the court of France, that this event, which he thought so exceedingly improbable, had taken place; that the truce was actually signed, and that Henry, as well as the emperor and his son, had sworn to observe it; the first at Blois, in the presence of the count de Lalain, and the two last before the admiral de Coligni at Brussels. The news of this transaction excited in Paul and his nephews the most alarming apprehensions. They were conscious of having given the emperor and Philip the justest ground of offence. They could not suppose that their conduct had been entirely secret, and they were now exposed to the resentment of enemies, by whom they must be quickly overwhelmed².

His dissimulation.

In order to elude that vengeance which they justly merited, Paul affected to rejoice, as became the father of the Christian church, at seeing an end put to the calamities of war. Under this mask he concealed his intention for some time,

² Pallavicini, lib. xiii. c. 16.

and that he might conceal it still longer, and more effectually, he sent two nuncios, a cardinal of the name of Rebiba, to the emperor and Philip; and his nephew cardinal Caraffa, to the king of France. He gave the same public instructions to both, and ordered them to make an offer to these princes of his mediation for establishing a solid peace on the foundation of the truce; and to treat with them of the measures proper to be taken for assembling a general council. But the real design of Caraffa's embassy was, to persuade Henry to fulfil the conditions of that alliance with the pope, into which he had entered some months before^{*}.

Rebiba was purposely detained in Rome for several weeks; but Caraffa, having carried along with him marechal Strozzi, a kinsman of the queen of France, proceeded in his journey to Paris with the utmost expedition. He possessed, in an eminent degree, the art and eloquence necessary for executing the difficult negociation which he had undertaken. And it was not without good reason, that the pontiff, when he reflected on his nephew's talents, still flattered himself with hopes of success.

Upon his arrival at Fontainebleau, Caraffa found the courtiers divided, as formerly, with regard to the subject of this embassy. When Henry first entered into alliance with the pope, the constable was suspected of having too faintly opposed it; not from any doubt which he entertained of its inexpe-

His nephew
persuades
Henry to
violate the
truce.

^{*} Pallavicini, lib. xiii. c. 16.

BOOK
II.

diency, but, either from the faithless complaisance of a courtier to the inclinations of the king ; or from a desire to have his rivals of the family of Guise removed to a distance from the court. But whatever ground there was for this suspicion , it is certain that Montmorency had been the chief promoter of the truce of Vaucelles ; and that he now showed himself extremely averse to that shameful violation of it, which Caraffa had come to solicit.

The duke of Guise, on the other hand, and his brother the cardinal, were still as much bent on the Italian war as ever ; and made no more scruple to exhort their master to undertake it, after he had sworn to observe the truce with the emperor, than they had done formerly, when he was at liberty, consistently with his honor, either to embrace or reject it.

Between the opposite counsels which were given him, the unstable mind of Henry remained for several days in suspense. Elated with the success which had hitherto attended his arms, and inflamed with the ambition of acquiring the Neapolitan kingdom, he was inclined to a renewal of the war, and withheld his consent from it, only out of respect for his oath, and his deference to the opinion of the constable. At length Caraffa having gained over the queen, through the influence of Strozzi ; and the Guises having employed the still more powerful intercession of the dutchess of Valentinois⁹, Henry began to yield to the importunity of such powerful

⁹ The famous Diana of Poitiers, Henry's mistress.

solicitors, and admitted Caraffa to a private audience, which he had requested, in the hopes of completing that victory over the constable's remonstrances, and the king's remaining scruples, which his associates had begun. On this occasion, having, with the usual ceremony, presented to the king, a consecrated sword, he remonstrated to him, at great length, on the breach of his engagements with the pontiff; and when he found that Henry was not offended with this freedom, he next addressed himself to his ambition, and represented, that a more favorable juncture than the present could not be desired for attempting to expel the Spaniards from Italy. That the reins of government were now abandoned by the emperor, and committed to his son; who, besides his inexperience, was extremely unacceptable to the Italian states and princes, and was not yet firmly established on his throne. That his exchequer was drained by those expensive wars in which the emperor had been almost continually engaged; and his armies were neither so numerous nor so flourishing as at any former period since the commencement of his father's reign. While, on the other hand, the French army would have easy access to Naples, through the territories of the pope; and would thence likewise be furnished, both with fresh troops, and with abundant supplies of ammunition and provisions.

Henry found it difficult any longer to withhold his consent. But there were two points on which he required still farther satisfaction, than either Caraffa's arguments or promises had given him. He

B O O K

II.

could not entirely divest himself of the scruples which arose from his oath; and nothing offered by Caraffa had taken off the force of the constable's objection against entering into engagements with a pope in the extremity of old age, who, it was likely, would die before the end of the proposed alliance could be accomplished. Caraffa had foreseen both these difficulties, and was prepared to remove them. He produced from Paul a power to absolve Henry from the obligation of his oath; he engaged that such a number of cardinals, partisans of France, and enemies to Spain, should be nominated at the next promotion, as would secure to Henry the absolute disposal of the papacy, in the event of the pontiff's death; and, for his further security, he promised, in all events, that Bologna, Ancona, Paliano, Civita-Vecchia, and even the castle of St. Angelo, should be put into his possession.

The war was now resolved upon without further hesitation. Caraffa immediately dispatched a messenger to Rebiba, who, according to his instructions, was advancing by slow journeys towards Brussels, to inform him of what had passed, and to desire him to return to Rome. Henry received absolution in form from the obligation of that sacred law of nature which enjoins the observance of an oath; and, at the same time, he received a dispensation from a law of nations, considered as no less sacred, by which it was held to be unchristian and barbarous to begin hostilities without a previous declaration of war ¹⁰.

¹⁰ Thuanus, lib. xvii. c. 7. Father Paul, lib. v. Pallavicini, lib. xiii. c. 10. p. 71.

As he flattered himself that his transaction with Caraffa might be for some time concealed, he was determined, if possible, to attack the emperor and Philip, while, trusting to the truce, they were off their guard. And thus did this monarch, who was not less virtuous than most of his contemporary princes, deliberately resolve to add treachery to the perjury and falsehood into which he had been betrayed; under a persuasion that his conduct was not only justifiable, but even honorable, and meritorious in the sight of God and man. Such is the fascinating power of false religion; and so pernicious to society that impious pretension to the power of annulling the sacred obligations of morality, which was claimed by the Roman pontiffs, and which, through the ignorance of their votaries, they were permitted for many ages to enjoy.

Caraffa had endeavoured to conceal his negotiation at the court of France, under the pretext of treating with the king about the establishment of peace, and the calling of a general council. But the emperor and Philip were too well acquainted with his character, to be so easily deceived. They had penetrated into the real intention of the embassy, and had for some time kept a watchful eye over all the motions both of Henry and the pope.

The conduct of Paul was extremely ill-calculated to elude the penetration of the Spanish ministers. Besides excommunicating the family of Colonna, and depriving them of their territories, he had treated with much severity and injustice all those whom he suspected of being attached to the Spanish inter-

The violence
of Paul.

B O O K
II.

est; and had received, in the most gracious manner, some Neapolitan exiles, who had fled to Rome. Some of his letters having been intercepted, he had put to the torture Antonio de Tassis postmaster at Rome, though a Spanish subject; and, in violation of a privilege long enjoyed by the kings of Spain, had given his office to another. He had put under arrest De la Vega, Philip's ambassador at Rome; and, with no small degree of vanity, set on foot a trial in the consistory, against Philip himself, on pretence that, as his liege-lord, he had a right to deprive him of the kingdom of Naples, on account of his having failed in the payment of 700 ducats, which he alledged was an annual tribute due from the possessor of that kingdom to the Holy See¹¹.

While Paul gave these impotent proofs of his resentment, his nephews were making diligent preparation for the approaching war. They were employed assiduously in repairing the fortifications of Rome, Paliano, and other places. And, having levied a considerable number of troops, they engaged Camillo Orfini, one of the ablest generals of the age, to command them.

The duke
of Alva.

The administration of Philip's affairs in Italy was at this time in the hands of Ferdinand de Toledo duke of Alva; a singular and distinguished personage in Philip's reign, whom there will be frequent occasion to mention in the sequel. He was arro-

¹¹ Gianone, lib. xxxiii. c. 1. The duke of Alva's letter in Summonte, tom. iv. p. 270. Clement VII. had renounced this claim.

gant, vain, and proud ; violent, inflexible, and relentless ; but patient, prudent, and sagacious ; inured from his youth to arms, and possessed of consummate skill in the art of war. He had been intrusted with the supreme command of the emperor's forces in Germany ; and, though unsuccessful in the siege of Metz, had discovered uncommon vigor and abilities. He did not, however, enjoy the same degree of credit with the father, which he afterwards attained under the son ; whom he nearly resembled in his character, and whose favor he had courted with great assiduity and success. Through the influence of Ruy Gomez de Silva, Philip's principal favorite, who beheld with a jealous eye Alva's growing favor with the king, and was desirous, on that account, to have him removed to a distance from the helm of government, he had, about a year before, been appointed viceroy of Naples, as well as governor of Milan, and commander in chief of all the Spanish forces in Italy.

Philip had been fully informed by Alva, of the pope's conduct with regard to him ; and even before he knew of his alliance with Henry, he could not entertain any doubt of his intentions. Had he permitted Alva to act with vigor, and to improve the advantage over Paul, which his defenceless situation afforded him, he might have got possession of all his fortified places, have deterred Henry from entering into any new connexion with him, and have thereby prevented the renewal of the war. But being convinced that Henry would never

BOOK

II.

violate the truce of Vaucelles, by which he was so great a gainer; and knowing that the pontiff could do nothing without the assistance of the French, he gave orders to Alva, to use every art of persuasion, before he should have recourse to arms. Alva, though naturally averse to all mild expedients, complied with his instructions; and, by letters and messengers, complained, remonstrated, and even soothed and flattered both Paul and his nephews. All his endeavours, however, were ineffectual. They still continued their preparations; and gave him sometimes haughty, and always unsatisfactory replies. At length the duke of Alva sent Pirro de Loffredo, with one letter to the college of cardinals, and another to Paul¹²; in which, after enumerating the various injuries which his master had received, and renewing his former offers of peace and friendship, he concluded with protesting, that if his offers were again rejected, the pope should be chargeable with all the calamities that might follow. Before the arrival of Loffredo, Paul had received intelligence from France of the success of the cardinal's negociation; and the duke of Alva's letter served only to precipitate him into new extravagances. He threw Loffredo into prison, and would even have put him to death, had not the college of cardinals interposed¹³. He then gave orders to Aldobrandin, the consistorial advocate, to finish the process which he had begun against Philip, on account of his

¹² The original letters are preserved by Summonte, lib. x. and dated August 21, 1556.

¹³ Summonte, lib. x. p. 277. Gianone, lib. xxxiii. c. 1.

failure in paying tribute for Naples; and, after hearing the cause pleaded, he passed sentence, depriving him of the sovereignty of that kingdom¹⁴.

This violent conduct of Paul gave great offence throughout Europe, and, in Italy, served rather to obstruct, than to promote his designs. The Venetians refused to accede to his alliance; and the Neapolitans, perceiving what the ambition of his nephews aimed at, with respect to them, entered warmly into all the prudent measures which the duke of Alva planned for their defence.

But Philip was not so much affected by Paul's extravagant behaviour, as might have been expected from a young, ambitious, powerful monarch, of a temper of mind impatient of injuries and affronts. Notwithstanding the contumelious treatment which he had received, he still continued irresolute, and discovered an amazing reluctance against proceeding to extremities.

Philip's
scruples.

Some historians affirm, that he had early imbibed, from the Spanish ecclesiastics, who had the care of his education, the highest veneration for the Holy See; and entertained some scruples as to the lawfulness of employing force against the sovereign pontiff. Others assert, that these scruples were mere grimace and affectation. He had already formed the plan of subjecting Europe to his dominion; and zeal for the Catholic faith was both

¹⁴ Gianone adds, that he was dissuaded from publishing it by Camerario of Benevento, the great Civilian, a Neapolitan exile.

B O O K the pretext and the instrument which he had re-
 11. solved to employ for accomplishing his design.

Neither of these accounts ought to be entirely rejected; and neither of them ought to be admitted as satisfactory. On the one hand, it is impossible to doubt that ambition, and not religion, was the ruling principle of Philip's conduct; and on the other, when we reflect on the pains which were taken, from his earliest infancy, to inspire him with an attachment to the popish faith, and consider how serious and zealous he ever appeared in the profession and support of it; it will be impossible to suppose, that in religious matters, he was entirely hypocritical. It is improbable that any person could act so uniform a part as Philip did, without feeling, in a considerable degree, the power of that motive which he held forth to the world as the principle of his conduct. Nor does it afford the smallest presumption against this supposition, that his conduct was, on many occasions, inconsistent with religious sincerity. His religion was not surely pure and genuine. It was neither the religion of nature, nor that of Christ, but was the barbarous superstition of the church of Rome, which, in the age of Philip, instead of deterring men from vice, tended to encourage them in the practice of it, by inculcating upon them the highest reverence for an order of priests, supposed to be invested with the power of absolving from the guilt and punishment of the most enormous crimes. To Philip's superstitious veneration for the Holy See, therefore, may be ascribed, in part, both his moderation in the present juncture, and a resolution which
 he

he formed, to consult the most distinguished divines, with regard to the lawfulness of waging war against an enemy whose person he deemed so sacred and inviolable.

Those men knew well what counsel was suited to his present circumstances; and they declared, that, although it behoved him to begin with supplicating his Holiness, as the universal father of the church, yet, if his entreaties were rejected, the law of nature would permit him to defend his territories, and to vindicate his right by force of arms¹⁵.

By this answer, Philip's religious scruples were removed. Still, however, he lamented the necessity he lay under, of beginning his reign with hostilities, against a power, with which, more than with any other, he was desirous of cultivating peace and friendship. But at last, after having lost a great deal of time in negotiating, he sent orders to the duke of Alva to take the field.

Alva's military operations.

That general, having some time before gone from the dutchy of Milan to the kingdom of Naples, and fixed his head-quarters near the confines of the Ecclesiastical State, began his march in the beginning of September one thousand five hundred and fifty-six, with a well-disciplined army; which, though small in number, was superior to that which the pontiff had provided to oppose it. In a few weeks Alva reduced several towns in the Campagna di Roma; and took possession of them in the name of the sacred college, and of the

1556.

¹⁵ Ferreras, vol. ix. p. 373.

B O O K

II.

1556.

future pope. The people of Rome were thrown into consternation by his approach ; and many families left the city, in order to avoid the calamities of a siege. Paul still retained all his wonted haughtiness, and poured out threats and anathemas against the enemy.

He grants a
truce.

But the duke of Alva still continued to advance till his troops could make incursions almost to the gates of Rome. In this situation cardinal Caraffa found his uncle's affairs upon his return from France. The army which he had obtained from Henry, had already reached Piedmont ; but, being detained there by the rigor of the winter, could not arrive in time to save Rome from falling into the hands of the Spaniards. In order to prevent this, Caraffa prevailed on Paul, who, from pride, and ignorance of his danger, was extremely reluctant to apply for a cessation of arms ; and Alva, at the request of his uncle, the cardinal of St. James, consented to a conference with Caraffa, in the isle of Fiumicino. He could not be ignorant, that this crafty Italian's intention was only to amuse him till the French army should approach. But an interval of repose was no less expedient for himself, than for the enemy. His army was greatly diminished by putting garrisons into the conquered towns. His ships with provisions had been long detained by contrary winds ; and his presence was necessary in Naples, to hasten his levies, and put the kingdom into a posture of defence before the arrival of the duke of Guise. Influenced by these considerations, Alva, readily consented to a truce of forty days ; and, immediately

after concluding it, he set out for Naples, where he exerted himself, with great assiduity, in completing his preparations for the next campaign.

B O O K

II.

1557.

The duke of Guise had now passed the Alps, with twelve thousand foot, and near two thousand horse, and had advanced as far as Rheggio. There he was met by the duke of Ferrara, who, having acceded to the alliance between the pope and Henry, had brought along with him near seven thousand men. Guise deliberated for some time whether he should begin his operations with laying siege to Cremona, Milan, and other towns in the north of Italy; or, leaving these behind him in the hands of the enemy, should march directly towards Naples. He had been earnestly exhorted by marechal de Brissac, whom he saw in Piedmont, to embrace the former of these measures, as being the safest and most practicable; and in this opinion the duke of Ferrara concurred; but Guise had received positive orders from the king, to be directed in this matter by the pope, who insisted that he should advance without delay towards Naples. In compliance, therefore, with his instructions, he pursued his march southward till he reached the frontiers of that part of the kingdom which is called the Abruzzo. At his arrival in Rome, he was received in triumph, as if he had been already crowned with victory. But he soon found that he had been cruelly deceived by Caraffa, with regard to the assistance which that prelate had so confidently promised him in the name of the pontiff; who had not been able either to raise the troops which he had stipulated, or to furnish his

B O O K
 II.
 1557. magazines with an adequate quantity of military stores. Guise was extremely mortified at his present disagreeable situation, and saw that he was likely to meet with nothing but disgrace and shame, where he had flattered himself with the hopes of adding to his former glory. He laid siege, however, to Civitella, and carried on his operations against it, for more than three weeks, with his wonted spirit and intrepidity. After having made a breach in the wall, he attempted to take the place by storm. But his troops were repulsed with great loss by the garrison, who were bravely seconded by the inhabitants. Even the women discovered, on this occasion, the most undaunted resolution, and seemed determined to lay down their lives, rather than submit to the dominion of the French; whose insolent use of victory, in former Italian expeditions, was not yet, after many years, obliterated from their minds.

He lays siege
 to Civitella.

The duke of Alva had resolved, with his usual caution, to act on the defensive; and to fortify his camp on the south side of the river Pescara, which lay between him and the enemy. But when he found that their enterprise against Civitella detained them so long, he concluded that the accounts which he had received of their strength must have been exaggerated; and therefore he crossed the river, and advanced towards them.

But is obliged
 to raise it.

Guise was extremely unwilling to quit the siege; but, having received certain intelligence that the enemy's army was superior to his own, he listened to the advice of marechal Strozzi, and retired into

the ecclesiastical territories. Alva followed him: but neither he nor Guise seem to have wished for a general engagement. The former could not have ventured on it with any probability of success; and the latter thought it absurd to risk a kingdom without necessity on the chance of a battle¹⁶.

Whilst these things passed in the Abruzzo, Mark Antony Colonna made rapid progress in the neighbourhood of Rome, where he reduced several forts and towns, and obtained a victory over the pope's forces, commanded by Julio Orsini and the marquis of Montebello.

By these disasters, Paul was overwhelmed with terror. And when he was lamenting in the confistory, the calamities in which his dominions were involved, he expressed his dread, that ere long the Vatican itself would be in the hands of the enemy. He added, that he longed now to be with Christ; and as if he had engaged in the present war from zeal for the faith, and not from ambition and resentment, he concluded with saying, that he would wait for his crown of martyrdom without dismay.

He was willing, however, to preserve his earthly crown as long as possible; and had sent to the duke of Guise, entreating him to hasten towards Rome for his defence. This general was now on his march thither; full of vexation and chagrin on account of the inglorious part which he had acted. He called upon cardinal Caraffa to fulfil his promises; and he

¹⁶ Haræus says, that Guise labored to force Alva to engage; but this does not appear from the detail in Thuanus.

B O O K
II.
1557.

employed all his interest to procure supplies from the court of France. But the pope's resources were already exhausted; and the French monarch had more than sufficient employment at home for all the troops which he had reserved, after providing for his Italian expedition.

The war in
France.

Philip had, for the reasons above mentioned, entered into the war with reluctance; but having, in the origin of it, received the highest provocation from Henry, as well as from the pope, and knowing that, in the beginning of his reign, the eyes of all Europe would be fixed upon his conduct, he had resolved to exert his utmost vigor, and to attack Henry, in that quarter, where he could most successfully annoy him.

With extraordinary industry and dispatch, he assembled a numerous army in the neighbourhood of Charlemont, under the command of Philibert Emanuel duke of Savoy. And Emanuel cheerfully undertook the charge committed to him, as it gave him at once an opportunity of displaying his great abilities, and of taking vengeance on the French king, by whom he had been expelled from his dominions. Of the army which was collected, only a small part consisted of Spaniards; the greatest part were either Dutch, and Flemings, or Germans. In levying them, Philip was much indebted to the zeal and alacrity with which his subjects in the Netherlands espoused his cause. For the States, notwithstanding the prejudice to their commerce, which they foresaw must arise from the war, granted, with unusual liberality, all the supplies which he demanded.

But while in this they gave proof of their loyalty, they discovered, by another part of their conduct, their jealousy and discontent. They reserved in their own hands the administration of the money which they voted him; and appointed commissioners to apply it to the payment of the troops. This action, which proceeded from their jealousy of the Spaniards, made a deep impression on the dark resentful mind of Philip; it contributed to alienate his affections from his Flemish subjects; and gave him an inveterate prejudice against that free constitution of their government, by which they were thus enabled to limit his authority. But he was sensible how improper it would have been, in the present conjuncture, to discover his resentment, or to dispute their privileges. He agreed to accept of their supplies, with the condition annexed to the grant of them; and proceeded to complete his preparations.

B O O K

II.

1557.

Not satisfied with the army which he had drawn together from Germany and the Netherlands, augmented by a reinforcement sent from Spain, he resolved, if possible, to persuade the English to enter into the war. With this view he went over to England. He found the privy-counsellors, the queen herself, and the whole body of the people, averse to his design. It has almost never happened, either before or since that period, that war with the French was not agreeable to the English. During many centuries they had been accustomed to consider their French neighbours as enemies and rivals, with whom they often showed an eagerness to contend, when it was greatly their interest to remain at

Philip engages England in the war.

See and
of St.

Aug 5.

B O O K

II.

1557.

peace. But their enmity towards the French yielded at this time to their jealousy of the Spaniards; and they entertained the most irreconcilable aversion to the proposed alliance. Mary, as just now hinted, was not of herself inclined to the war, but notwithstanding this, and the cold indifference with which Philip had ever treated her, she was unable to resist his solicitation¹⁷.

Her kinsman cardinal Pole, and her other counsellors, represented, that it was a chief article of her marriage-treaty, that the alliance with France should be preserved inviolate; that the violation of it would excite an universal alarm with regard to the observance of the other articles, and that the present state of her finances would render it impossible for her, if she should enter into the war, to acquit herself with honor. But Philip having said, that if he were not gratified in his request, he would leave England, and never return to it; Mary was deaf to every argument that could be employed to dissuade her from her purpose; and, without further hesitation, she ordered war to be declared in the city of Rheims, with the usual ceremony, on pretences which were either entirely false, or extremely frivolous. As she knew it would be in vain to apply to her parliament for assistance in carrying on a war so disagreeable to the nation, she had recourse to the oppressive expedient of extorting loans from individuals and corporations. By this,

¹⁷ Van Meteren, Thuanus, lib. xix. c. 7. Camden's Apparatus.

and other means of the same nature, she equipped a considerable fleet, and raised an army of eight thousand men; of which she gave the command to the earl of Pembroke.

B O O K

II.

1557.

When this reinforcement had joined the duke of Savoy, his cavalry amounted to twelve thousand, and his infantry to between forty and fifty thousand; an army much superior to any which Henry could muster to oppose it. This inconsiderate monarch had not expected that Philip would have been able to make so great an effort, and saw now the folly of his late engagements with the pope. He was not wanting, however, either in prudence or activity, in repairing his fault, and providing for the security of his kingdom. He committed the chief command of the forces to the constable, whom, notwithstanding his averseness to the war, he chose to employ, as the ablest of all his generals, to conduct it; and a great number of the principal nobility and gentry flocked to the camp, eager to display that zeal and bravery, which the French nation have often exhibited in defence of their king and country.

The constable could not for some time conjecture on which side the duke of Savoy intended to turn his arms. His first movements were calculated to beget a persuasion, that he designed to enter France by the way of Champaign; but no sooner had he drawn the French army to that quarter, than, changing his route, he marched into Picardy, and laid siege to St. Quentin.

The siege and
battle of St.
Quentin.

This town must quickly have surrendered to so

August.

BOOK

II.

1557.

Admiral
Coligni.

great a force, had it not been defended by the celebrated Jasper de Coligni, admiral of France, who made, on this occasion, a conspicuous display of those extraordinary talents which rendered him afterwards one of the most illustrious personages of the age. Being governor of the province in which the place lay, he thought it his duty to exert himself to the utmost for its preservation; and he forced his way into it, through the midst of the surrounding army, with a body of troops, which he animated to expose themselves to every hazard of war in its defence. Immediately after his arrival, he expelled the Spaniards from the suburbs, and set fire to the houses. But he soon perceived, that, by reason of the neglected state of the fortifications, the garrison was still too weak; and that, without a reinforcement, it would be impossible to hold out long against so numerous an enemy. Of this he gave immediate intelligence to the constable his uncle, and at the same time informed him where it would be easiest to introduce the succour which he requested. The constable, anxious for his nephew's safety, and sensible how necessary it was for the preservation of the kingdom that the duke of Savoy should be detained before St. Quentin, appointed d'Andelot the admiral's brother, to the command of a select body of two thousand foot, destined for the relief of the besieged. A person of the name of Valpergue, well acquainted with the face of the country, had been sent by the admiral, to serve as a guide to this reinforcement. But whether he mistook his way, or the duke of Savoy

had got intelligence of the design, is uncertain. B O O K
 D'Andelot found the enemy prepared to receive II.
 him, and was so vigorously attacked, that he 1557.
 escaped with difficulty, after the greatest part of
 his troops had been cut to pieces.

By this disaster the besieged were extremely
 dejected, and the admiral had much occasion to
 exert all the address and eloquence which he pos-
 sessed, to prevent them from abandoning themselves
 to despair. From a high tower in the town he could
 view the country round, and saw that the place
 was completely invested on every side but one,
 where there was a marsh or lake, too deep in some
 places to be passed on foot, and in others too shallow
 to admit of boats. Through this marsh, however,
 he hoped that his friends might introduce a rein-
 forcement. Having concerted with the constable
 the time and manner of putting his design in
 execution, he threw up the earth in a part of the
 marsh, and reduced the water into a canal large
 enough to receive some small boats which he had
 prepared. When this was done, the constable ad-
 vanced toward the lake with all his forces, and
 gave d'Andelot an opportunity of entering the
 town, with between four and five hundred men¹⁸.
 But, in making his approach, the constable had
 led his army through some narrow defiles, which
 he must repass before he could put his troops in
 safety. His misconduct, in thus exposing his army
 to so great a risk in fight of an enemy so much
 superior, was quickly perceived by the duke of

¹⁸ Laboureur additions, &c. p. 375.

B O O K

II.

1557.

Savoy; and a council of war was immediately called to consider of the measures proper to be pursued. Many of the officers thought that the constable should be suffered to retire; but count Egmont, general of the horse, whom Philip afterwards used so ungratefully, maintained with warmth¹⁹, that it was practicable to attack him in his retreat with the highest probability of success. The duke of Savoy approved of the plan of attack which the count proposed, and committed the execution of it to himself. No time was lost. Egmont advanced instantly at the head of the cavalry, while the duke hastened forward with the infantry to support him; and finding the enemy unprepared for their defence, he soon threw them into disorder. The constable exerted himself strenuously to retrieve his error; but count Egmont, seconded by the infantry, with the general at their head, advanced with such impetuosity, that the constable found it impossible to recover his troops from the confusion into which they had been thrown. Perceiving that the fortune of the battle was irretrievable, and stung with the consciousness of the imprudence of which he had been guilty, he rushed into the midst of the enemy, and seemed determined not to survive the reproach in which his rashness had involved him. He was dangerously wounded, and would have fallen in the field, as he desired; but, being personally known to some

¹⁹ Auctore, consuasore, & prope dicam, perfectore Egmondensi. L. Guicciardini, p. 150. lib. iii.

Flemish officers, he was by them rescued from the soldiers and taken prisoner. His army was entirely broken. Three thousand men were killed on the spot, and four thousand taken prisoners; among whom, besides the constable and his two sons, there were many persons of distinction, and several of the first nobility in France. On the side of the victors only eighty men were killed; a certain proof that the attack had been conducted with no less prudence than intrepidity.

Philip, although a slave to the lust of power, yet unambitious of military glory, remained at Cambray till intelligence was brought him of the victory. He then entered the camp with great pomp, and when the duke of Savoy and count Egmont approached him, he received them in the most gracious manner, and expressed his gratitude for the important service they had performed, with a degree of sensibility and joy which he was seldom accustomed to discover²⁰. His conduct on this occasion was in another respect more agreeable to his character. In memory of the battle, he vowed to consecrate a palace, a church, and monastery, to St. Laurence, because it was on the anniversary of that saint that he had obtained the victory. He afterwards religiously fulfilled his vow by building the Escorial; for which he reserved immense sums, notwithstanding the difficulties in which, through his expensive wars, he was almost continually involved.

B O O K

II.

1557.

The French
defeated.

²⁰ Cabrera, lib. iv. c. 7.

B O O K

II.

1557.

Surrender of
St. Quentin.

The battle of St. Quentin might have been attended with the most important consequences, if Philip had complied with the advice of some of his general officers, who exhorted him to lead his army without delay into the heart of France. But this measure was too bold to be relished by a prince like Philip, whose caution often bordered on timidity. He gave orders to proceed in the siege of St. Quentin; saying, that it would be dangerous to leave so strong a place behind him in the hands of the enemy, and that every army that ventured to penetrate into a powerful kingdom, like that of France, ought first to secure their retreat. His officers were the more easily reconciled to these orders, as they believed it impossible for the besieged to hold out above a few days longer. But they were disappointed in their expectations by the skill and intrepidity of the admiral; who, in order to save his country and retard the progress of the Spanish arms, had resolved to bury himself in the ruins of the place, rather than agree to a surrender. He inspired the garrison with the same generous resolution; and though the fortifications were weak and ruinous, he withstood all the vigorous and skilful efforts of the duke of Savoy till the seventeenth day after the renewal of the siege, when the town was assaulted in eleven different places at one time, and both the admiral and his brother, after a brave and obstinate defence, were taken prisoners on the breach. During the assault, Philip showed himself to his troops in complete armour; and this was the only time in his life in which he was ever

seen in a military dress. He allowed his army to plunder the town, as a reward of their labors; but gave strict orders to preserve the churches and the relics of the tutelary saint.

B O O K

II.

1557.

In the mean time Henry's ministers, who had been overwhelmed with consternation, employed to the best advantage the leisure which the admiral's heroic bravery afforded them. They levied forces in every quarter of the kingdom, gathered together the remains of the vanquished army, sent for the troops which served in Piedmont under the marshal de Brissac, and recalled the duke of Guise. In a few weeks the whole eastern frontier was in a posture of defence, and an army collected in Picardy under the duke of Nevers, able to make head against the enemy. Philip perceived then that he had suffered the only opportunity to escape which he would probably ever have, of penetrating into France and seizing the capital unprepared. He was now under a necessity of being satisfied with employing his troops in enterprises of less splendor and importance; and the only fruit of his victory at St. Quentin was, the taking of the inconsiderable towns of Catelet, Ham, and Noyon; after which, he dismissed a great part of his army, sent home his English forces, and retired himself to Brussels²¹.

The recalling of the duke of Guise from Italy rendered it necessary for the pope, though exceedingly reluctant, to apply for peace; to which Philip

Peace concluded between Philip and the Pope.

²¹ Thuanus says, that the English and Spaniards quarrelled after the battle, and that this was the reason why Philip so hastily broke up his camp. Lib. xix. p. 660.

B O O K

11.

1557.

readily consented upon much more moderate terms than could have been expected, considering that Paul was now entirely at his mercy, and that no enemy remained in Italy able to withstand his power. The same motives, whether religious or political, that made him so averse to entering into this war with the pontiff, determined him to have it brought as soon as possible to a conclusion. Almost the only condition which he required was, that Paul should observe a strict neutrality between France and Spain. All the ecclesiastical towns which had been taken were restored; and orders sent to the duke of Alva to go to Rome, and supplicate the pope's forgiveness, both in his own name, and that of his master, for their crime of invading the sacred possessions of the church. In these conditions, and in the manner in which they were fulfilled, Paul appeared as if his arms had been victorious; and Philip, as if he had been humbled and overcome. Such was the reverence which the latter either felt in reality for the Holy See, or thought it necessary to affect, in order to promote his ambitious designs ²².

The duke of
Guise returns
from Italy.

In this manner did Philip put a period to the war with the sovereign pontiff; but that with Henry still continued. This prince, conscious of his incapacity, and sensible that an exertion of the highest abilities was necessary in the present critical situation of his affairs, devolved almost his whole authority to the duke of Guise, and

²² Thuanus. Summonte, c. 10.

created him viceroy of France, under the name of Lieutenant General of the kingdom. The French nation knew how much the ambition of this nobleman had contributed to involve them in their present calamities; nor were they ignorant how unsuccessful his attempts in Italy had been against the sagacity and skill of Alva; yet so splendid were his accomplishments, and to so great a height in the general esteem had his spirited defence of Metz against the emperor exalted him, that his arrival diffused universal joy, and roused the nation from that despondency into which it had been cast by the late disaster at St. Quentin. He quickly showed that his countrymen were not mistaken in the opinion which they entertained of his abilities. The ordinary season for action was over, and the enemy had gone into winter-quarters, when he took the field, at the head of an army which he had collected with the utmost secrecy and dispatch. The eyes of all Europe were directed towards him, and Philip attended to his motions with much anxiety; never doubting that he intended to fall either upon St. Quentin, or some of the frontier towns of the Netherlands. It soon appeared that he meditated an attack, by which the interest of Philip's allies would be more affected than his own, but in the success of which France was more deeply interested than even in the recovery of St. Quentin. For more than two hundred years the town of Calais had remained in the hands of the English; and as it served for a key by which they could at all times open an entrance for their armies into France, it

B O O K
II.

1558.
January.
Siege of Calais.

B O O K

II.

1558.

had been ever deemed one of their most valuable possessions. The French monarchs were fully sensible of the dishonor, as well as of the danger, which attended the suffering a rival nation to possess a place of so much importance in their dominions. But in those days, when the art of attacking towns was little known, Calais was regarded as impregnable. Nor had any of the French kings, even in the height of prosperity, ever thought of laying siege to it. They were ignorant of the means of taking it by storm, and they could not reduce it by blockade; while the English could easily furnish it by sea with fresh troops, stores, and provisions. But a plan of attack, which had never occurred to any person, was discovered by the fruitful genius of the admiral de Coligni, and by him had been suggested to the duke of Guise.

In order to carry this plan into execution, and thereby to redeem the nation from what had ever been considered as reproachful and ignominious, Guise put his troops in motion long before the usual season for action had arrived. He judged wisely in making choice of the rigor of winter for beginning his enterprise; for, besides that the enemy had no army in the field at this time to disturb his operations, he knew that the queen of England and her ministers had, from a principle of ill-judged economy, been accustomed to dismiss a great part of the garrison in the end of autumn, and to trust, for the security of the place, to the marshy ground on the land side, by which, they believed, that, in winter, all access to it would be found impracticable.

But the briskness of the duke of Guise's approaches soon convinced the governor, lord Wentworth, how little reason there was for this imprudent confidence. Wentworth represented to the English ministry, the necessity of sending him an immediate reinforcement. He acquainted them, that he had not above one-fourth of the number requisite to defend the works; and that, with the present garrison, it was impossible to prevent the place from falling quickly into the hands of the enemy. Had Mary's ministers been ever so desirous of complying with his request, it would not have availed him. Guise was sensible that the success of his enterprise depended on his conducting it with expedition. He pushed forward all the operations of the siege with extraordinary vigor, and although it is acknowledged that the governor and garrison acquitted themselves with honor, yet he reduced them to the necessity of capitulating on the eighth day after his arrival²³. He then laid siege to Guisnes and Ham, which he subdued with great facility; and thus, in less than four weeks he expelled the English from all those possessions on the continent which they had enjoyed since the time of Edward the Third, and in the acquisition of which that victorious prince had, after the battle of Crecy, employed a numerous army for near a twelve-month.

January 8th.

The remaining part of winter was spent in preparing for the next campaign: and, on the part of

The reduction of Thionville.

²³ Thuanus, l. 20. Van Meteren, p. 18. Carte's Hist. of England.

B O O K the French, preparations were carried on with the
II. utmost diligence, not only in France but in Germa-
1558. ny, where forces were levied to the amount of four
 thousand horse and fourteen thousand foot. These
 troops the duke of Guise received in Lorraine; and
 then he marched with his whole forces united, and
 invested Thionville, a city of great importance in
 the province of Luxemburgh. The garrison, which
 consisted of eighteen hundred men, made a vigor-
 ous defence; but as the vigilance of Guise rendered
 all attempts to introduce supplies impracticable,
 they were soon obliged to capitulate.

The battle of
 Gravelines.

While the duke of Guise was thus employed in
 Luxemburgh, the marechal de Thermes, an old ex-
 perient commander, who had been appointed
 governor of Calais, having collected an army of ten
 thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse, invaded
 Flanders, took and destroyed Dunkirk, together
 with some other places of smaller note, and pene-
 trated as far as Newport, laying waste the country
 with fire and sword. Philip sent count Egmont,
 with an army superior in number, to oppose him.
 On the count's approach, de Thermes retired haf-
 tily towards Gravelines, intending to continue his
 march to Calais, along the shore, without risking
 a battle. But the impetuosity and ardor of count
 Egmont, who advanced towards him with great
 rapidity, put it out of his power to execute this de-
 sign. His men too were loaded with the spoil of
 the ravaged country, which, whilst it retarded
 their march, contributed not a little to accelerate
 the progress of the enemy. He had time however

to repass the river Aa; but finding it impossible any longer to avoid an engagement, he drew up his army advantageously on a plain, where the enemy could not attack him but in front, nor avail themselves of the superiority of their number. He placed his carriages with the baggage and plunder on the south, and had the sea upon the north, and the mouth of the Aa behind him. In this posture he waited for the enemy; and being fully prepared for their reception, he made considerable havock among them with his artillery as they advanced. This served only to quicken the approach of the Flemings, and to bring on the sooner a close fight, in which almost every part of both armies was engaged, troop with troop, and man with man. The French were rendered desperate by their situation in an enemy's country, where they could not escape without conquering; and the Flemings were animated, partly by revenge for the outrages that had been committed by the enemy, and partly by the desire of recovering the spoil which they had carried off. The battle was obstinate and bloody, and the issue remained for some time doubtful. It would probably have been sooner decided, if the Germans in count Egmont's army had shown an equal regard with the Flemings to the exhortations and example of their general, who not only acted the part of a prudent commander, but often mingled with the foremost combatants, and gave conspicuous proofs of the most heroic valor. The French however still maintained their ground, and seemed resolved

B O O K

II.

1558.

either on death or victory; when, fortunately for count Egmont, some English ships of war, which happened to be cruising upon the coast, perceiving the smoke, and conjecturing the occasion of it, entered the river, and began to discharge their guns upon the French army. Although they did not approach near enough to do much execution, yet so unexpected an event, in the time of battle, could not fail to produce an alarm even in the most resolute, and it threw the cavalry into confusion. Count Egmont improved, with great dexterity, the advantage which was thus presented to him; and pushing forward with all his force, he broke their ranks and dispersed them. The infantry intimidated, turned their backs and fled. Near two thousand veteran troops were slain on the field of battle. Many were drowned in the river; and some were killed by the peasants, in revenge for the devastation of their country. A small number only made their escape. The marechal de Thermes, who was grievously wounded, and several other persons of distinction, besides three thousand common soldiers, were taken prisoners. All the artillery and baggage fell into the hands of the victors; whose loss did not exceed four hundred men ²⁴.

Philip was now at liberty to employ all his forces united, against the duke of Guise. Having almost exhausted his finances by the extraordinary effort which he made in the first campaign, and

²⁴ Thuanus, lib. xx. Van Meteren, p. 16. Haræus, tom. ii. p. 698.

having found it impossible to draw any considerable supplies from England, it was late in the season before he could assemble an army of sufficient strength. But after the marechal de Thermes was defeated, and count Egmont's victorious troops were combined with those under the duke of Savoy, the armies of the two monarchs were nearly a match for one another, and consisted, each of them, of more than forty thousand men.

B O O K

II.

1558.

They came in sight of each other, upon the borders of Picardy, where the duke of Savoy pitched his camp near Dourlens, and the duke of Guise, in the neighbourhood of Pierrepont. Both kings discovered that anxiety which it was natural for them to feel in their present critical situation, and though they placed entire confidence in their generals, they could not be at ease while they remained at a distance from the scene of action, and therefore they repaired, each of them, to his respective camp. Many skirmishes happened with various success. But it soon appeared that neither of the two monarchs was inclined to risk a general engagement. The principal strength of both armies consisted in their German forces, and it was apprehended that, if either of the two armies were defeated, the victors as well as the vanquished would be exposed to the injuries and insults of the foreign troops²⁵.

Anxiety of
Philip and
Henry.

Besides this consideration, by which both parties were alike affected, there were other motives peculiar to each. Henry had, from his late misfor-

They wish
for peace.

²⁵ Meteren. L. Guicciardini, lib. iii.

BOOK

II.

1558.

tunes, learned a degree of caution, which nature had not bestowed on him. He trembled at the thoughts of another battle, in which he must encounter the same generals by whom his troops had been already twice conquered; and considered that, after his defeat at St. Quentin, it had been owing to the remissness or misconduct of the enemy, more than to his own strength, that his capital had not been taken, and his kingdom over-run. Philip, on the other hand, was, in all military affairs, cautious to excess; and chose rather to accomplish his designs by political negociation, in which he judged for himself; than by the operations of war, in which he depended on the abilities of others. Far from being elated with the success which had hitherto accompanied his arms, he was now as desirous of peace, as he had been before averse to entering into the war. This is not to be ascribed either to his moderation, or his freedom from the ambition of extending his power and territories. No prince ever gave more convincing proofs of his being actuated by that ambition; but having, as was just now hinted, found, that his most vigorous exertions had been necessary to assemble the forces which he had brought into the field; he dreaded, that, in case his present army were defeated, the difficulty of raising another would be insurmountable²⁶. His arms, indeed, had hitherto been crowned with victory; but none of his generals had entered the

²⁶ Carte says, he received no less than three millions of gold during this war, from Peru, p. 343.

lists on equal terms with the duke of Guise ; and he was justly apprehensive with regard to the issue of a battle in which he must contend with a general so highly celebrated for his military genius, and whose enterprises had been so often accompanied with success.

B O O K

II.

1558.

These considerations derived additional force from Philip's extreme impatience to return to Spain ; for which, in preference to his other dominions, he discovered, through his whole reign, a warm and partial affection. And his desire of going thither was increased by accounts which he received at this time, that the opinions of the Protestants had made their way into that kingdom. He dreaded the propagation of these opinions, and resolved, as soon as possible, to embrace this opportunity in his native country, of testifying his zeal for the catholic faith, by showing, that he would treat those who opposed it, without mercy, in whatever part of his dominions they should be found.

Such were the motives which made the contending monarchs so desirous to put a period to the war. A negociation had been begun for this purpose in the month of August, by the constable Montmorency, and William the first prince of Orange. Montmorency, who beheld with much anxiety the exaltation of the family of Guise, had borne his captivity with great impatience ; and in order to obtain his liberty, had exerted himself strenuously in removing every obstacle to the establishment of peace. He was permitted to go to Paris on his pa-

Negociations
for peace.

B O O K

II.

1558.

role, to treat in person with the king. A marriage was concluded about that time between his son and a grand-daughter of the dutchess of Valentinois. And by this event, joined to the king's habitual attachment to him, he recovered all his wonted influence; and easily persuaded Henry to consent to such terms of accommodation as it was not likely that Philip would reject.

Plenipotentiaries were soon afterwards named by both princes, and a congress, for discussing their respective claims, appointed to be held at the abbey of Cercamps, not far from the place where the armies were encamped. The duke of Alva, the prince of Orange, Ruy Gomez de Sylva, Granvelle bishop of Arras, and Viglius, president of the council of state at Brussels, were nominated by Philip; and by Henry, the constable himself was named, the cardinal of Lorraine, the marechal of St. André, Morvilliers bishop of Orange, and Aubespine the secretary of state. The dutchess of Lorraine, whom it highly imported, on account of the vicinity of her dominions, that the two kings should put an end to the war, acted with great assiduity the part of mediator between them.

The conferences, which were opened in October, were soon afterwards interrupted by the death of Mary queen of England, who ended her short inglorious reign on the seventeenth of November following. But Elizabeth renewed the powers of the English commissioners, and the congress was resumed in the beginning of the year one thou-

land five hundred and fifty nine , at Chateau Cambresis ²⁷. BOOK
II.
1559.

In removing so many grounds of difference as subsisted between Philip and Henry, the plenipotentiaries encountered many difficulties; but the zeal and activity of the constable, added to the unlimited influence which he had acquired over his master, surmounted every obstacle, and soon brought the treaty, so far as Philip, Henry, and the duke of Savoy were concerned, to the desired conclusion. Nothing retarded the signing of it, but the determined obstinacy of the French commissioners in refusing to restore Calais to the queen of England; who, on the other hand, declared, that she would not agree to the peace unless that conquest were restored. Philip thought himself bound in honor to support the claim of Elizabeth; since it was entirely on his account that the English nation had engaged in the war, and incurred the loss of the place in question. In a political view, likewise, he was desirous that Calais should be restored. He considered, that, in some future period, he might derive advantage, as his father had sometimes done, from that facility which the possession of Calais gave the English of invading France.

But the zeal which Philip discovered on this occasion in behalf of Elizabeth, arose principally from a very different motive. By Mary's death, his connexion with England had lately been dissolved, and he had formed the scheme of renewing it, by

²⁷ Forbes's Full View, p. 1.

B O O K marrying Elizabeth. The duke of Feria, his am-
 II. bassador at London, was ordered to propose the
 1559. marriage, and at the same time to acquaint the
 queen that his master would procure a dispensation
 for it from the pope.

Elizabeth had many motives to deter her from
 listening to this proposal. Philip's imperious temper
 would alone have been a sufficient reason for re-
 jecting it. Besides this, she knew well what appre-
 hensions her sister's marriage had occasioned among
 the English, with regard to their liberty and in-
 dependence; and that her own popularity was
 greatly owing to the universal joy which their
 deliverance from these apprehensions had excited.
 She considered that her marriage with Philip
 would be liable to the same objection as that of
 her father with Catharine of Arragon; and that
 her accepting of the pope's dispensation would be
 in effect to acknowledge that her mother's marriage
 was unlawful, and she herself illegitimate. By
 doing this she might secure to herself the protection
 of the Spanish monarchy, and thereby hold a
 precarious and dependent authority during Philip's
 life; but she would forfeit for ever the favor of
 her protestant subjects, who alone were sincerely
 attached to her person and government; while she
 would throw herself on the mercy of the catholics,
 who considered her as an usurper; and would, on
 the first favorable opportunity of asserting the title
 of the queen of Scotland, think it their duty to
 deprive her of her crown.

While, for these reasons, Elizabeth was unal-

terably determined not to accept of Philip for a husband, she thought it prudent for some time to conceal her intention; and she returned such an ambiguous, but obliging answer to his ambassador, that Philip flattered himself with the hopes of success, and actually took some steps to procure a dispensation. As long as there remained any foundation for these hopes, he appeared extremely zealous for the restitution of Calais. But when Elizabeth, finding herself firmly established on the throne, ventured to introduce certain alterations in religion, which discovered her resolution to abolish popery in her dominions, Philip considered this part of her conduct as a sufficient indication of her intentions with regard to him. That zeal with which he had at first espoused her interest, began to abate; and the English plenipotentiaries dreaded that, without respect to the claim of their mistress, he would not delay much longer to put the finishing hand to his treaty with the king of France²⁸.

B O O K

II.

1559.

²⁸ If it is likewise true, that he made an offer to Elizabeth, of continuing the war till she should recover what she had lost, upon condition that she too would engage to carry it on for a certain term of years; it would then seem, that he gave little reason for accusing him as some authors have done, of having acted ungenerously towards his English allies. But as this circumstance is omitted by the principal historians, and contradicts what is said of his coldness with regard to the interest of Elizabeth, I have not ventured to advance it as an undoubted fact. Burnet, part. ii. p. 383.

B O O K

II.

1559.

Elizabeth at length perceived that it was in vain to hope for recovering Calais by treaty; and, as the situation of her affairs at home rendered it highly inexpedient to employ force, she wisely resolved to give it up on the following conditions: that Henry should restore it before the end of eight years, or pay 500,000 crowns; that foreign merchants, not subjects of France, should give security for the money; that hostages should be delivered, till that security were procured; and that, whether the money were paid or not, Elizabeth's claim should remain valid, unless, within the time specified, she should commit hostilities against the subjects of the French king.

Peace con-
cluded.

Towards his other allies, Philip's conduct was perfectly conformable to the dictates of the strictest honor. He procured the restitution of Montferrat to the duke of Mantua; of Bouillon to the bishop of Liege; of the isle of Corsica to the Genoese; and of all the towns which the French had seized in Savoy, Piedmont, and Bresse, to the duke of Savoy. This peace was advantageous to himself as well as to the princes in alliance with him. He recovered Thionville, Marienburgh, Montmedi, and all the other places which had been taken by the French generals during the war, and acquired the sovereignty of the county of Charolois²⁹.

In return for the many concessions made by Henry, that monarch received no other compensation but St. Quentin, and the two unimportant

²⁹ Meteren, p. 24. Guicciardini, lib. iii.

towns of Ham and Catelet. While his people, therefore, rejoiced at the conclusion of the war, which, had some times excited in their minds the most dreadful apprehensions, they complained bitterly of the inequality of the terms of peace, and were highly exasperated against the constable; who, in order to accomplish his private views, had abused the too easy temper of his master, and made a sacrifice of the interests and the honor of France. Montmorency durst not have counselled Henry to consent to such disadvantageous terms, had he not devised the expedient of giving Elizabeth, Henry's, eldest daughter, in marriage to Philip, and Margaret, his sister, to the duke of Savoy. These marriages served, in some measure, as an excuse for the ample concessions made to these two princes; since honorable settlements were thereby obtained for the daughter and sister of the king.

Amidst that attention which Philip and Henry bestowed in this treaty, on their political and civil interests, religion was not forgotten. They bound themselves mutually to maintain the catholic faith in their dominions; and to procure ¹⁰ the convocation of a general council, for suppressing heresy, and restoring tranquillity to the church.

It is not to be doubted that Henry would have fulfilled this article of the treaty with the same exactness which he observed in executing the other articles; but a sudden period was put to his life, in a few months after the peace was signed, by an

Death of
Henry.

¹⁰ F. Paul, lib. v.

B O O K

II.

1559.

accident which happened in the time of the rejoicings celebrated on account of his sister's marriage. Having entered the lists at a tournament with the count of Montgomery, captain of his guards, the count's lance broke on Henry's corset, and a splinter of it having pierced his right eye, inflicted a wound, of which he died in a few days, at the age of forty.

This melancholy event made no alteration with respect to the treaty of peace. The duke of Alva had some time before espoused Elizabeth, in his master's name; and Margaret's marriage with Emanuel was celebrated privately in a chapel of the palace.

State of
France.

The courtiers and the people of France were affected variously by Henry's death. The constable lost thereby all the fruits of his late intrigues, and was soon afterwards obliged to retire from court, and to resign that power which he had shown himself so solicitous to attain, into the hands of his enemies.

Francis II.

The young king, Francis the Second, a prince equally weak in body and in mind, was entirely governed by his wife, the celebrated Mary queen of Scots; who was blindly devoted to her uncles, the cardinal of Lorraine and the duke of Guise. These two men engrossed almost the whole administration of the kingdom; admitting only the queen mother to a share of it, from their knowledge of her ambitious, intriguing spirit, and the dread which they entertained of her influence, as a mother, over the feeble mind of Francis. They showed no moderation in the exercise of the power which they had usurped;

usurped; but seized on every advantage for themselves, and laid hold of every opportunity to humble and mortify their adversaries. The princes of the blood, with Lewis prince of Condé at their head, bore with extreme impatience the insignificance to which they were reduced; and resolved to embrace the first occasion that should offer, to vindicate their right to that share in the management of affairs, to which they thought themselves entitled by their birth, and the ancient practice of the realm³¹.

While the great men in France were thus animated against each other by considerations of a political nature, the people were violently agitated, and their minds inflamed by religious controversies. Under the reign of Henry, the Calvinists had suffered the most cruel persecution; yet they had multiplied exceedingly during that period in every quarter of the kingdom. The duke of Guise and the cardinal of Lorraine kept alive the flames of persecution against them, and on all occasions appeared intent on their destruction. This alone would have determined the prince of Condé and his adherents to espouse the protestant cause; for even although we should not believe that the chiefs in either party were sincere in their religious profession, yet it cannot be supposed they would have failed to embrace so specious a pretext as the differences in religion afforded them to palliate their conduct. The prince of Condé would instantly have had recourse to arms, if the admiral, more prudent and sagacious, had not prevailed on

B O O K

II.

1559.

³¹ Davila, Castelnau ab initio, & Additions aux Mémoires de Castelnau.

B O O K

II.

1559.

him to suspend his resolution till a more favorable juncture; but it was impossible that passions so violent as those by which both parties were impelled, could be kept long under restraint; and to every person capable of reflecting on what he saw passing before him, it was apparent that the nation was upon the eve of a civil war.

France has in no period produced a more remarkable assemblage of great men than in the present and the succeeding reigns; and had there been a prince upon the throne possessed of abilities sufficient to control their inordinate ambition, the French nation might have much sooner reached that degree of greatness and prosperity, which it attained towards the conclusion of the following century: but this mighty kingdom, possessed of every advantage which nature bestows, became a scene of devastation and misery for almost forty years, through the misapplication of those very talents, which, if they had been properly employed, would have rendered it prosperous and happy.

Nothing could be more desirable to Philip than this confusion, and the debility consequent upon it, in that nation, from which alone he had reason to expect opposition to his designs. It left him at liberty to pursue whatever measures he should think proper for the confirmation and increase of his power in Spain, Italy and the Netherlands; and it gave no small reason to the other European powers to apprehend, that France itself would fall under the Spanish yoke.

State of Italy.

In Italy, the state of affairs was no less favorable to Philip's views, than in France. He was now the sole

and undisputed sovereign of the dutchy of Milan, and the kingdom of Naples and Sicily. His inveterate enemy, Paul the fourth, was lately dead; and Pius the fourth, who was no less devoted to his interest than Paul had been adverse, was raised to the papal throne. The republic of Genoa, the dukes of Savoy, Mantua, Tuscany, and Parma, were his allies, whom he had bound to his interest by the strongest ties; the three first, by procuring for them the restitution of their dominions from the French king; the fourth, by granting him the investiture of Siena; and the last, by ceding to him the city of Placentia and its territory.

After the conclusion of the peace, nothing remained to render Philip uneasy, either in his own dominions or in the neighbouring kingdoms, but the progress which the reformers had made, and were still making, in almost every country in Europe. From Germany and Switzerland, where the reformation took its rise, it had spread with the most astonishing rapidity. It had become the established religion, not only in several of the considerable provinces and free cities in Germany and the Cantons in Switzerland, but likewise in the kingdoms of England, Scotland, Sweden, and Denmark; and in some of those states where the ancient religion still maintained its ground, the protestants were grown so numerous as to be extremely formidable to their opponents.

From the constant intercourse which subsists between Germany and the Netherlands, it was impossible but the new opinions must have been

B O O K

II.

1559.

early propagated from the former to the latter; and accordingly, in the month of May 1521, the emperor Charles had published an edict, in which all the penalties of high treason were denounced against those who should be found guilty of holding any of Luther's tenets; or of republishing, or vending any books written by him or his followers. In the execution of this edict, which Charles from time to time renewed, all the fury of persecution was exercised; and it is affirmed by several cotemporary historians, that during the reign of Charles fifty thousand of the inhabitants of the Low Countries were put to death on account of their religious principles. These principles however, far from being extirpated, were more and more diffused in the midst of those severities which were employed to suppress them.

Philip was not ignorant of the progress which they had made; and it gave him the greater uneasiness, because, being exceedingly desirous of setting out for Spain, he would be obliged to commit the business of extirpating heresy from the Netherlands to others, whom he could not suppose possessed of the same fervent zeal against it, of which he himself was conscious. In order to prevent as much as possible the inconveniences which might arise from his absence, he had gone from his camp at Dourlens to Brussels, and had been employed during the winter season in settling the government of the provinces.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK III.

THE provinces, which, on account of their situation, are called the Netherlands, were long governed, by their respective princes, under the titles of Dukes, Marquisses, or Counts. These princes were for many years engaged in perpetual wars with the neighbouring powers, or with one another; and, as they had frequent occasions, during these wars, to have recourse to the people for supplies, the cities, the nobles, and ecclesiastics, acquired, in return, several rights and privileges, by which the provinces partook more of the nature of republics, than of regal governments. The supreme authority was lodged in the assembly of the States, which had the power of meeting as often as the members thought expedient. And without the consent of that assembly, no war

BOOK
III.

1559.

Ancient State
of the Nether-
lands.

BOOK could be undertaken, no taxes could be imposed,
 III. no new laws enacted, no change made in the
 1552. current coin, and no foreigners admitted into any
 branch of the administration. The sovereignty
 descended according to the ordinary laws of here-
 ditary succession; but no prince was allowed to
 enter upon the exercise of it, till he had solemnly
 sworn to observe and maintain the fundamental
 laws¹.

In this situation these provinces remained for
 several ages, till by the failure of the male line in
 some of the reigning families, by intermarriages,
 and by conquests, they fell under the dominion of
 the house of Burgundy. After this event they still
 continued to enjoy their ancient privileges, and
 to be governed according to their old laws; with
 this difference only, that whereas all criminal and
 civil causes had been formerly determined, in the
 last resort, by the councils of the several pro-
 vinces, it was established, that parties might
 appeal from these to the tribunal of Mechlin;
 which was instituted in order to unite the pro-
 vinces more closely, and to give them more the
 appearance of one state.

Prosperity of
 the Provinces.

Under the administration of the Burgundian
 princes, and even long before their accession to the
 sovereignty, trade and manufactures flourished in
 the Netherlands more than in any other European
 state. No city in those days, except Venice, pos-
 sessed such extensive commerce as Antwerp. It

¹ Grotius de Antiq. Repub. Batav. cap. 5.

was the staple, or great mart of all the northern nations. Bruges was little inferior. Arras was famous for tapestries, which still retain the name of that place. In the city of Ghent there were many thousand artificers employed in the woollen manufacture, long before the art was known to the English, from whom the wool was purchased by the industrious Flemings.

B O O K

III.

1559.

For this prosperity the inhabitants of the Netherlands were, in a great measure, indebted to the nature and situation of their country; which, as it lies in the centre of Europe, commanding the entrance and navigation of several of the great rivers of Germany, and is almost every where intersected by these rivers, or, by canals and branches of the sea, is admirably fitted both for foreign and domestic or inland trade. This singular advantage, however, could not have enabled the Flemings to leave the other European nations so far behind them, if the form of their civil government had not been peculiarly favorable to their exertions. The greatest advantages which nature affords for improvement in the arts of life, may be rendered useless to the people who possess them, by an injudicious, or tyrannical and oppressive exercise of the civil power. And universal experience proves, how vain it is to expect that men will apply themselves with vigor to commercial pursuits, where their persons are insecure, or where the fruits of their industry may be seized by the rapacious hand of a despotic prince. But happily for the inhabitants of the Low Countries,

Causes of it.

BOOK

III.

1552.

the sovereigns of the several provinces (unable, perhaps, from the small extent of their dominions, to execute any plan of tyranny against the people) were, at a very early period, induced to give their consent and sanction to the above-mentioned system of fundamental laws; by which, although their prerogative was abridged, yet their power and resources were greatly augmented, through that prosperity which their moderate government had enabled their subjects to attain.

The sovereignty of these flourishing provinces passed from the family of Burgundy into that of Austria, by the marriage of Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold, and sole heiress of his dominions, with Maximilian, son of Frederic the Third, emperor of Germany. This marriage was set on foot and concluded by the Flemings themselves, who, agreeably to their free maxims of government, assumed the direction of the conduct of their princes in this matter, which so nearly concerned their prosperity and safety.

Lewis the eleventh of France had demanded her for his son the dauphin; whilst he most impolitically gave offence to the States, by seizing upon Burgundy and Picardy as fiefs of the kingdom of France. This imprudent step, and the death of the bishop of Liege, uncle of Mary, and a partisan of Lewis, determined the Flemings in their choice. They judged wisely, that their liberty would be safer in the hands of Maximilian whose hereditary dominions were small, and lay at a distance from them, than in those of a neighbouring prince so powerful as Lewis, who,

in all his conduct, had discovered so much injustice and rapacity. B O O K

III.

1559.

The Flemings showed the same laudable jealousy of their privileges after Maximilian's marriage with their princess, which had influenced them in their choice of him for her husband. About four years after her marriage, Mary died of a bruise which she received by a fall from horseback, when she was big with child. Maximilian, under the name of tutor to his son Philip, assumed the reins of government. The Flemings considered his conduct as an encroachment on their rights, and refused to acknowledge his authority, till the States had ordained that he should be admitted as governor, only for a limited time, and upon conditions which they required he should take an oath to fulfil.

He did not observe these conditions so exactly as they expected. They complained of his conferring offices upon Burgundians and Germans. They were grievously offended with him for introducing foreign troops into the provinces, and apprehended that he had formed a design against their liberty. After he was elected king of the Romans, their suspicions rose to so great a height, that, upon his entering the city of Bruges with a numerous train of attendants, the inhabitants ran to arms, surrounded him in the marketplace, seized his person, and confined him in the castle, where they kept him prisoner for several months. The pope and emperor interposed in his behalf, but could not obtain his liberty till he had given security with regard to the several particulars on account of which they had taken offence.

B O O K

III.

1559.

Charles V.

Of the same jealous attention to their liberty the Flemings gave proofs during the administration of Maximilian's successors. Under that of his grandson Charles V. they had real ground of uneasiness. Charles might have easily subdued them, if he had been inclined to use his power so ungenerously: and his arbitrary temper had sufficiently appeared in his government of Spain and Germany; in both which countries he had trampled on all those rights of the people, which had been long esteemed the most inviolable. On several occasions he had introduced foreign troops into the Low Countries; and it has been asserted², that he once deliberated whether he should employ them in establishing in the provinces the same sort of arbitrary government which subsisted in his Spanish and Italian dominions.

His popular-
ity.

But Charles was born in the Netherlands, and had passed there the pleasantest of his younger days. He loved the people, and was fond of their manners; which resembled his own, and were not so reserved and stately as those of the Spaniards. From taste and early attachment he kept them always about his person, and had bestowed on them the most important offices in his dominions. To his preceptor, Adrian of Utrecht, who, through his interest, was afterwards advanced to the papacy, he committed the government of Spain: and Charles de Lanoy, whom he appointed viceroy of Naples, was intrusted with the management of his affairs in Italy for several years, with unli-

² Grotius, p. 6.

mitted authority. In all the wars which he carried on in Germany, and on the frontiers of France, he placed a particular confidence in his Flemish troops; used the people, when he resided among them, with the most courteous familiarity, and banished from his intercourse with them, that form and ceremony which renders it so difficult for princes either to know that they are beloved, or to show that they deserve it¹.

B O O K

III.

1559.

The Flemings entertained a grateful sense of the kindness with which he treated them. If we except the insurrection of the people of Ghent, there happened almost no disturbance in the Netherlands during his reign. The States assisted him liberally in defraying the expense of those wars in which he was almost continually engaged, and discovered, at all times, a warm attachment to his person.

Charles would gladly have transmitted to his son the affection which he bore towards his Flemish subjects; and for this purpose he had, as above related, brought him to Flanders in his youth, in order to reconcile him to the manners and customs of the people. And afterwards, when he himself had resolved to retire from the world, and to leave the government of his dominions in the hands of Philip, he exhorted him, with much earnestness, to cultivate the affections of the Flemings, and to govern them according to those laws to which they had been so long accustomed, and were so strongly attached.

¹ Bentivoglio, p. 4.

B O O K

III.

1559.

Of Philip. His
unpopular be-
haviour.

But Philip could not enter into his father's views. He had never made any considerable stay in the Netherlands; and could not be fond of a people whose manners were so different from his own. In Spain, where he received his education, he had been taught the most superstitious reverence for the Holy See, and had imbibed the most extravagant ideas of the extent of regal authority. Charles was not, in reality, less fond of power; but in him ambition was, in some measure, tempered and corrected by his acquaintance with the world; whereas, in Philip, it was perverted and inflamed by the sentiments of an illiberal, cruel, gloomy superstition.

The Flemings
jealous of him.

The Flemings had long perceived and lamented the difference between the character of their late, and that of their present sovereign. Philip had taken the usual oath, by which he bound himself to maintain their privileges; and had made them the strongest professions of regard and affection. But they judged of his disposition towards them from his conduct, rather than from his oath or his professions. They were not admitted, whilst he lived amongst them, to any share of his trust and confidence; and, in violation of their fundamental laws, he committed the administration of the most important branches of government to the bishop of Arras, a Burgundian; or to his Spanish ministers, Ruy Gomez de Sylva, prince of Eboli, and the dukes of Feria and Alva; whom the Flemings considered as enemies to their nation, and strenuous abettors of that despotic power, to

which, from the beginning of Philip's reign, they had suspected that he aspired.

It was not long before he gave them convincing proof how well-grounded their fears were with regard to his intentions, by the measures which he employed for extinguishing the new opinions in religion. These opinions had been of late diffused through every corner of the Netherlands; having been imported thither, partly by foreign merchants who came to reside there; and partly by the Swiss and German troops, whom both Charles and Philip had employed in their wars against France; but chiefly by the English, French, and German protestants, who had fled from the persecutions which were carried on against them in their native countries.

Charles had, as mentioned in the preceding book, shown the same inclination to extirpate the reformed religion in the Netherlands, which he had discovered in Germany; and had, for this purpose, published several edicts against the protestants; many of whom had suffered the most cruel death*.

Great numbers had begun to leave the provinces, and to transport their families and effects to the neighbouring states. Charles was moved with

* It is almost incredible that the number of those who suffered could amount to 50,000, yet this is affirmed by several historians. Meteren calls the number 50,000. Grotius, p. 12. calls it 100,000. F. Paul, lib. v. calls it 50,000.

B O O K

III.

1559.

The edicts
against the
protestants.

B O O K

III.

1559.

the representation which he received of this event, from the regent his sister, the queen dowager of Hungary. He felt for the calamities of the people, and he dreaded the consequences of depopulating a country where he had often received the most effectual assistance and support.

But these considerations had no degree of influence on Philip. He republished the edicts, and ordered the governors and magistrates to carry them into rigorous execution.

In these edicts it was enacted, that all persons who held any erroneous opinion should be deprived of their offices, and degraded from their rank. It was ordained, that whoever should be convicted of having taught heretical doctrines, or of having been present at the religious meetings of heretics, should, if they were men, be put to death by the sword, and if women, be buried alive. Such were the punishments denounced even against those who repented of their errors and forsook them; while all who persisted in them were condemned to the flames. And even those who afforded shelter to heretics in their houses, or who omitted to give information against them, were subjected to the same penalties as heretics themselves.

The inquisition.

Philip was not satisfied with publishing and executing these cruel edicts. He likewise established a particular tribunal for the extirpation of heresy, which, although it was not called by the name Inquisition, had all the essentials of that iniquitous institution. Persons were committed to prison upon

bare suspicion ; and put to the torture on the slightest evidence. The accused were not confronted with their accusers, or made acquainted with crimes for which they suffered. The civil judges were not allowed to take any further concern in prosecutions for heresy, than to execute the sentences which the inquisitors had pronounced. The possessions of the sufferers were confiscated; and informers were encouraged, by an assurance of impunity in case they themselves were guilty, and by the promise of rewards^s.

It is not surprising, that the establishment of this arbitrary tribunal should have occasioned disquietude in the Netherlands. It had created disturbance even in Spain and Italy, where the people could not boast so much as the Flemings of their civil rights ; and had been strenuously opposed by many who were sincerely attached to the catholic religion. In the Flemings it excited the most frightful apprehensions. They considered it as utterly subversive of their liberty. They dreaded the ruin of their commerce ; which could not subsist unless the foreign merchants, many of whom were protestants, could reside among them with safety. The new opinions had been propagated throughout all the provinces, and men knew not how far the inquisitors might extend their power, or how great a number might be found liable to punishments that were denounced, not only against heretics

B O O K

III.

1559.

^s Grotius Annales, lib. i.

B O O K

III.

1559.

New erection of bishoprics.

themselves, but against all those who were suspected to befriend them.

To these causes of discontent Philip added another, by increasing the number of bishoprics from five to seventeen, the number of the provinces. This measure, which would not at any other time have given much offence, was in the present juncture universally disagreeable. Granvelle bishop of Arras was the chief adviser of it: nor did he and the king's other counsellors scruple to acknowledge, that their intention in promoting it, was to have at all times a sufficient number of persons in the Netherlands, upon whose zeal the king could rely for a vigorous execution of the edicts.

The new bishops were therefore considered as so many new inquisitors. Their creation was regarded as an encroachment on the privileges of the provinces, and a violation, on the part of the king, of the oath which he had taken at his accession, to preserve the church in the condition in which he found it. The principal nobility were particularly averse to this innovation, because the number of the counsellors of state was thereby greatly augmented, and consequently the influence of the ancient members of the council was impaired, and the balance of power thrown into the hands of the clergy; who, they doubted not, would on all occasions show themselves ready to support the arbitrary measures of the sovereign. But no sect of men exclaimed so loudly as the monks and abbots, whose opposition was inflamed by motives both of ambition and interest. For besides that
they

they would be obliged to yield the precedency to the bishops, and have much less weight than hitherto in the assemblies of the States, it was out of their revenues that the new bishoprics were to be endowed. They were therefore highly incensed. They labored to connect their private interest with that of the public; and represented the new erection as no less pernicious to the country in general, than it was to their order in particular.

B O O K

III.

1559.

Besides the grievances enumerated, the Flemings complained bitterly, that in the midst of peace the provinces were filled with Spanish soldiers. They had ever esteemed it one of their most valuable privileges, that, according to their fundamental laws, no foreign troops could be brought into the Netherlands. Charles indeed had often introduced them in the course of his wars with France, and with the protestants in Germany. But the Flemings had been dazzled with the glory which generally attended that monarch's arms, and had not entertained the same jealousy of his intentions as of those of Philip; who, they could not help thinking, had formed a design to reduce them under a despotic government; and had, with this view, deferred so long the dismissal of his Spanish troops. Their discontent was greatly increased by the insolent and rapacious behaviour of these troops; which in Zealand was so intolerable, that the people actually refused to work at their dikes, saying, that they chose rather to be swallowed up by the ocean,

Spanish
troops in the
Netherlands.

* Bentivoglio, lib. i.

BOOK

III.

1559.

The dutch-
ess of Parma
appointed
regent.

than to remain a prey to the cruelty and avarice of the Spanish soldiers ⁷.

Such was the state of affairs, and such the temper of the people, when Philip, intending to set out for Spain, was deliberating concerning a proper person to whom he might commit the government of the Netherlands.

He hesitated for some time between Christina the dutchess of Lorraine, his cousin, and Margaret dutchess of Parma, a natural daughter of the late emperor. The former had distinguished herself by her prudent conduct in the government of Lorraine after her husband's death, and had lately acquired considerable reputation by her negociations in the treaty of peace at Chateau-Cambresis. From the vicinity of Lorraine to the Low Countries, the Flemings were well acquainted with her character, and, as they had groaned under the burden of the French war, and had now begun to taste, with gratitude, the fruits of that peace which Christina's wisdom had contributed to procure for them, they were exceedingly desirous that the government of the provinces should be left in her hands. But Philip had good reason for the preference which he gave to the dutchess of Parma. The dukes of Lorraine were, from their situation, in some measure dependent upon the crown of France; whereas the dutchy of Parma was surrounded with Philip's Italian domini-

⁷ These soldiers were not removed till the year following, when Philip had occasion for them elsewhere. Reidanus, p. 5. Meursii Auriacus, near the beginning

ons; and the duke and dutchefs were willing to fend their fon, the celebrated Alexander Farnese prince of Parma, to the court of Spain; on the pretence of being educated there, but, in truth, as a pledge of that implicit obedience which the dutchefs engaged to yield to the king's injunctions in her government of the provinces^{*}.

B O O K

III.

1559.

As Philip did not intend to return soon to the Netherlands, he thought proper, before his departure, to summon a convention of the States; which was accordingly held in Ghent. He was present himself, accompanied by the new regent, at the first opening of that assembly; but as he could not speak the language of the country, he employed the bishop of Arras to address the deputies in his name.

The bishop began his speech with informing them of the king's resolution of going to Spain, and the reasons which rendered his journey thither necessary. He expatiated on the affection which Philip bore towards his Flemish subjects; to whom his family had been so much indebted for that ascendant and influence, which had given them possession of such extensive territories. His affairs in Spain, he hoped, would not detain him long; but, in case they should, he promised to send his son to reside in the Netherlands. In the mean time he earnestly exhorted the States to study to preserve the public peace; and to this end he thought that nothing could conduce so much, as the extirpation of heresy, which, whilst it set men at variance with

The bishop
of Arras's
speech to
the States.

^{*} Bentivoglio.

B O O K

III.

1552.

God, put arms into their hands against their civil sovereign. They ought therefore zealously to maintain the purity of their ancient faith, and, for this purpose, to execute with vigor the several edicts published for the suppression of heresy. In this, and every other measure, he hoped that they would concur cheerfully with the dutchess of Parma, whom he had appointed regent in his absence. He would leave the Netherlands, impressed with the deepest sense of that fidelity and affection which his subjects there had ever shown him; and would, as soon as possible, remove the foreign troops, and deliver the people from every other burden which the exigency of his affairs had made it necessary to impose.

The answer of the States to this speech contained the warmest sentiments of affection and loyalty. But, before the convention was dissolved, Philip perceived that the deputies were far from being satisfied with every part of his administration. They had expected that the troops would have been immediately transported to Spain, and could not discover any reason for keeping them longer in the Low Countries but such as filled their minds with terror. Their suspicion that the Inquisition was about to be established in the Netherlands, excited the most disquieting apprehensions. There were some of the deputies who scrupled not openly to remonstrate, That the Low Countries had never been accustomed to an institution of so much rigor

^p Bentivoglio, p. 9.

and severity : that the people trembled at the very name of the Inquisition , and would fly to the remotest corners of the earth rather than submit to it : that it was not by fire and sword , but by the gentlest and softest remedies , that the evil complained of must be cured : that as each individual had a habit or constitution of body peculiar to himself , so every nation had a peculiar temperament or character : that what might be suitable to Spain or Italy , would be extremely unfit for the Netherlands ; and that , in general , the nations in the southern parts of the world could live happily under a degree of restraint which would render the northern nations extremely miserable ¹⁰.

B O O K
III.
1559.

These and such other representations were addressed to the king himself by some of the deputies , who endeavoured to persuade him to annul , or at least to moderate the edicts. But on this head Philip was inexorable. And when one of his ministers represented , that , by persisting in the execution of these edicts , he might kindle the seeds of rebellion , and thereby lose the sovereignty of the provinces ; he replied , “ That he had much rather
“ be no king at all , than have heretics for his
“ subjects ” ¹¹.

Philip re-
fuses to gra-
tify them.

His religion , which was of all superstitions the most intolerant ; his temper of mind , which was naturally haughty and severe ; his pride , which

¹⁰ Bentivoglio , lib. i.

¹¹ Ch'egli voleva piu tosto restar senza regni , che possederli con eresia. Bentivoglio , p. 10.

B O O K

III.

1559.

would have been wounded by yielding to what he had repeatedly declared he would never yield; his engagements with the pope, and an oath which he had taken to devote his reign to the defence of the popish faith and the extirpation of heresy; above all, his thirst for despotic power, with which he considered the liberties claimed in religious matters by the protestants as utterly incompatible; all these causes united, rendered him deaf to the remonstrances which were made to him, and fixed him unalterably in his resolution to execute the edicts with the utmost rigor. He showed himself equally inflexible with regard to the new bishoprics; nor would he consent at this time to withdraw the Spanish soldiers. In order however to lessen the odium arising from his refusal, he offered the command of these troops to the prince of Orange and count Egmont, the two ablest and most popular noblemen in the Netherlands; the former of whom he had appointed governor of Holland, Zealand, and Utrecht; and the latter, of Artois and Flanders. Both of them declined accepting of the offer which was made to them, and had the courage to declare, that they considered the continuance of the troops in the Low Countries, after peace had been established with France, as a violation of the fundamental laws of the constitution.

Count Eg-
mont.

Count Egmont, descended from the dukes of Guelderland, and one of the most accomplished noblemen in the Netherlands, having lately gained immortal honor by the victories of St. Quentin and

Gravelines, had just ground to expect the highest rewards in the power of Philip to bestow.

The prince of Orange, so well known in history by the name of William the first; was the representative of the ancient and illustrious family of Nassau in Germany. From his ancestors, one of whom had been emperor of Germany, he inherited several rich possessions in the Netherlands; and he had succeeded to the principality of Orange by the will of René de Nassau and Chalons, his cousin-german, in the year 1544. From that time the late emperor had kept him perpetually about his person, and had early discovered in him all those extraordinary talents which rendered him afterwards one of the most illustrious personages of this or of any other age. Both he and count Egmont had aspired to the regency; and their declining to accept of the command of the Spanish troops was, by some, ascribed to the chagrin occasioned by their disappointment¹². The prince of Orange, after dropping his own pretensions, had expressed his desire to have the regency bestowed on the dutchess of Lorraine; and this discovery of William's inclination is said to have been a principal motive with Philip, and his Spanish counsellors, for conferring it on the dutchess of Parma. Nor were they satisfied with thwarting him in this. He had begun and made some progress in a treaty of marriage with one of the princesses of Lorraine. In this measure likewise they opposed him, from an apprehen-

B O O K

III.

1559.

William I.
prince of
Orange.

¹² Ferreras, tom. ix. Grotius, p. 4—9.

BOOK

III.

1559.

Causes of
Philip's
alienation
from him.

fion, it was pretended, that so close a connexion with a family of so great influence, and whose territories lay so near the Netherlands, would give him an accession of power that might be dangerous in the hands of a person whose loyalty there was reason to suspect.

It does not however appear, that, before the assembly of the States, Philip had any just ground for his suspicions of William's conduct; and there is only one circumstance recorded to which they can be ascribed. The prince having been sent to France as an hostage for the execution of some articles of the peace of Chateau-Cambresis, had, during his residence there, discovered a scheme formed by the French and Spanish monarchs for the extirpation of the protestants. This scheme he had communicated to such of his friends in the Netherlands as had embraced the reformed religion, and from that time the king ceased to treat him with his wonted confidence¹³.

But we find a still more satisfactory account of Philip's alienation from the prince, in the jealousy of Granvelle and the Spanish ministers. From his early youth William had been considered as a principal favorite of the late emperor, who had on all occasions distinguished him with peculiar marks of his esteem. Charles used to communicate to him his most secret counsels, and had been heard to declare, that the prince, though scarcely arrived

¹³ Bentivoglio, p. 6. Thuanus, tom. i. lib. xxii. sect. 10.

at the years of manhood, had often suggested expedients to him that were of great advantage to his affairs. William was in the twenty-third year of his age when Charles resigned his dominions, yet he had already received several public proofs of the emperor's attachment. Not to mention his making choice of him to support him in that august assembly in which he resigned his dominions, or his bestowing on him, in preference to his other courtiers, the honor of carrying the imperial crown to his brother Ferdinand; he had appointed him commander in chief of his army, in the absence of the duke of Savoy, when the prince was only two-and-twenty years old. Against this measure all his counsellors had remonstrated, and had represented to him the superior character of the French generals, the duke de Nevers and the admiral de Coligni. But Charles adhered to his choice, and had no reason afterwards to repent of it. William not only saved the troops while they were under his command from sustaining any misfortune or calamity, but fortified Charlemont and Philipville, and thereby secured the frontier of the Netherlands, in spite of the most vigorous efforts which the enemy could make to prevent him. This uncommon degree of attachment that was shown him by the father, was the real cause of the coldness with which he was treated by the son. Granvelle and the Spanish ministers were envious of his rising greatness, and took every opportunity to inspire Philip with suspicions of his designs, and an aversion to his character. Philip was confirmed in his suspicions by

BOOK William's refusing to accept of the command of
 III. the troops; and saw that neither he, nor count Eg-
 1559. mont, who likewise declined accepting it, were
 persons on whom he could depend for executing
 the plan which he had formed for establishing des-
 potism in the provinces.

He left them however in possession of the several governments to which they had been appointed, and still allowed them to hold their places as formerly in the council of state. He did not chuse to exasperate them too much. Their merit, he was sensible, entitled them to all the honors and offices which they enjoyed. He knew how extensive their influence was among the people; and he was conscious they had been guilty of nothing that could justify him for removing them from their employments; since, even when their conduct had offended him the most, they had only exercised those rights, which, by the fundamental laws of the country, belonged to every inhabitant of the Netherlands.

But although Philip did not think proper to dismiss them from his service, he resolved that they should not have power to frustrate his intentions. And for this purpose he left, for principal counsellor to the regent, the bishop of Arras; whose views were entirely coincident with his own, and in whom, therefore, the dutchess of Parma was desired to repose unlimited confidence.

The bishop
 of Arras.

Antony Perenot, bishop of Arras, so well known in the history of the Netherlands by the name of cardinal Granvelle, was son to the cele-

brated chancellor of that name, whom the late emperor had for many years intrusted with the management of his most important affairs. Antony having been early initiated into business, had been employed by the emperor for several years in the nicest political negociations, and in some of the highest departments of the state. He was a person of extraordinary abilities, and particularly distinguished for his eloquence, his activity, his industry, and address. Yet he was extremely odious to the people whom he was left to govern, who considered him as the principal author of all their grievances. In the court of Charles, and afterwards in that of Philip, he had acquired habits and principles not unsuitable perhaps to the minister of a despotic prince, but which rendered him exceedingly unfit for the government of the Low Countries, where the power of the sovereign was so much limited by the laws. He was naturally choleric and haughty, vain, and ostentatious of his credit with the king; and, by an imperious and interested behaviour, had disgusted many of his friends, and inflamed the resentment of his enemies. He was particularly obnoxious to the principal nobility; and, in the course of his ministry, had been instrumental in disappointing many of them in their most favorite views of ambition and interest ¹⁴.

In the hands of a person so universally disliked, it could not reasonably be expected that the government would proceed smoothly. While Philip

B O O K

III.

1559.

¹⁴ Bentivoglio, & Strada, & Dom l'Evesque, tom. i.

BOOK

III.

1559.

himself was present, the discontented nobles were overawed. But no sooner was that restraint removed which the king's presence imposed upon them, than their ill-humor broke out, with a degree of violence that drew after it the most serious and important consequences.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK IV,

PHILIP set sail from the Netherlands with a fleet of near seventy ships, on the 20th of August, and arrived at Loredó, in the province of Biscay, on the 29th. He reached the port in safety, but no sooner had he landed than a dreadful storm arose, in which a part of his fleet was shipwrecked; above a thousand men perished, and a great number of capital paintings, statues, and other curious works of art, were lost, which Charles had been employed during forty years in collecting, in Germany, Italy, and Flanders.

Philip, animated by a spirit similar to that which prompted him, after the victory of St. Quentin, to consecrate a church to St. Laurence, thought he could not, on this occasion, express his gratitude

BOOK
IV.
1559.
Philip's arrival in
Spain.

B O O K

IV.

1559.

The joy of
the Spaniards
on this
occasion.

for his preservation, in a manner more acceptable to the Deity, than by declaring his resolution to dedicate his life to the defence of the catholic faith, and the extirpation of heresy^{*}.

As the Spaniards had not for many years enjoyed the presence of their sovereign, his arrival diffused universal joy throughout the kingdom. His administration before his marriage with the queen of England had procured him the general esteem, and he was now more respected than ever, on account of the signal success with which his arms had been attended in his war with France, and the moderation and equity which he had displayed in the peace of Chateau - Cambresis.

Philip's attachment
to Spain.

The proofs of affection which he received at this time from his Spanish subjects, were the stronger, because, although Philip seldom suffered either joy or sorrow to appear in his looks, his discourse, or behaviour, it was well known how much he was attached to his native country, more than to any of his other dominions; and it was generally believed, that he intended to fix in it his perpetual residence. His manners were suited only to those of his Spanish subjects; he could not, as has been already mentioned, speak with facility any other language but theirs, and he possessed not that courage and enterprise by which the late emperor had been determined to undertake so many voyages and journies to the different states which were subject to his dominion. The Low Countries had

^{*} Father Paul, lib. v. p. 417.

not, in the eyes of Philip, those charms by which Charles had been so powerfully attracted; and were particularly disagreeable to him, on account of the restrictions which their free constitution of government imposed on his authority.

B O O K

IV.

1559.

In the beginning of the reign of Charles, Spain was one of the freest states in Europe; but as the nobles were humbled, and their power abridged, during the arbitrary, but vigorous administration of cardinal Ximenes; so the ill-concerted and unsuccessful attempt which the commons of Castile made some years afterwards, to assert their rights, served only to exalt the royal prerogative, which they intended to have circumscribed, and to reduce the Cortes to an entire dependence on the crown. And although in Arragon the people still enjoyed their ancient privileges, yet there was little probability that they would ever adventure to dispute the will of their prince; who possessed such inexhaustible resources, and could, when he pleased, employ even their own countrymen the Castilians, to subdue them. But there was no circumstance which served more to increase Philip's partiality for Spain, and to make him prefer it to any of his other dominions for the place of his abode, than the full establishment which the court of inquisition had acquired in that kingdom, and the security which this institution afforded him against the propagation of heresy.

This tribunal, which, although it was not the parent, has been the nurse and guardian

Of the in-
quisition.

B O O K

IV.

1559.

of ignorance and superstition, in every kingdom into which it has been admitted, was introduced into Spain near a century before the present period, by Ferdinand and Isabella; and was principally intended to prevent the relapse of the Jews and Moors, who had been converted, or pretended to be converted to the faith of the church of Rome. Its jurisdiction was not confined to the Jews and Moors, but extended to all those who, in their practice or opinions, differed from the established church. In the united kingdoms of Castile and Arragon, there were eighteen different inquisitorial courts; having each of them its counsellors, termed Apostolic Inquisitors; its secretaries, serjeants, and other officers; and besides these, there were twenty thousand familiars dispersed throughout the kingdom, who acted as spies and informers, and were employed to apprehend all suspected persons, and to commit them for their trial, to the prisons which belonged to the inquisition. By these familiars, persons were seized on bare suspicion; and, in contradiction to the common rules of law, they were put to the torture, tried and condemned by the inquisitors, without being confronted either with their accusers, or with the witnesses on whose evidence they were condemned. The punishments inflicted were more or less dreadful, according to the caprice and humor of the judges. The unhappy victims were either strangled, or committed to the flames, or loaded with chains and shut up in dungeons during life.

Their

Their effects were confiscated, and their families stigmatized with infamy ².

BOOK

IV.

1559.

This institution was, no doubt, well calculated to produce an uniformity of religious profession; but it had a tendency likewise to destroy the sweets of social life; to banish all freedom of thought and speech; to disturb men's minds with the most disquieting apprehensions, and to produce the most intolerable slavery, by reducing persons of all ranks of life to a state of abject dependence upon priests; whose integrity, were it even greater than that of other men, as in every false religion it is less, must have been corrupted by the uncontrouled authority which they were allowed to exercise.

Such nearly were the sentiments which even the Spaniards entertained of this iniquitous tribunal, at the time when it was erected³. But not having had experience then of its pernicious effects, and considering it as intended for the chastisement of Jews and infidels, they only murmured and complained; till, the yoke being wreathed about their necks, the most secret murmurings became dangerous, and often fatal to those who uttered them.

By this tribunal, a visible change was wrought in the temper of the people; and reserve, distrust, and jealousy, became the distinguishing character of a Spaniard. It perpetuated and confirmed the reign of ignorance and superstition. It inflamed the rage of religious bigotry; and, by the cruel spectacles to which, in the execution of its decrees, it familiarized

Effects of this institution on the character of the people.

² Mariana, lib. xxiv. c. 16. p. 137.

³ Mariana.

B O O K

IV.

1559.

the people, it nourished in them that ferocious spirit, which, in the Netherlands and America, they manifested by deeds that have fixed an everlasting reproach on the Spanish name.

But these considerations could not be apprehended by Philip; nor, if they had been suggested to him, would they have had any influence upon his conduct. He had imbibed, in all its virulence, that spirit of bigotry and persecution, which gave birth to the inquisition. He regarded heretics as the most odious of criminals; and considered a departure in his subjects from the Romish superstition, as the most dreadful calamity that could befall them. He was therefore determined to support the inquisitors with all his power, and he encouraged them to exert themselves, in the exercise of their office, with the utmost diligence.

The zeal and vigilance of these men fully corresponded to that ardor with which their sovereign was inflamed; yet so irresistible in this age was the spirit of innovation, and so great the force of truth, that the opinions of the reformers had found their way even into Spain, and were embraced openly by great numbers of both sexes, among whom there were both priests and nuns.

Caranza Abp.
of Toledo.

Even the archbishop of Toledo, Bartlemi di Caranza y Miranda, was, from certain propositions contained in a catechism which he published, suspected to have espoused them. The inquisitors informed the king of the grounds of their suspicion, and desired to receive his instructions for their conduct. Caranza had been universally

respected as one of the most virtuous and learned prelates in Spain. Having, when provincial of the order of St. Dominique, been carried by Philip into England, as a person well qualified to promote the re-establishment of popery in that kingdom, he had labored with so much zeal for that end, and thereby recommended himself so powerfully to the king, that in the year one thousand five hundred and fifty-seven, Philip advanced him to the primacy. His first employment after attaining this high dignity was to administer spiritual comfort to the late emperor, whom he attended in his last distress. But the memory of his merit and services was now obliterated. Philip wrote to the inquisitors from the Netherlands, that they must, without hesitation, proceed against the archbishop as they would do against other delinquents; and that they should not spare even his own son, if they found him guilty of heresy. Caranza was accordingly thrown into prison, and his revenues were sequestered. The propositions in his catechism, at which the inquisitors had taken offence, were held to be of a disputable nature even among the catholics themselves. It is probable, however, that sentence would have been pronounced against him, had not the pope interposed, and claimed an exclusive right to decide the cause. Philip, anxious for the honor of the holy office, to whose power he was desirous that no bounds should be prescribed, employed all his interest to prevail on the pontiff to drop his pretensions. But at last he himself yielded; and Caranza, after having languished in

B O O K

IV.

1559.

BOOK IV. 1559. prison for six years and seven months, was transported to Rome, where he was released from confinement, but died in a few weeks after he was set at liberty^{*}.

An Auto-de-fe
at Valladolid,

witnessed by
Philip.

Before Philip's arrival in the city of Valladolid, an Auto-de-fe had been celebrated, in which a great number of protestants were committed to the flames. There were still in the prisons of the inquisition more than thirty persons, against whom the same dreadful punishment had been denounced. Philip, eager to give public proof as early as possible of his abhorrence of these innovators, desired the inquisitors to fix a day for their execution; and he resolved to witness it. The dreadful ceremony (more repugnant to humanity, as well as to the spirit of the christian religion, than the most abominable sacrifices recorded in the annals of the pagan world) was conducted with the greatest solemnity which the inquisitors could devise; and Philip, attended by his son Don Carlos, by his sister, and by his courtiers and guards, sat within sight of the unhappy victims. After hearing a sermon from the bishop of Zamora, he rose from his seat, and having drawn his sword, as a signal, that with it he would defend the holy faith, he took an oath administered to him by the inquisitor-general, that he would support the inquisition and its ministers, against all heretics and apostates, or others who should attempt to oppose it; and

^{*} Ferreras, Annis 1559 and 1565. Campana, an. 1559. Miniana, lib. v. c. 11.

would compel his subjects every where to yield obedience to its decrees. BOOK

IV.

1559.

Among the protestants condemned, there was a nobleman of the name of Don Carlos de Sessa, who, when the executioners were conducting him to the stake, called out to the king for mercy, saying, "And can'st thou thus, O king, witness the tortments of thy subjects? Save us from this cruel death; we do not deserve it." "No," Philip sternly replied, "I would myself carry wood to burn my own son, were he such a wretch as thou'." After which, he beheld the horrid spectacle that followed, with a composure and tranquillity that betokened the most unfeeling heart.

This dreadful severity, joined with certain rigid laws, enacted to prevent the importation of Lutheran books, soon produced the desired effect. After the celebration of another Auto-de-fe⁶, in which about fifty protestants suffered, all the rest, if there were any who still remained, either concealed their sentiments, or made their escape into foreign parts⁷.

Philip proceeded next to settle the civil government of the kingdom; and, according to the Spanish historians, he discovered in the choice of his ministers, and of the governors of towns and provinces, much prudence and circumspection; of which last, a historian gives the following

⁶ Yo traeria lena para quemar a mi hijo, si fuere tan malo como vos. Cabrera, lib. v. c. 3. Miniana, l. v. c. 11.

⁷ In Seville.

⁷ Miniana, lib. v. c. 11.

B O O K

IV.

1559.

instance, that besides making diligent inquiry concerning the characters of the several candidates for office, he kept a register for his own use, in which he recorded all the vices and defects, as well as the virtues and accomplishments of each^a.

He might have confined his attention to objects of this nature, and have applied himself wholly to the internal administration of his dominions, had he not found it necessary to provide against the hostile intentions with which the Turkish emperor, and the corsairs of Barbary, were animated against him.

Of the Turkish
emperor.

The Ottoman empire was, in the present period, at the summit of its glory, under the victorious Solyman; the greatest and the most enlightened of all the Sultans. In Persia, in Hungary, and in Africa, this heroic prince had widely extended the limits of his empire; had expelled the knights of St. John from Rhodes, which till then had been deemed impregnable; had stripped the Venetians of a great part of their territories; laid waste the coasts of Italy and Spain; and filled all Europe with admiration of his exploits, and with the terror of his name. From the time of his competition with Ferdinand in Hungary, he had regarded the princes of the house of Austria as his rivals. He had assisted Henry II. of France, first against Charles, and afterwards against Philip; as he had formerly assisted Francis against the emperor. And in the late war, although by some accident his fleet did

^a Miniana, lib. v. c. 11.

not arrive in time to act in concert with that of France, yet it came afterwards under his admiral Piali, who, having landed his troops in Italy, and in the islands of Prochita and Minorca, put great numbers of the inhabitants to the sword, and carried off many hundred prisoners into slavery^{*}.

From an enemy so powerful and enterprising, Philip had much to apprehend. But he believed it to be inconsistent with the character of protector of the church, to which he aspired, to enter into any alliance with a prince who was the declared and irreconcilable enemy of Christianity; and therefore, far from proposing any terms of accommodation, he issued orders for putting the coasts of Spain and Italy into a posture of defence, lest Solyman should find leisure from his other occupations to renew hostilities.

But the Spanish monarch had more immediate cause of inquietude from the corsairs on the coast of Africa, who had become much more formidable than before by the assistance which Solyman had afforded them ever since they acknowledged him for their sovereign. They consisted of Turks, Arabs, Negroes, and Moors; the last of whom were partly natives, and partly such as had been expelled from Spain in the time of Ferdinand and Isabella. They were all men of barbarous manners, inflamed with the most bigoted zeal for the Mahometan religion, open foes to almost every

The Corsairs
of Barbary.

^{*} Ferreras, ann. 1558.

B O O K Christian power, and animated with a peculiar
IV. hatred against the Spaniards, who had often at-
1559. tacked them in their strong holds, and had long
 treated their brother Mahometans, the Moreoscoes
 in Spain, with inhumanity. They had often taken
 full revenge for these injuries, under the celebrated
 brothers, Horuc and Hayradin Barbaroffas. Their
 principal fleet was now commanded by another
 corsair, of the name of Dragut, the Barbaroffa of
 his age, and not inferior to either of the two
 brothers in those qualifications by which they
 were so eminently distinguished.

Dragut.

Born in a little village in Natolia, opposite to the
 isle of Rhodes, and sprung, like the Barbaroffas,
 from the meanest parents, Dragut had, in his youth,
 enlisted himself on board a Turkish galley, and had
 served there for some years as a common sailor. In
 that station he gave conspicuous proofs of his capa-
 city. He seemed however to be governed by a pas-
 sion extremely different from that ambition which
 is the ordinary attendant upon genius, and to have
 no other end in view than to enrich himself. But as
 soon as he had acquired a certain sum of money, he
 purchased a galley of his own, and began the ad-
 venturous occupation of a corsair, in which he be-
 came remarkable for his skill in navigation, his
 knowledge of the seas, his intrepidity, and enter-
 prise. His character did not remain long unknown
 to Hayradin Barbaroffa, who was at that time high
 admiral of the Turkish fleet. Barbaroffa gladly re-
 ceived Dragut into his service, and having made
 him his lieutenant, he gave him the command of

twelve of his ships of war. With this fleet Dragut did infinite mischief to all the European states who traded in the Mediterranean, the French only excepted, whose monarchs were in alliance with the Turkish emperor. He suffered no season to pass unemployed. Scarcely a single Spanish or Italian ship escaped him; and when he failed in taking a sufficient number of prizes, he commonly made some sudden descent on the coasts of Spain or Italy, plundering the country, and carrying off great numbers of the inhabitants into captivity. In these descents he was generally fortunate; but in the year 1541, having landed his men in a creek in Corsica, they were scattered along the coast, and employed in collecting their booty, when Juanetin Doria, the brave nephew of the illustrious Andrew Doria, came upon him with a superior force, took nine of his ships, and compelled him to surrender. When he was carried on board the admiral's galley, he could not restrain his indignation, but exclaimed, "And am I then doomed to be thus loaded with fetters by a beardless youth?" a saying which occasioned his meeting with harder usage than he would otherwise have received. Both Barbarossa and Solyman interested themselves in his behalf, and made tempting offers to the Genoese for his ransom. Notwithstanding which they detained him four years in captivity; nor could they be persuaded to set him at liberty till Barbarossa, with a hundred gallies under his command, appeared before their town, and threatened to lay it in ashes if he were not instantly released. The Genoese found it neces-

B O O K

IV.

1559.

B O O K fary to comply with this request; and Dragut, who
 IV. was immediately afterwards furnished with a strong
 1559. squadron of ships by Barbarossa, and was now
 inflamed with redoubled hatred against all who
 bore the name of Christians, resumed his former
 occupation, and fought after opportunities, with
 unceasing ardor, to wreck his vengeance upon
 his enemies. Besides captures which he made at
 sea, he sacked and pillaged, year after year, in-
 numerable villages and towns in Italy and the ad-
 jacent isles. Having been dispossessed by Doria of
 his strong sea-port of Mohedia on the coast of Bar-
 bary, he had ample revenge afterwards on that gal-
 1552. lant seaman, in an engagement off Naples, in which
 he took six of his ships, with a great number of
 troops on board, and obliged Doria himself, and
 the rest of the fleet, to fly before him. In the year
 immediately following he subdued almost the whole
 island of Corsica, and delivered it into the hands
 of the French. After this, having made himself
 master of Tripoli, he fortified that place in the
 strongest manner. From Tripoli he issued forth as
 often as the season would permit; and after Phi-
 lip's accession, and even after peace was concluded
 between France and Spain, he continued to practise
 as formerly his depredations upon the coasts of Sicily,
 Naples, and other states which belonged to the
 Spanish monarchy.

Expedition
 against Tri-
 poli and the
 isle of Gerba.

Of these hostilities Philip had received particular
 information before he left the Netherlands, and
 had been earnestly exhorted by the Sieur de la
 Valette, grand-master of the knights of Malta,

and the duke de Medina Cœli, governor of Sicily, to think seriously of putting an end to the innumerable mischiefs to which his subjects were exposed from this active corsair, by sending such a force against him as might compel him to abandon his retreat. Philip readily consented to his request; and as he was informed by la Valette, that Dragut himself was absent at that time from Tripoli, carrying on an inland war against one of the kings in Barbary, he sent immediate orders to the duke de Medina Cœli, Doria, and others, to hasten forward the preparations necessary for the intended enterprise. The pope and most of the other princes in Italy contributed their assistance, and a fleet was assembled consisting of more than a hundred ships, having 14,000 soldiers on board. This armament, of which the duke de Medina Cœli had the chief command, set sail from Messina in the end of October 1559, and passed over to Syracuse. There it was detained by contrary winds for several weeks, and during that time a disease, occasioned by unwholesome provisions, carried off between three and four thousand of the troops. Medina Cœli however proceeded in his voyage, still hoping that he had force sufficient to ensure success; and it is probable that he would not have been disappointed had he advanced directly and laid siege to Tripoli. But he thought it would facilitate the reduction of that place, to make himself master beforehand of the isle of Gerba, which lies a few miles from Tripoli, and was held by a Moorish governor, attached to the interest of Dra-

B O O K
IV.
1559.

gut. This island was subdued with little difficulty; and a castle which had been erected upon it was, after a feeble resistance, abandoned by the Moors, whose commander swore allegiance upon the Alcoran to the king of Spain.

It was the opinion of some of the principal officers that this castle should be immediately destroyed, and that the fleet should proceed to Tripoli without delay. But the duke was unfortunately of a different opinion, and resolved not only to preserve the castle, but to strengthen and enlarge it. In this preposterous undertaking a great deal of time was lost. Dragut had returned with his army from his inland expedition; and he had leisure not only to provide for the security of the town, but to send notice to the Grand Signor of the operations of the Christian fleet, which he represented might be attacked with great advantage in its present situation, while the commander was off his guard, and most of the forces were on shore.

Destruction of
the Spanish
fleet by the
Turks.

Solyman embraced without hesitation the tempting opportunity which was thus presented to him. He fitted out, with the utmost expedition, a fleet of seventy-four gallies, put a hundred Janissaries, besides other soldiers, on board each of them, and gave the command to his admiral Piali, with orders to proceed in his voyage as fast as possible. The Spaniards were informed of his approach by a Maltese frigate, and were thrown into great perplexity. A council of war was immediately held. Some officers were for waiting till the enemy should arrive,

and advised Medina to give them battle. Others, among whom was the younger Doria¹⁰, whose courage was unquestionable, were of opinion, that considering the sickly condition of the troops, and the great diminution which they had undergone, they could not contend with so powerful an enemy without the utmost danger of a total overthrow, and therefore that they ought immediately to retire, and conduct the fleet to a place of safety. The duke de Medina Cœli, a man of no experience in maritime affairs, and utterly unqualified for the charge which he had undertaken, was at a loss to determine to which of the two measures proposed he should give the preference. There was a necessity for embracing instantly either the one or the other. Yet he balanced between them for some days, and still continued to make the troops work in completing the fortifications of the castle, till intelligence was brought him that the enemy were at hand, and steering directly towards the island.

There was no time now to put the fleet into a posture of defence. Both the mariners and soldiers were overwhelmed with terror; and each crew, without waiting for the word of command, made haste, with oars and sails, to escape from the impending danger. Several ships foundered among the flats and shallows. Others were driven back by the wind, or by the enemy, and wrecked upon the island. Some escaped, and particularly those

¹⁰ The elder Doria was prevented from taking a part in this expedition by the infirmities of old age.

BOOK

IV.

1559.

The Duke of Medina Cœli
the Duke of Medina Cœli
the Duke of Medina Cœli
the Duke of Medina Cœli

BOOK

IV.

1559.

which belonged to the order of St. John, through their superior acquaintance with the coast. Above thirty were taken by the Turks; about one thousand men were killed or drowned, and five thousand taken prisoners. Medina Cœli, with Doria and some other principal officers, passed in the night through the middle of the enemy's fleet, and arrived safe at Malta; having, before his departure, committed the charge of the fort of Gerba to Don Alvaro de Sande, to whom he gave the strongest assurances of speedy assistance and relief.

The siege of
the fort of
Gerba by
the Turks.

This valiant Spaniard had very little reason to trust to these assurances, and could not expect to be able to hold out long against so great a force as he knew would be employed against him; especially as he was but indifferently furnished with provisions, and was much more likely to find enemies than friends in the natives of the island. Notwithstanding these discouraging circumstances, he readily undertook the arduous task assigned him; and having got his garrison augmented by the crews of those ships which, in attempting to make their escape, had been driven back upon the coast, he prepared with great alacrity for a vigorous defence.

Piali lost no time after his victory, but immediately landed his troops and began the siege. He was furnished with artillery by Dragut, who brought it himself, together with some fresh forces, from Tripoli. About twelve thousand Turks, besides the islanders and other Moors, were employed in the siege. In their first approaches many of them were killed. But soon after their battery had been

unmasked, a great part of the wall of the fort was laid in ruins. The besieged in the mean time began to suffer greatly from the heat of the season, and from the scarcity and unwholesomeness of the water and provisions. Great numbers died, and many, grown impatient under the hardships to which they were exposed, deserted to the enemy. By these men Piali was informed of the distressed condition of the garrison; and he invited them to surrender, and promised to spare their lives. Don Alvaro rejected this offer with disdain, and still persisted in the defence. But at length finding that his stock of provisions was almost spent, and having despaired of the relief which had been promised by Medina, he called together the garrison, which amounted now only to one thousand men, and having reminded them of the glory which they had acquired, and informed them that they had neither bread to support their bodies, nor numbers to defend the fort any longer, he desired them to resolve, whether they would give themselves up tamely to be the slaves of their barbarous enemy, or imitate the example which he would set them, and die with their arms in their hands, fighting bravely for the honor of their religion and their country. The soldiers called out with one voice, "That they chose death rather than slavery; and were ready to follow wheresoever he should lead them." He then desired they would refresh themselves with such victuals as still remained, and hold themselves in readiness to leave the fort about the middle of the night.

B O O K

IV.

1559.

End of July

1560.

B O O K

IV.

1559.

At that time they set out, by the gate which looked towards the sea, and having passed a triple rampart, which had been thrown up to prevent their sallies, they made dreadful havock among the Turks, and had almost reached the general's tent, when they were put to a stand by the Janissaries. They fought long and desperately; but at last, the whole Turkish camp being up in arms, they were overpowered by numbers, and almost all of them were slain. Alvaro, with two officers who had kept near him, forced his way through the thickest part of the enemy, till he reached the shore, and got on board a Spanish ship which had been stranded. There he was standing at day-break, with his target in one hand and his sword in the other, surrounded by the Turkish soldiers, who would have quickly buried him under their darts, if their officers, who highly respected his heroic valor, had not restrained them. Having been urged by a Genoese renegade to lay down his arms, and assured of receiving a treatment suitable to his rank and merit, he at last consented to surrender himself to Piali¹¹.

Such was the conclusion of this unfortunate enterprise; the failure of which, and all the calamities which ensued, seem to have been owing principally to the weakness, obstinacy, and inexperience of the commander in chief; yet we do not find that Philip ever expressed any dissatisfaction with his conduct.

¹¹ He was carried to Constantinople with the other prisoners, and was afterwards set at liberty, by an article in a treaty of peace between the Sultan and the emperor of Germany.

He

He either viewed it in a different light from that in which it has been represented by the contemporary historians; or he considered, that it would have been a tacit acknowledgment of his own want of discernment, to accuse, of imprudence, or incapacity, a person whom he had judged deserving of so great a trust. Instead of this, he applied himself to provide against the effects which he had reason to dread from the success of the Turkish arms. He could hardly doubt that Piali would pursue his victory, and make a descent on the coasts of Spain or Italy.

The inhabitants were every where agitated with the most alarming apprehensions. Watch-towers were raised along the coast; and the fleet, which had lately suffered so much, was repaired with the utmost diligence. But these preparations, although they were afterwards found useful, were not at present necessary. Solyman having other objects of ambition which engrossed his attention, recalled his fleet to Constantinople, and thus delivered the Italians and Spaniards from their present fears¹².

Philip soon afterwards received intelligence that Hascem, son of the celebrated Barbarossa, and viceroy of Algiers under Solyman, had formed a design upon Oran and Mafarquivir, two strong forts on the coast of Barbary, which had been in the possession of Spain since the year one thousand five hundred and nine, when they were subdued by cardinal Ximenes. In order to frustrate this

B O O K

IV.

1559.

The siege of
Oran and Ma-
farquivir.

¹² Cabrera, lib. v. c. 5. 8. 12. 13. Miniana, lib. v. c. 12.

B O O K

IV.

1559.

design, a fleet of twenty-four gallies had been ordered to sail to Oran, for the reinforcement of the garrison; but this fleet had been overtaken in the middle of its course by a dreadful storm, in which two and twenty of the ships were lost, and upwards of four thousand men.

By this accident Hascem was encouraged to proceed in his projected enterprize. Having persuaded several of the Mahometan princes in Barbary to assist him with their troops, he arrived in the neighbourhood of Oran early in the spring, with a fleet of more than thirty ships, and an army of a hundred thousand men. Of the two places which he intended to attack, only Mafarquivir is a sea-port, and Oran lies at the distance of near a league from it. With so great an army he was enabled to block up both places at once; but he began his operations with the siege of Mafarquivir, which, though of greater importance by reason of its situation, was not so strongly fortified.

The count de Alcaudete, the Spanish governor, who had foreseen the approaching storm, had provided to the utmost of his power for the security of the places committed to his care; and both he and his brother Don Martin de Cordova, to whom he committed the chief command in Mafarquivir, were determined to hold out to the last extremity. Many bloody rencounters passed between the contending parties, in the sallies which Alcaudete made from Oran; and in these the Spaniards had generally the advantage. Don Martin, and the troops under his command, gave, if possible, still stronger proofs

of intrepidity in their defence of Mafarquivir. The walls were laid in ruins by the enemy's artillery. Hascem made eleven different assaults, and his standard was raised again and again upon the ruins of the walls; yet he was finally repulsed and obliged, notwithstanding his numbers, to yield to the unconquerable obstinacy of the Spaniards. These brave men, however, were now sensible, that, from the want of provisions, they must ere long either throw away their lives, or submit to that odious slavery to which they knew that the implacable hatred of their ungenerous enemy had doomed them.

Philip was not ignorant of the distress to which they were reduced; and he had exerted himself with great activity in making preparations for their relief. But as Mafarquivir was blocked up by sea as well as by land, it was necessary that the supplies which he had provided should be accompanied with a fleet superior to that of the enemy. Such a fleet he at last collected from Italy and the seaports in Spain, and gave the command of it to Don Francis de Mendoza, with instructions to sail for Mafarquivir with the utmost expedition. Mendoza happily arrived in time. Having come unexpectedly upon Hascem's fleet, he took nine ships, and put the rest to flight; and Hascem himself, who had been employed for some days in preparing for a new assault, perceiving the danger to which he was exposed from the Spanish fleet on the one hand, and the garrisons in Oran and Mafarquivir on the other, raised the siege precipitately, after it had

B O O K

IV.

1559.

The siege of
Oran raised
by the Spaniards.

B O O K

IV.

1559.

lasted for three months; and marched off with all his forces to Algiers. The Spaniards pursued for several miles, but finding they were unable to overtake him, they returned; and the fleet, after reinforcing the garrisons of Oran and Mafarquivir, set sail for Spain, where they were received with great rejoicing. The count de Alcaudete was soon after made viceroy of Navarre; Don Martin received distinguished marks of the royal favor; and all the officers, and even private soldiers, were rewarded in proportion to their rank and merit¹³.

The reduction
of Pennon de
Velez by the
Spaniards.

During the absence of the fleet, the trade of Spain had sustained considerable prejudice from the depredations of a celebrated corsair, of the name of Cara Mustapha, who, with a squadron of six or seven ships, traversed the Mediterranean with unwearied activity, and made innumerable captures. His retreat was a fort on the African coast, called Pennon de Velez, which, in those days, before the invention of bombs, was reckoned almost impregnable. It is situated on a steep and rugged rock, and is inaccessible, except by a narrow path, cut out in the rock itself; which is separated from the continent by a channel, capable of containing about a dozen of those ships which were usually employed in cruising. This rock was fortified, both above and below, with a wall, flanked with bastions, and mounted with cannon; and afforded a constant shelter and protection to the corsairs, when pursued. From its situation near

¹³ Cabrera, lib. vi. Herrera Hist. Gen. del Mondo, lib. v. c. 3. and 4.

the straits, these corsairs could annoy the Christians, while they themselves were exposed to very little danger; and it was become an object of the most serious concern to all the Christian powers who traded in the Mediterranean, to wrest it from them.

B O O K
IV.
1552.

In consequence of a report which gained credit, that Solyman intended this year to make an attack either on Spain or Italy, Philip had greatly augmented his naval force; but when he found that either there had been no ground for this report, or that the Sultan had changed his design, he thought, that he could not employ his fleet more usefully than by attempting to reduce Penon de Velez, which had been long an object of much dread to his subjects.

Not satisfied with his own numerous fleet, he solicited assistance from Portugal, from the knights of Malta, and from his allies in Italy; nor did he permit them to set sail from Malaga, the place of rendezvous, till he had collected above ninety gallees, besides sixty ships of a smaller size, with no less than thirteen thousand soldiers on board. The providing of so great a force was not merely an effect of that extraordinary caution with which Philip commonly entered upon any military enterprise; and such a number of troops could not be employed in besieging a place of such small extent as Penon de Velez; but, as the Moors in the country adjacent, were deeply interested in the preservation of the fort, on account of immense quantities of commodities of all kinds, and the

B O O K number of Christian slaves which were daily sold
 IV. to them by the corsairs, there was reason to apprehend that they would consider the cause of these
 1559. pirates as their own, and give all the opposition in their power to the Spaniards, in the operations of the siege.

Agreeably to this persuasion, the allies no sooner arrived upon the coast, than great numbers of these barbarians appeared among the hills, by the foot of which the army were obliged to pass in their way to the fort. But these tumultuary troops were not able to prevent the Spaniards from landing; nor, although they gave them some annoyance on their march, could they obstruct the operations of so formidable a body of regular forces. Still, however, it was the opinion of several of the allies, that after all that could be done to reduce a fort of so singular a construction, they would in the issue find it necessary to abandon their attempt. This would probably have happened, if Mustapha himself had been present. But, in order to save his ships from falling a prey to the enemy, he had left the place some time before, and given the command of it to a renegado, of the name of Ferret, with two hundred Turks under him, and ammunition and provisions sufficient to serve for a much longer time than the blockade was likely to continue.

He believed that the Spaniards would soon perceive the folly of their undertaking; and was therefore employed in his usual practice of cruising, with very little concern about the fate of his retreat. But he had been deceived in his opinion of those to

whom he had committed a charge of so great importance. Both the governor and garrison were intimidated by the sight of that powerful fleet and army which now encompassed them. No sooner were some of their guns dismounted by a Spanish battery, and a part of the wall demolished, than they were struck with the most violent panic, and the governor, and most of the garrison, made their escape to the continent in the middle of the night, by swimming. Such of them only remained as could not swim; and by these men the fort was delivered to the Spaniards.

There was much good fortune and little glory in this valuable conquest; but the joy which it excited over all the southern coast of Spain was inexpressible; and it was the more complete, as well as the more generally diffused, because only a very small number had been killed or wounded in their encounters with the Moors. Don Garcia de Toledo, the commander in chief, was, soon after his return, rewarded by Philip, with the viceroyalty of Sicily¹⁴.

¹⁴ Cabrera, lib. vi. c. 17. Ferreras, part xiv. Vertot's Hist. of the Knights of Malta.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.
BOOK V.

BOOK
V.
1552.

DURING the course of those military operations which have been described, Philip beheld with much anxiety the rapid progress of heresy in almost every state in Europe except Spain; and, in order to obstruct it, he employed all his influence to procure the convocation of a general council of the church.

The persecu-
tion of the
protestants.

In the first years of the reformation, the bigotry of those who adhered to the ancient superstition, suffered them not to think of any other means of extirpating the opinions of the protestants, but persecution; which was exercised against them with the same unrelenting severity, as if they had been guilty of the most atrocious crimes. But it soon appeared how inadequate this barbarous procedure was to the purpose which the Romanists intended. Those bloody edicts which were published, those fires which were lighted up, and that

variety of torments which priests and inquisitors invented with ingenious cruelty, served in reality to propagate the doctrines against which they were employed, and contributed to inflame, rather than extinguish, that ardent zeal with which the protestants were animated. Being firmly persuaded, that the cause which they maintained, was the cause of God and truth, and that their perseverance would be rewarded with a happy immortality, they courted their punishments instead of avoiding them; and in bearing them, they displayed a degree of fortitude and patience, which, by exciting admiration in the beholders, produced innumerable profelytes to the faith for which they suffered.

Several princes had been converted to that faith. In some states the protestants had become more numerous and powerful than their opponents; and in others, their opinions so generally prevailed, that the catholic princes found it no longer possible to extirpate them, without depriving themselves of great multitudes of their most industrious subjects, on whom the wealth and importance of their states depended. The time when persecution might have proved effectual was past, and the princes came at length to perceive the necessity of having recourse to some more gentle means than had been hitherto employed. They were at the same time sensible, notwithstanding their prejudices against the reformers, that some reformation was extremely necessary; they had long borne with great impatience the numberless encroach-

B O O K

V.

1559.

Progress of
the Reforma-
tion.

B O O K

V.

1559.

A general
council de-
sired by the
catholic
princes.

ments of the court of Rome ; and were convinced, that if some abuses were removed, it would not be impracticable to persuade the protestants to return into the bosom of the church.

A general council appeared to be the only expedient by which this important end could be obtained ; and the late emperor Charles had taken infinite pains to procure the convocation of that assembly. In former times the councils of the church had been convened by the emperors themselves ; but, in the time of Charles, the power of calling them was, by all true catholics, considered as the peculiar prerogative of the popes ; who dreaded, that such assemblies might derogate from their usurped authority, and were therefore inclined, if possible, to prevent them from being held. With the timid Clement, Charles employed all his art and influence to procure a council, but in vain. Paul the third was likewise exceedingly averse from this measure ; but the emperor being seconded by almost all the catholic princes in Europe, Paul yielded to their importunities, and summoned a council to meet in Trent. From this place it was afterwards translated to Bologna. After the death of Paul it was again assembled in Trent in the year one thousand five hundred and fifty-one, and continued to be held there till the year following ; when it was prorogued for two years, upon war being declared against the emperor, by the elector of Saxony.

In the sessions which were held under Paul, that fundamental tenet of the reformers, by which

the writings of the evangelists and apostles are held to be the only rule of the Christian faith, was condemned; and equal authority, was ascribed to the books termed Apocryphal, and to the oral traditions of the church.

B O O K
V.

From the manner in which the deliberations of this assembly were conducted; from the nature of its decisions, and from the blind attachment of a great majority of its members to the court of Rome, there was little ground to hope for the attainment of those ends for which the calling of it had been so earnestly desired. But no other expedient could be devised, which the catholics thought so likely to stop the progress of heresy; and therefore, as soon as the war between France and Spain was concluded, the several catholic princes began to think seriously of the restoration of the council.

The state of Europe at that time seemed more than ever to require the application of some immediate remedy. The power and number of the protestants were every day becoming more and more considerable. Both England and Scotland had disclaimed allegiance to the see of Rome, and new-modelled their religion. In the Netherlands the reformers had greatly multiplied of late, notwithstanding the most dreadful cruelties had been exercised against them; and in France, where every province was involved in the most terrible combustion, there was ground to apprehend, that they would soon become too powerful for the catholics, and be able to wrest from them

1560.
The state of
Europe.

B O O K

V.

1560.

The pope's
dread of na-
tional fynods
in Savoy and
in France.

the reins of government. The new opinions had penetrated even into Italy, and had been embraced by a considerable number of persons both in Naples and Savoy. From the former of these States they were extirpated by the unrelenting severity of Philip; who issued orders to his viceroy to put all heretics to death without mercy, and even to pursue with fire and sword a remnant of them who had fled from Cosenza, and were living quietly among the mountains¹.

But the duke of Savoy, unwilling to deprive himself of so great a number of useful subjects as had been converted to the protestant faith, was inclined to attempt to enlighten and convince them; and with this view he desired the pope's permission to hold a colloquy of the principal ecclesiastics in his dominions, on the subject of religion. Pius was about the same time informed, that in France a resolution had been embraced to have recourse to the same expedient. He believed that no measure could be devised more likely to prove fatal to that exclusive prerogative which he claimed, of judging in matters of religion. He dreaded that the example of France and Savoy would be quickly followed by other States, and the decrees of provincial fynods substituted in the place of those of the Holy See. It highly concerned him, therefore, to prevent this measure (so pernicious to his authority) from taking place. Nor did he find much difficulty in

¹ F. Paul, lib. v.

dissuading the duke of Savoy from adopting it. B O O K
 “ If the heretics, said he to the duke’s ambassa- V.
 dor, stand in need of instruction, I will send 1560.
 divines and a legate, by whom they may be
 both instructed and absolved. But your master
 will find, that they will lend a deaf ear to all the
 instructions that can be given them, and will put
 no other interpretation upon his conduct, but
 that he wants power to compel them to submit.
 No good effect was ever produced by that lenity
 which he inclines to exercise; but from experience
 he may learn, that the sooner he shall execute
 justice on these men, and make use of force to
 reduce them, the more certain will be his suc-
 cess; and if he will comply with the counsel
 which I offer, he shall receive from me such
 assistance as will enable him to carry it into
 execution. ”

The duke, who was sincerely attached to the
 Romish faith, and closely connected with Philip,
 unfortunately yielded to these persuasions, and
 engaged in a bloody war with his protestant sub-
 jects, of which he had afterwards the greatest
 reason to repent².

The pope met with much more difficulty in His aversion
 preventing a national synod in France, than in to the calling
 Savoy; and was obliged to promise, that he of a council.

² He found it necessary at last to grant them the free
 exercise of their religion, after having been worsted by
 them in several skirmishes among the mountains, and
 suffering a total overthrow in a pitched battle, in which
 he lost 7000 of his troops. F. Paul, lib. v.

B O O K

V.

1560.

should call a general council without delay. Pius had, before his promotion, taken an oath to this purpose, as all the other cardinals had likewise done, before they proceeded to his election. But no sooner had he ascended the papal throne, than he adopted the sentiments of his predecessors; and showed that he entertained the same aversion to this assembly which *they* had so uniformly manifested. He remembered the motives which had determined Paul the third to dissolve it, under the color of a translation to Bologna. He reflected on the danger to which Julius had been exposed, and from which his good fortune and the war of Germany had delivered him; and he considered, that as there was now no prince so powerful as Charles, by whom the prelates could be overawed, they would probably assume a bolder tone in the council, and attempt to advance their own prerogatives on the ruins of the papacy.

He finds it necessary to consent to it.

For these reasons he would gladly have eluded the performance of his oath. But so great was his dread of the fatal consequences which might arise from a national synod in France, and so earnest the importunity of Philip, of the emperor, and other catholic princes, that he at last thought it necessary to comply with their request; resolving to employ all his attention in providing against the dangers to which his authority would be thereby exposed.

After many delays, which Pius knew well how to interpose, the bull of convocation, summoning the council to meet in Trent at Easter, was published

in the consistory on the twenty-ninth of September one thousand five hundred and sixty; and nuncios were dispatched to give intimation of it to all the Christian powers.

B O O K

V.

1560.

The pope and cardinals were greatly at a loss to determine whether the council should be mentioned in the bull as a new one, or as a continuation of that which had been held under Paul and Julius. The decision of this point, seemingly of small importance, was rendered difficult by the consequences which it involved. For if the continuation were declared, then all those decrees of the former sessions, which were levelled against the protestants, would be held sacred, and receive the sanction of the council that was about to be convened. The protestants would consider themselves as already condemned, and pay no regard to the bull of convocation. Whereas, if in this bull the assembly to be summoned were denominated a new council, they might expect that all the points in controversy would be discussed anew, and consequently, might be persuaded to send deputies to the council, and to acknowledge its authority.

The bull of
convocation.

In this the emperor and the queen mother and ministers of France were deeply interested; and they urged with great earnestness, that in the bull no mention should be made of the former sessions, and no occasion given the protestants to suspect that any restriction would be laid upon the proceedings of the council. Philip was governed by views and sentiments of a very different nature. His detestation of the protestants prevented him

BOOK
V.
1560.

from relishing any other method of dealing with them, but that of force. He was utterly averse from making any concessions to reconcile them; and he desired the celebration of the council, not so much in order to recover those who had already revolted from the church, as either to prevent others from following their example, or, as Pius afterwards suspected, to increase the power of the bishops and princes, by abridging the jurisdiction of the pope; to whose exorbitant pretensions Philip was in reality adverse, notwithstanding that devoted attachment to the Holy See which he affected, in order to promote his ambitious designs. With these views and sentiments, Philip did not desire that the protestants should come to the council. He believed that their presence would serve only to perplex and retard its deliberations. He apprehended, that to suffer the decrees of the former sessions to be again discussed, would contribute to invalidate the authority of the council itself: and for this reason he thought it necessary that the intended meeting should be declared a continuation of the council which had formerly been prorogued.

In this matter Philip's sentiments were entirely conformable to those of the pope; but Pius durst not, on this occasion, run the risk of giving offence either to the emperor or to the court of France; and therefore, after long deliberation, he couched the bull of convocation in such ambiguous expressions, as might be interpreted to signify either a new council, or a continuation of the former.

This

This expedient had, in some degree, the effect intended. Although neither of the parties was entirely satisfied, yet neither of them was so much disgusted as either the one or the other would have been, if the terms had been explicit: and the bull was at length received by the emperor and the French king, as well as by Philip, and the other catholic princes; who all gave orders to the ecclesiastics in their dominions to repair to Trent at the time appointed.

In the bull, only bishops, abbots, and others entitled to vote by the rules and ancient practice of the church, were summoned to attend. But an invitation was carried to the several protestant powers, by two nuncios, Martinengo and Commendone.

The protestants refuse to attend the council.

The protestant princes in Germany were, on this occasion, assembled at Naumburgh, in Upper-Saxony; and to that place the emperor sent three ambassadors, to second the nuncios in their invitation. To the imperial ambassadors, the princes replied in terms expressive of their respect for Ferdinand. They thanked him for the sollicitude which he discovered in their behalf; and said, that nothing would be more agreeable to them than a general council, provided it were calculated to heal the divisions of the church. But no such desirable effect, they thought, could be expected from the council to which they were now invited; which was called by one whose authority they could not acknowledge; and in which (as appeared from the bull of convocation) only those were to

Their reasons.

B O O K

V.

1560.

have decisive votes, who had sworn allegiance to the pope, and the see of Rome.

The nuncios, however, were brought in, and briefs were delivered by them from the pope to each of the princes; but these briefs were on the next day returned unopened, with the following declaration: "That as they did not acknowledge any jurisdiction in the bishop of Rome, there was no reason why they should explain to him their sentiments of the council, which they had already done to the emperor³."

From Naumburgh the nuncios set out for England and Denmark; but they were obliged to stop short, Martinengo in the Low Countries, and Comendone at Lubec; the latter having been forbid to proceed by Frederic, and the former by Elizabeth, both of whom had resolved to give no encouragement to the intended council.

The council
meets at
Trent, and
is governed
by the pope
and his le-
gates.

The opinion which the protestants entertained of the sinister intentions of the pope was fully justified by the event. In the very first decree of the first session, when many of the prelates were not yet arrived, his legates, who presided in this assembly, procured it to be enacted, that they only should propose the several questions to be discussed; and thus they made at once effectual provision against all attempts to correct any of the numberless abuses in the court of Rome, for remedying which the meeting of the council had been desired. Against this decree Philip and the other princes remonstrated in the most importunate manner, and

³ F. Paul, lib. v.

employed their interest, both with the pope and in the council, to procure the repeal of it. But all their endeavours were ineffectual. Their solicitude on this head served only to confirm Pius in his suspicions of their having formed a design to encroach on his authority. He eluded their applications with consummate artifice, and sent orders to the legates to make all the opposition in their power to any proposal which might be made for annulling the decree.

This did not prevent several of the prelates from endeavouring to persuade the council to establish certain points, such as the divine institution and the residency of bishops, which would have struck deep at the root of the papal power. The pope, from whom the legates received instructions on every difficult emergency, was kept in perpetual anxiety; and he sometimes thought of suddenly dissolving an assembly, which he found so difficult to keep within the bounds he prescribed to it. But, by unremitting vigilance and attention, by threatening some prelates with his displeasure, by flattering others, and heaping promises upon them of advancement in the church; and above all, by means of the great number of Italian bishops*, who depended entirely on his favor, he secured, in every question, a majority of voices; and not only prevented any decision from being passed that might be detrimental to his authority, but procured the ratification of many of those ecclesiastical usurpations which the

B O O K

V.

1560.

Vain attempts to abridge the power of the pope.

* Many of them were so poor, that he was obliged to defray the expenses of their attendance.

B O O K
V.

princes, who had been so solicitous for the convocation of the council, had expected would have been abolished and condemned. These princes were greatly disappointed and chagrined. Their ambassadors, as well as the prelates, complained, that the council, far from enjoying freedom, were fettered in all their deliberations by the secret orders which were daily sent from Rome: and on this head, remonstrances were made again and again to the pope himself, who sometimes vouchsafed a soft, evasive reply; and at other times, appearing to be greatly offended, asserted that the council was at perfect liberty; and insinuated, that the true source of all the discontent on this head was, that the ambassadors of the princes had not the power of dictating the decrees.

Conclusion
of the council.
1563.

Whatever ground there was for this insinuation, the deliberations of the council were conducted in the same manner as before, till at length Pius, grown impatient under the perpetual attention and expense which it required from him, sent orders to his legates to bring it as soon as possible to a conclusion. And it was concluded accordingly, with the most indecent precipitation, towards the end of the year one thousand five hundred and sixty-three, without any considerable opposition from the princes, who had long despaired of deriving from it any of those salutary effects which had been expected. They perceived that the pope's influence over it was

⁵ The acts were subscribed by the 4 legates, 2 cardinals, 3 patriarchs, 25 archbishops, 268 bishops, 7 abbots, 7 generals of regulars, and 39 proxies. F. Paul, lib. viii.

not to be controuled; and foresaw that the continuance of it must serve only to augment and strengthen his authority, which it had been their intention to circumscribe. Of this they had the most convincing evidence in the concluding session, in which two decrees were passed that had not been mentioned before, and were manifestly designed as an acknowledgment of the subordination of the council to the Holy See. One of these was, That application should be made to the pope for his confirmation of the decrees; and the other, That whatever expressions had been employed in any of the decrees, were to be understood without prejudice to the pope's authority.

Pius rejoiced exceedingly when he was informed of the dissolution of the council, and still more when he received intelligence of these its last decrees. He ordained, on this occasion, a solemn thanksgiving; and in the consistory declared, that he would confirm all the decrees, and add many reformati-
 ons to those which had been enacted by the council. By these reformati-
 ons, some of his courtiers apprehended that the profits arising from their offices would be diminished; and they employed all their influence to dissuade him from his purpose. Pius had no intention to introduce any alterations of which they had reason to be afraid; but he considered, that his refusing to confirm the decrees would be interpreted as a condemnation of the council; that all its acts would be thereby brought into disrepute; and that occasion might thence be taken, by the French and others, to hold

B O O K

V.

The last decrees.

1564.

The pope's joy on this occasion.

B O O K

V.

1564.

His bull of
confirmation.

national assemblies. And he considered likewise, that it would depend entirely upon himself to determine, how far any particular decree should be carried into execution. For these reasons he disregarded the objections of his courtiers, and published his bull of confirmation, with the usual formalities; requiring all prelates and princes to receive and enforce the decrees of the holy council of Trent; prohibiting all persons, whether laymen or ecclesiastics, from writing any explication of them under the form of notes or commentaries; and commanding the catholics every where to have recourse, in all dubious cases, to the Apostolic See.

Bad effects of
the decrees of
the council.

This bull was addressed only to the catholics; for Pius did not expect that any greater regard would be paid to it by the protestants than they had shown to his bull of convocation. The whole conduct of the council had, from the beginning, been calculated to widen, instead of closing, that breach which subsisted between them and the Roman church. The ancient religion was now more clearly ascertained. Its doctrines, the offspring of subtle sophistry, artifice, and presumption, were formally defined; its rites, which had crept into the church in the dark ages of ignorance and superstition, were now made an essential part of worship; and anathemas were pronounced against all persons by whom either the former or the latter were not embraced. By this impolitic conduct the protestants were more clearly instructed where to direct their attack; and in those absurdities, into which men must fall who venture to dogmatize on subjects so

mysterious as many articles of the Christian faith, they often found abundant matter of victory and triumph. No concessions of any kind had been made by the council, in order to reconcile them, but all their doctrines had been indiscriminately condemned; and henceforth all ground of hope was cut off of ever inducing them to return into the bosom of the church, by any other means but open force and persecution.

Pius flattered himself that these means would sooner or later prove effectual; and was therefore little concerned at the conduct of the protestants with respect to the council. He was much more deeply affected by the ill-humor which the queen mother and ministers of France discovered on the present occasion. They had been somewhat disgusted at the little regard that had been shown to their desire, of having the council declared to be a new council. They were displeased with the decrees of reformation, by some of which the ecclesiastical jurisdiction was extended beyond its former bounds; and they were highly dissatisfied with the tacit acknowledgment contained in the concluding decrees, of the superiority of the pope above councils; an opinion which in France had been always impugned and rejected. Influenced by these considerations, and desirous at the same time of avoiding to give any fresh occasion of discontent to the Calvinists, the French court (although earnestly solicited by Pius) refused to receive and publish the decrees.

B O O K

V.

1564.

The decrees rejected by the court of France.

* F. Paul, lib. v, vi, vii, viii.

B O O K

V.

1564.

They are
accepted by
Philip, and
other catho-
lic princes.

Pius had reason to apprehend that the example of so great a monarchy would be imitated by the other catholic powers. But he had the pleasure of receiving information from his nuncios, that not only the republic of Venice, and the several Italian princes, but most of the catholic princes in Germany, and the king of Spain, had resolved to acknowledge the authority of the council.

In forming this resolution, Philip gave a striking proof of that zeal which he so uniformly felt, or affected, for the catholic religion and the Holy See. No prince was ever more jealous of his power, or more tenacious of his rights; upon some of which encroachments had been made in the decrees of reformation. During the celebration of the council, he had complained loudly of the dependance in which it was held by the pope; he had again and again endeavoured, but in vain, to get that first decree rescinded, by which the legates alone could propose the questions to be discussed; and he had likewise been highly offended with the pope's precipitate dissolution of the council, in which measure he had neither been consulted, nor had any delay been granted at his ambassador's request. To these causes of alienation, Pius added another, which might have been attended with the most serious consequences, by determining a dispute for precedence between the Spanish and French ambassadors at Rome, in favor of the latter. To decide this point, which was of so delicate a nature, at so critical a juncture, the pontiff was induced, partly by the hopes of prevailing on the court of France to

Dispute of
precedence
between the
ambassadors
of France
and Spain.

receive the decrees of the council, and partly by his dread that if the young king were not gratified in this matter, his counsellors would advise him to break off all connexion with Rome, and to commit the supreme ecclesiastical authority in the kingdom to a patriarch of his own election.

Pius ordered his nuncio to explain these motives to the catholic king, and spared no pains to convince him of the necessity of the step which he had taken: and his endeavours were not altogether ineffectual. Philip did not, indeed, for some time, send any ambassador to Rome in the place of Don Louis de Requesens, who left it when the point of precedence was decided; but being determined, if possible, to live on amicable terms with the Holy See, he resolved to stifle his resentment. Nor did he suffer it to influence his conduct with regard to the decrees of the council, which, although they were not entirely conformable to his wishes, yet would contribute, he believed, in some measure, to prevent the progress of heresy; and therefore he issued orders, without hesitation, to have them received and obeyed throughout all his dominions⁷.

B O O K

V.

1564.

decided in
favor of
France

July 1

⁷ Cabrera, lib. vi. c. 16. Pallavicini, lib. xxiv. cap. 12.

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK VI.

BOOK

VI.

1565.

Hostile intentions of the Sultan against Philip and the knights of Malta.

PHILIP's attention was, soon after this, called to objects of a very different nature from those by which, during the sitting of the council, it had been engrossed. The success of his enterprise against Pennon de Velez, having given great uneasiness to all the piratical states, they had endeavoured to engage the Sultan to undertake the recovery of that fort; and had entreated him to employ such a fleet and army as might be sufficient to expel the Spaniards from the coast of Africa. Solyman was at the same time earnestly solicited by great numbers of his subjects, to take vengeance on the knights of Malta, who, besides co-operating with the Spaniards in all their African expeditions, still continued to exercise their wonted hostilities against the Turks

at sea, and had of late made innumerable captures.

BOOK

VI.

1565.

This prince was of himself as much incensed both against the former and the latter of these his enemies as any of his subjects could desire; and notwithstanding his great age, he was inflamed as much as ever with the ambition of extending his dominions. He therefore lent a willing ear to the solicitations which he now received; and having suspended all his other pursuits, he resolved to turn his whole attention against the Maltese and Spaniards. But he hesitated whether he should begin his operations with invading Malta, or the dominions of the catholic king; and to assist him in deciding this point, he held a council of his most experienced commanders.

Mahomet, the oldest and wisest of all his Bashas, was of opinion, that it would be highly inexpedient to begin with invading Malta, in subduing which, he said, the Sultan would find infinitely greater difficulty than he had encountered formerly in the conquest of Rhodes. For the latter of these islands, he observed, lay at so great a distance from Europe, as had made it almost impossible for the Christians to send assistance to the besieged; and was besides so large and fertile as to furnish subsistence to the Turkish troops. Whereas the former was small and barren; so far from the Porte, and so near to Sicily and Italy, that the knights could easily receive from thence perpetual succours and supplies. The king of Spain was deeply concerned in their preservation; and he, and other Christian princes, would,

B O O K

VI.

1565.

from religion as well as interest, think themselves bound to support an order of men whom they had long regarded as the champions of their faith. The knights would defend their island with the utmost obstinacy. And even although the Sultan should at last get possession of it, yet a new crusade would be formed by the Christians for its recovery, and the Turkish fleet would be destroyed in the harbours, before it could be put into a posture of defence. Sicily, he thought, would be a much easier and more certain conquest. The reduction of that island would conduce more to the Sultan's glory, as well as to the interest of his empire; and it would be quickly followed by the reduction of the knights of Malta, who could not subsist a single season without those continual supplies of provision which that more fertile region afforded them.

Solyman resolves to begin with the siege of Malta.

A prince of so great penetration as Solyman could not be insensible of the weight of these considerations; but having been long accustomed to triumph over much more formidable enemies than the knights of Malta, and having formerly expelled the knights themselves from Asia, when their power was more considerable than at present, he believed that they could not long resist his victorious arms. In this confidence of success he was confirmed by most of the Bashes, who chose rather to flatter his inclinations at the expense of his interest, than to run the risk of incurring his displeasure. His resentment against the knights was greatly heightened at this time by the capture of a rich

galleon belonging to some of his greatest favorites in the seraglio. These persons exerted all their influence to procure a speedy vengeance, and contributed to determine the Sultan to open the campaign with the siege of Malta; after the conquest of which he resolved to turn his arms against the king of Spain.

Having thus fixed his purpose, he issued orders for equipping all the ships in his empire with the utmost expedition; sent a great number of troops to the sea-ports in the Morea, where he intended they should embark; and desired Hascem and Dragut, his viceroys in Algiers and Tripoli, to hold their corsairs ready to join his fleet when it should arrive at Malta. He gave the command of the fleet to Piali, and that of the land forces to Mustapha, an experienced general, at the age of sixty-five, who had acquired his esteem and confidence by several victories which he had obtained in Asia. To these men he recommended strongly the acting in concert with each other; and required them to consult in every matter of importance with Dragut, whom he regarded as the ablest naval officer in his dominions.

The news of his preparations soon reached the several Christian powers on the coasts of the Mediterranean. But they were for some time in doubt where the storm which was gathering would burst. At length John de la Valette Parisot, the grand-master of Malta, received certain information of Solyman's design, from spies whom he employed

B O O K

VI.

1565.

His preparations.

La Valette
the grand-
master of
Malta.

B O O K at Constantinople. He immediately communicat-
VI. ed his intelligence to the king of Spain, the pope,
1565. and most of the other Christian princes; and represented to them the necessity of granting their assistance at the present crisis, if they would save from ruin an order of men whose bravery had for ages past been continually exerted in the protection of Christians of every nation in Europe, against the implacable enemy of the Christian name.

Philip's resolution to support the knights.

But although the subjects of almost every Christian state had, on numberless occasions, been supported by their generosity, and protected, or rescued from slavery, by their intrepid valor, yet only such princes thought it incumbent on them to interest themselves in their behalf, whose territories lay exposed to immediate danger. Of these no one had so much ground to dread the consequences of suffering the knights to be overwhelmed, as the king of Spain. For besides that his dominions were more exposed, he was much more obnoxious to the Sultan, than any other Christian monarch. He had repeatedly committed hostilities against the African corsairs, whom Solyman had taken under his protection; and he could not call in question the intelligence transmitted to him by the grand-master, that as the Turkish armament was to be sent first against the knights, it would be employed next against himself. Philip had ever looked on Malta as his principal bulwark against the invasions of the Turks; and he was sensible that he had now more reason than ever to consider it in that view. Prompted by these motives,

he resolved to exert himself with vigor in its defence; and having writ to his ministers and allies in Italy, to form an army of twenty-thousand men, which should be ready to embark on the shortest notice, he assembled a numerous fleet at Messina, and sent instructions to Don Garcia de Toledo, the viceroy of Sicily, to watch over the preservation of Malta with the same solicitude as if Sicily itself were to be attacked.

B O O K
VI.
1565.

The zeal with which Philip espoused the cause of the knights, delivered them from their anxiety with regard to the final issue of the war, but did not prevent the grand-master from exerting his activity and vigilance in preparing for a vigorous defence. Besides sending a general summons to the knights dispersed throughout the several provinces in Europe, to repair instantly to Malta; he distributed all the inhabitants of the island capable of bearing arms into companies, and appointed the knights to train them in the several branches of military discipline. He caused two thousand troops to be levied by his agents in Italy, and kept all the ships belonging to the order, perpetually employed in importing arms, military stores, and provisions.

The grand-master's activity and vigilance.

In obedience to his summons, all the knights hastened to his assistance, except such as were prevented by age or infirmities; and these supplied their personal services, by sending him all the money which they could raise out of the effects belonging to their convents. Before the arrival of the enemy, he reviewed his forces, and found

BOOK
VI.
1565.

that they amounted to seven hundred knights and eight thousand five hundred soldiers, including two companies of Spaniards which were sent to him from Sicily. These troops, after a solemn religious procession, and partaking of the holy sacrament, he distributed among the knights; and assigned to all of them their proper stations. In the midst of the multiplicity of affairs which demanded his attention, there was nothing omitted which human prudence could provide. He was continually employed either in visiting the posts, or examining the stores, or strengthening the fortifications, or instructing the officers as to the conduct proper to be observed in case of an attack. The wisdom displayed in his plan of defence, inspired his troops with confidence; and his tranquillity and fortitude communicated to them an elevation of mind, which rendered them superior to every calamity that could befall them.

Arrival of
the Turks
at Malta
under Mus-
tapha and
Fiali.

At length the Turkish fleet having left Constantinople in the end of March, arrived in sight of Malta about the middle of May; consisting of more, than two hundred sail, and having on board, besides a great number of Christian slaves, designed to serve as pioneers, above forty thousand land forces, composed chiefly of Janissaries and Spahis, the bravest soldiers of the Ottoman empire. This formidable army landed at some distance from Il Borgo¹, and soon afterwards spread themselves

¹ The town where the strength of the order was concentrated.

over the country ; setting fire to the villages , putting the peasants to the sword , and carrying off such of the cattle , as , notwithstanding the orders of the grand-master , had not been secured within the forts and towns.

While the Turks were thus employed , La Valette sent out De Copier , marshal of the order , with two hundred horse and six hundred foot , to watch their motions. De Copier , an officer of great experience , executed his commission with so much prudence and vigor , that by falling unexpectedly on detached parties , he cut off one thousand five hundred of the Turks , with the loss of only about eighty men. But La Valette intended , by permitting these skirmishes , only to make trial of his troops , and to accustom them to the looks and shouts of the enemy. He considered that even so small a loss as was occasioned by these rencounters , was more than he could easily support. He therefore recalled De Copier , and sent the soldiers and knights under his command to their respective posts.

The Turkish general held a council of war as soon as all his troops were landed , to assist him in resolving where he should begin his attack. Piali , agreeably to what he understood to have been the Sultan's instructions , was of opinion that they ought not to enter upon action till Dragut should arrive. But Mustapha having received information of the king of Spain's preparations , thought that something must be done instantly for the security of the fleet , which lay at present in a creek where it was

The siege of
St. Elmo.

BOOK

VI.

1565.

Difficulties
attending
the siege.

exposed to the violence of the east wind, and might be attacked with great advantage by the Spaniards. On this account he was of opinion, that they should immediately lay siege to a fort called St. Elmo, which stood on a neck of land near Il Borgo, having the principal harbour on one side of it, and on the other, another harbour large enough to contain the whole fleet in safety. This proposal was approved by a majority of the council, and Mustapha proceeded without delay to carry it into execution. He vainly expected that he would be able to reduce the fort in a few days. But besides the valor with which it was defended, there were two circumstances which greatly augmented the difficulty of his enterprise: one of these was that the garrison could easily receive supplies from the town, across the great harbour, which was secured by two forts, called St. Angelo and St. Michael, or La Sangle; and the other, that his approaches to the fort were retarded by the nature of the road leading to it, which was either a bare rock, or the rock thinly covered with a stony soil. This last inconvenience he remedied, by substituting in the place of trenches, a parapet formed of planks and beams covered on the side towards the fort with earth, which they brought from a distance, and mixed with straw and rushes. By this invention he was enabled to open a battery mounted with his largest cannon, on the sixth or seventh day after his arrival on the island; and he quickly convinced the governor, the bailiff of Negropont, that it would be impossible for him to hold out

long. Of this the governor gave immediate information to the grand-master, and made choice of a knight of the name of La Cerda for his messenger. This man, greatly disturbed by fear, exaggerated the danger which he had been sent to represent, and had the imprudence to tell the grand-master, in the presence of many of the knights, that he must not expect that the place would sustain the siege above a week longer. "And what loss," said La Valette, "have you received that makes you so soon despair?" "The fort," replied La Cerda, "is to be considered as a sick person, greatly reduced, who must receive continual remedies and supplies." "I myself," answered the grand-master with great indignation, "will be the physician; and will bring others along with me, who, if they cannot cure you of your fear, will at least preserve the fort from falling into the hands of the Infidels."

La Valette did not expect that a place which was neither strong, nor large enough to admit a numerous garrison, could be defended long, against so great a force as was employed to reduce it; but he thought it necessary that the siege of this fort should be prolonged as much as possible, in order to give the viceroy of Sicily time to come to his relief. With this view he resolved to throw himself into St. Elmo with a select body of troops; and he was preparing to set out when the whole body of knights remonstrated with such earnest importunity against his leaving the town,

The grand-
master's rea-
sons for de-
fending it
to the last.

B O O K

VI.

1565.

Progress of
the siege.

that he at last consented to suffer the reinforcement which he had prepared, to be conducted to the fort by a knight called De Medran, upon whose conduct and intrepidity he could rely with the most assured confidence.

Not long after De Medran's arrival in the fort the garrison made a vigorous sally, in which they drove the enemy from their intrenchments, and put a number of them to the sword. But the rest soon recovered from their surprise, and having returned to the charge, they compelled the Christians to retire. In this rencounter, the vigorous efforts of the Janissaries were favored by the wind, which blew the smoke of the guns upon the fort, and covered the besieged with a thick cloud, through which it was impossible to discern the operations of the enemy. This incident the Turks had the presence of mind to improve to great advantage. They seized, unperceived, upon the counterscarp, made a lodgment there with beams, woofsacks, and gabions; and raised a battery upon it with incredible expedition. After the smoke was dispersed, the besieged beheld what had been done with much astonishment; and they were the more disquieted, as the fortification which the Turks had raised upon the counterscarp, overtopped a ravelin which lay near it, in which the besieged could no longer appear with safety. They resolved however to defend this ravelin as long as possible, whatever it should cost them.

Arrival of
Dragut.

In the mean time Dragut and another noted corsair called Uluchiali arrived with twenty gallies,

having, besides slaves and seamen, two thousand five hundred troops on board. This reinforcement and the presence of Dragut added fresh vigor to the operations of the siege. This gallant corsair exposed himself on all occasions with the utmost intrepidity; spent whole days in the trenches; and as, besides his other extraordinary talents, he was particularly skilful in the management of artillery, he caused some new batteries to be raised in more advantageous situations than had hitherto been made choice of; and kept up a continual fire both upon the ravelin above mentioned, and a cavalier that covered the fort, and was one of its principal defences.

Progress of
the siege.

This cavalier soon became the only defence which could prevent the besiegers from coming up to the very foot of the walls. Some Turkish engineers having approached the ravelin at day-break, to examine the effects of their artillery, they observed a gun-port so low, that one of them, when mounted on the shoulders of another, looked into it, and saw the Christian soldiers lying on the ground asleep. Of this they gave immediate information to the troops; who, advancing as quickly and silently as possible, and clapping ladders to the gun-hole, got up into the ravelin, and cut most of the Christians to pieces.

Between this ravelin and the cavalier lay the ditch, over which the besieged had thrown a temporary bridge of planks, leading up to the cavalier. The Turks perceiving this, leapt instantly upon the bridge, and attempted to make themselves masters

BOOK

VI.

1565.

of the cavalier, as they had already done of the ravelin. But the garrison was now alarmed; the bravest of the knights hastened from different quarters to the post of danger; and, after an obstinate engagement, they compelled the Turks to retire into the ravelin. There the Janissaries observing another way of reaching the cavalier, by a path from the bottom of the ditch, they threw themselves down without dread or hesitation; and having ascended by this path to the other side, they renewed their attack with greater fury than ever. The combat lasted from sun-rise till noon, when the invincible bravery of the garrison proved at last victorious. About twenty knights and a hundred soldiers were killed, and near three thousand of the enemy.

As the ravelin was open on the side towards the fort, the besieged pointed some cannon against it, and made great havock among the infidels. But Mustapha, sensible of the value of the acquisition which he had made, poured in fresh soldiers without number; and the pioneers coming forward with woofsacks, planks, and gabions, put the troops at length in safety, and made a lodgment in the ravelin, of which the garrison were never able to dispossess them.

The grand-master's concern on account of this disaster was greatly augmented, by considering that it could not have happened so soon, without some negligence on the part of the garrison. He sent them however an immediate reinforcement; and both the siege and the defence were carried on with the same vigor as before.

But the situation of the besieged was now become much more dangerous than formerly. The Turks applied themselves with unremitting diligence to heighten the ravelin till it overtopped the wall of the fort; and after this, the garrison could no longer appear upon the parapet with safety. Many were killed by the enemy's artillery. Several breaches were made in different parts of the wall, and the hearts of the bravest knights began to fail within them. They apprehended, that ere long the Turkish general would attempt to take the fort by storm, and they dreaded that it would be impossible for so small a number to resist so numerous an enemy.

They agreed therefore, though with much reluctance, to apply to the grand-master for liberty to quit the fort; and they made choice of the chevalier de Medran for their messenger. De Medran represented that the fort was in reality no longer tenable, and that to continue in it, though only a few days, would infallibly occasion the utter destruction of the garrison. That nothing could be of greater advantage to the Turks than sending the forces of the order to a place where there were no fortifications to defend them; that, by doing so, the troops necessary for the defence of the other fortresses would soon be consumed, and these fortresses become an easy prey to the enemy. But he concluded with saying, that, although this was the opinion of all the garrison, he was commissioned to declare to the grand-master, that whatever resolution he should form, they

B O O K

VI.

1555.

The distress of the garrison.

They apply for liberty to quit the fort.

B O O K

VI.

1565.

Refused by the
grand master.

were determined to yield an implicit obedience to his authority.

Most of the knights in council thought that this request of the garrison ought to be immediately granted. But La Valette was of a contrary opinion. The fort, he acknowledged, would not probably hold out much longer; and he lamented the fate of those gallant knights and soldiers who were stationed in so perilous a situation. But there were cases, he said, in which it was necessary to sacrifice some of the members for the preservation of the body; and such he knew to be the present critical state of their affairs. For he was credibly informed that the Sicilian viceroy had declared, that if the fort of St. Elmo were lost, (as the consequence would be, that he could not attack the Turks with the same advantage as at present) he would not expose his fleet to the risk of a defeat for the sake of the rest of the island. And on this account La Valette subjoined, that the preservation of the order depended almost entirely on the length of the present siege. This he represented to the chevalier De Medran, and sent him back with instructions to remind the knights of the vow which they took at their entrance into the order, of sacrificing their lives for its defence. He likewise bade him assure them, in his name, that he would not fail to send them such reinforcements as they should stand in need of, and was determined, as soon as it should be necessary, to come himself to their assistance, with a fixed, unalterable purpose.

to lay down his life, sooner than deliver the fort into the hands of the Infidels.

B O O K

VI.

1565.

This answer had the desired effect on several of the knights, and particularly on those whose principles of honor and attachment to the order were confirmed by years. But the greater part of them were much dissatisfied. They thought the grand-master's treatment of them harsh and cruel, and wrote him a letter, subscribed by fifty-three, in which, after repeating their former request, they informed him, that if he did not, on the next night, send boats to carry them to the town, they were determined to sally out into the Turkish camp, where they might fall honorably by the sword, instead of suffering such an ignominious death as they had reason to expect, if the fort were taken by storm.

To this letter La Valette replied, "That they were much mistaken, if they expected to satisfy their honor by throwing away their lives; since it was no less their duty to submit to his authority, than to sacrifice their lives in defence of the order: that the preservation of the whole depended on their present obedience to his commands: that no aid was to be expected from Spain, if the fort were given up; and that, if he should yield to their request, and bring them to the town, the town itself would then be immediately invested, and they, as well as the rest, soon afterwards reduced to a situation more desperate than that from which they were so solicitous to escape, by deserting an important station which they had undertaken to defend."

B O O K

VI.

1565.

Besides this letter, he sent three commissioners to examine the state of the fortifications ; intending by this measure either to gain time , or to prevent the garrison from sinking into despair.

These commissioners differed widely in the accounts which they delivered at their return. Two of them thought it impossible to defend the fort much longer. But the third, named Constantine Castriot, a Greek prince, descended from the famous Albanian hero, Scanderbeg, whether from ignorance, or a consciousness of greater resources in his native courage than the other two possessed, maintained that the garrison was far from being reduced to the last extremity ; and to give proof how firmly he was persuaded of the truth of what he said, he offered to enter the fort himself, and to undertake the defence of it with such troops as should be willing to accompany him.

The grand-master, strongly impressed with a sense of the necessity of protracting the siege, immediately accepted this offer, and bestowed the highest encomiums on Castriot's zeal and resolution. Nor did Castriot find any difficulty in persuading a sufficient number to attend him, who were no less zealous and resolute than himself. The soldiers crowded to his standard, and were emulous to have their names enrolled for that dangerous service in which he had engaged.

When La Valette saw the spirit by which these men were animated, and had no longer any doubt of being able, by their means, to prolong the siege of the fort, he sent a letter to the knights,

acquainting them, that he was now willing to give them their discharge; and would immediately send another garrison, into whose hands, he desired, they should be ready to deliver up the fort, and come themselves to the town in the boats in which their successors were to be transported. "You, my brethren," continued he, "may be in greater safety here than in your present situation; and I shall then feel less anxiety for the preservation of the fort, although I think it of so great importance, that on the preservation of it, that of our order seems entirely to depend."

The contents and style of this letter affected the knights in the most sensible manner, and roused within them that delicate sense of honor, by which the order had been so long and so eminently distinguished. They trembled at the thoughts of the reception which they were about to meet with from the grand-master and the other knights. "Should this new garrison, said they to each other, which is appointed to succeed us, be fortunate enough to hold out till the Spaniards arrive, in what corner of the earth shall we conceal our infamy?" They resolved without hesitation to remain in the fort till every man should perish, rather than either deliver it to the new garrison, or abandon it to the enemy. And they went in a body to the governor, and entreated him to inform the grand-master of their repentance, and to join with them in praying that they might be suffered to wipe out the remembrance of their fault by their future conduct.

B O O K

VI.

1565.

The governor readily complied; and, in order to prevent the new garrison from setting out in the night, he dispatched his letter by a noted swimmer before it was dark. La Valette secretly rejoiced at this application; but sent word to the governor, that he must always prefer even a body of new troops to the most experienced warriors, who had refused to submit to the control of military discipline. When this answer was reported to the knights, they were overwhelmed with anguish, and had recourse to the most submissive entreaties of forgiveness. The grand-master suffered himself at last to be overcome; and henceforth the garrison, dismissing all thoughts of their own safety, were intent on nothing but how to prolong the defence.

The grand-master sent them every night fresh troops, to supply the place of the killed and wounded; and kept them well furnished with provisions, ammunition, and fire-works. Of these last he had invented a particular kind, which consisted of hoops of wood, covered with wool, and steeped in boiling oil, and other inflammable liquors, mixed with nitre and gunpowder. To these machines they set fire, and threw them flaming in the midst of the enemy, when they were crowded together at an assault. It happened often that two or three of the Turks were hooked together and scorched to death; and the utmost confusion was produced wherever the hoops were thrown.

The invincible
bravery of
the garrison.

The besieged stood much in need of this, and every other instrument of mischief, that could be devised for their defence. In spite of the most vigor-

ous opposition, the Turks had cast a bridge over the ditch, and begun to sap and undermine the wall. From the 17th of June to the 14th of July, not a single day past without some rencounter; and Mustapha had frequently attempted to scale the wall of the fort, but had been as often repulsed with the loss of some of the bravest of his troops.

Asbamed at having been detained so long before a place of such inconsiderable strength, he resolved to make one great decisive effort, and to bring to the assault as many of his forces as the situation of the place would permit him to employ. He had already made several breaches; but in order to secure the success of the assault which he now intended, he kept his batteries playing all the 15th without intermission, till the wall on that side where he designed his attack was almost level with the rock. On the 16th the fleet was drawn up before sun-rise as near the fort as the depth of the water would allow; four thousand musketeers and archers were stationed in the trenches; and the rest of the troops, upon a signal given, advanced to the breach. The garrison was prepared to receive them. The breach was lined with several ranks of soldiers, having the knights interspersed among them at certain distances. The Turks attempted often to break through this determined band, and to overpower them with their numbers. But their numbers served only to augment the loss which they sustained. Every shot from the fort did execution. The artillery made dreadful havock among them, and the burning hoops were employed with astonishing

B O O K
VI.
1565. success. The novelty of these machines, and the shrieks of those who were caught in them, added greatly to the terror which they inspired, and made it impossible for the Turkish officers to keep their men firm and steady in pursuing the advantages which, had they preserved their ranks, their numbers must have infallibly secured.

At length Mustapha, after having continued the assault for more than six hours, without gaining a single inch of ground on the besieged, gave orders for founding a retreat.

In this attack the garrison lost about twenty knights and three hundred soldiers; but this loss was immediately supplied by a reinforcement from the town: and Mustapha was at last convinced, that, unless the communication between the fort and the town were cut off, it would be impossible to bring the siege of the former to a period, while any troops remained in any other part of the island. By the advice of Dragut he resolved to extend his trenches and batteries, on the side next to the town, till they should reach to that part of the sea, or great harbour, where those supplies were landed which the grand-master daily sent to the garrison. This undertaking, he knew, must be attended with the utmost difficulty, because all the space between his intrenchments and the point to which it was necessary to extend them, lay exposed to the artillery both of fort St. Elmo and St. Angelo. In viewing the ground, a Sangiac, in whom he put confidence, was killed by his side; and, which was still a more irreparable loss,

Dragut received a mortal wound, of which he died in a few days². This did not however discourage Mustapha from pursuing his design. By employing his troops and pioneers at the work day and night without intermission, he at length carried it into execution. Then having planted batteries along the shore, and filled his trenches with musketeers, it was impossible for any boat to pass from the town to the fort, without the most imminent danger of either being sunk or intercepted.

After this precaution, he resumed with fresh vigor his attempt to take the fort by storm. On the twenty-first, he made four different assaults; all of which the garrison withstood, and, in repulsing so many thousand brave and well-disciplined troops, displayed a degree of prowess and fortitude which almost exceeds belief, and is beyond the power of description. But this heroic garrison was now exceedingly reduced in number, and there was the strongest reason to apprehend, that, in one assault more, they must inevitably be overpowered unless a reinforcement were sent them from the town. Of their desperate situation they gave intelligence to the grand-master, by one who swam across the harbour in the night. The boats were instantly filled with knights and other soldiers, who generously resolved to devote themselves to certain destruction, for the general safety, and the preservation of the fort. They set

B O O K

VI.

1565.

Dragut killed.

The garrison reduced to the last extremity.

² He was wounded in the head by the splinters of a stone, which was beat to pieces by a cannon-shot from fort St. Angelo.

B O O K

VI.

1565.

off from the town with as much alacrity as if they had entertained the most sanguine hopes of victory; but they found the Turks every where so much upon their guard, and the lines so strongly defended, that, after several fruitless attempts to land, they were at last obliged to return, depressed with sorrow for the fate of their brave companions.

The garrison now despairing of relief, gave themselves up for lost; but instead of either capitulating or attempting to escape, they prepared for death, and passed the night in prayer, and in receiving the sacrament; after which, they embraced one another tenderly, and then repaired to their respective posts; while such of the wounded as had been disabled from walking, were, at their own earnest desire, carried to the side of the breach, where they waited, without dismay, for the approach of the Turkish army.

St. Elmo
taken by
assault.

Early in the morning of the twenty-third of July, the Turks advanced to the assault, with loud shouts, as to certain victory, which they believed so small a handful of men as now remained in the fort would not dare to dispute with them. In this expectation they were disappointed. The garrison being resolved on death, and despising danger, were more than men, and exerted a degree of prowess and valor that filled their enemies with amazement. The combat lasted upwards of four hours, till not only every knight, but every soldier had fallen, except two or three who saved themselves by swimming. The Turkish colors were then

then planted on the ramparts; and the fleet entered the harbour which the fort commanded in a kind of triumph. When Mustapha took a view of the fort, and examined its size and fortifications, he could not refrain from saying, "What will not the father cost us, (meaning the town) when the son, who is so small, has cost so many thousands³ of our bravest troops." But this reflection, far from exciting his admiration of that heroic fortitude which he had found so difficult to overcome, served only to inspire him with a brutal fury. He ordered all such of the garrison as were found lying on the breach alive to be ript open, and their hearts torn out. And as an insult on the knights and their religion, he caused their dead bodies to be searched for, and large gashes to be made in them, in the form of a cross, after which he tied them on planks, and threw them into the sea, to be carried by the wind and tide to the town, or fort St. Angelo.

The grand-master was at first melted into tears at this shocking spectacle; but his grief was soon converted into indignation and revenge; and these passions betrayed him into an action unworthy of the exalted character which he bore. In order to teach the Basba, as he pretended, to make war with less barbarity, he caused all the Turks whom he had taken prisoners to be massacred; and then putting their heads into his largest cannon, he shot them into the Turkish camp.

³ Eight thousand.

B O O K

VI.

1565.

In the siege which has been related, the order lost about one thousand five hundred men, including one hundred and thirty of the bravest knights. The grand-master was deeply affected at so great a loss; but he wisely dissembled his concern, and wearing still the same magnanimous and intrepid aspect as before, he inspired all the troops that remained, with a fixed, unalterable resolution, to defend the town and the other forts to the last extremity.

Mustapha vainly imagined, that being intimidated by the fate of their companions, they would be now inclined to listen to terms of capitulation; and in this hope he sent an officer with a white flag to one of the gates, attended by a Christian slave, designed to serve for his interpreter. The Turk was not allowed to enter within the town; but the Christian was admitted, and was led through several ranks of soldiers under arms by an officer, who, after showing him all the fortifications of the place, desired him to take particular notice of the depth and breadth of the ditch, and said to him, "See there, the only spot we can afford your general; and there we hope soon to bury him and all his Janissaries."

Siege of Il
Borgo and
fort St. Mi-
chael.

This insulting speech being reported by the slave, excited in the fiery mind of the Bascha the highest degree of wrath and indignation, and made him resolve to exert himself to the utmost in the prosecution of the siege. His troops, though greatly diminished, were still sufficient to invest at

once both the town and the fort of St. Michael *. He kept a constant fire on both; but he intended first to apply himself chiefly to the reduction of the latter, which he proposed to attack both by land and water, at the extremity of the peninsula on which it stands. In order to accomplish this design, it was necessary he should have some shipping introduced into the harbour, for transporting his forces. But the mouth of the harbour having been rendered inaccessible by a great iron chain, and the cannon of St. Angelo, his design must have been relinquished, if Piali had not suggested an expedient against which the grand-master had not provided. This was to make the Christian slaves and the crews of the ships draw a number of boats, by the strength of their arms, over the neck of land on which stood fort St. Elmo. Of this proposal, which Mustapha immediately adopted, information was carried to the grand-master by a Turkish officer, who, being by birth a Greek, was touched suddenly with remorse, and deserted to the Christians. In consequence of this intelligence, La Valette set a great number of hands to work in framing a stacado along that part of the promontory where the Turks intended their attack; and at another part, where the depth of the water

R O O K

VI.

1565.

* They are situated on two promontories that run out into the great harbour, and are separated from each other by a channel, where the gallies belonging to the Order lay, and the mouth of which was strongly secured on each side by batteries.

' Called the Spur.

BOOK
VI.
1565.

Arrival of
Hascem son
of Barba-
rossa.

or the hardness of the bottom would not admit of the stacado, he caused strong intrenchments to be made upon the beach. Mustapha in the mean time fired incessantly upon the fort, while the slaves and crews were employed in transporting the boats over land into the harbour. At length the Bascha, judging that the number of boats which he had transported would be sufficient, and that the breaches which his artillery had made were practicable, resolved without further delay to make an attack both by sea and land. He was the more confident of success, as, since the taking of St. Elmo, he had received a considerable reinforcement, by the arrival of Hascem, son of Barbarossa, with two thousand five hundred select soldiers, commonly called the bravoës of Algiers. Hascem, who possessed a considerable share of his father's fire, and was ambitious to distinguish himself in the Sultan's service, begged of Mustapha to intrust him with the assault of fort St. Michael; and vaunted, with his natural arrogance, that he would soon make himself master of it sword in hand. The Bascha, whether from an opinion of his valor, or an intention to make him learn at his own expense the folly of his presumption, readily complied with his request; and having added six thousand men to his Algerines, he promised to support him with the rest of his army.

Hascem divided his forces with Candelissa, an old corsair, his lieutenant; to whom he committed the attack by sea, whilst he reserved that on the land to himself.

Candelissa having put his troops on board the boats, set out with drums beating, and hautboys and other musical instruments playing, preceded by a boat filled with Mahometan priests, some of whom were employed in offering prayers to Heaven for his success, or in singing hymns; while others had books in their hands out of which they read imprecations against the Christians. Candelissa attempted first to break down the stacado which had been formed to obstruct his landing; but finding it much stronger than he expected, and that, while he was employed in demolishing it, his troops must suffer greatly from the enemy's fire, he thought it would be easier to make a descent on that part of the shore which the grand-master had strengthened with intrenchments. At this important post, the Christian troops were commanded by an ancient knight of the name of Guimeran. This experienced officer reserved his fire till the Turks had advanced within a little distance of the shore, when by a single discharge he killed about four hundred men. This did not prevent the rest from approaching. Candelissa pushed forwards while the Christians were loading their cannon, and landed at the head of his Algerines. But Guimeran having reserved some cannon charged with grape-shot, did dreadful execution among them after they had landed, and many of them began to fly to their boats; which Candelissa observing, he commanded the boats to be put off to a little distance from the shore. His troops, perceiving then that they must either die

B O O K

VI.

1561.

Candelissa
repulsed
with great
slaughter.

B O O K

VI.

1565.

or conquer, took courage from despair, and advanced boldly to the intrenchment, with ladders for scaling it in one hand, and their sabres in the other. The combatants on both sides displayed the most intrepid valor. Great numbers fell, and the ditch was choaked with blood, and with the bodies of the dead and wounded. The Turks at last, after an engagement of five hours, reached the top of the intrenchment, and there planted their ensigns. The knights, stung with shame on account of their retreat, returned with redoubled ardor. But they would probably have been overpowered by the superior number of the enemy, had not the grand-master sent them a seasonable reinforcement, under the admiral de Giou, and the chevalier de Quiney; who fell upon the Algerines and Turks with a degree of fury that struck terror into Candelissa himself, who was noted for his intrepidity. Having ordered the boats to be brought nearer the shore, he was among the first who fled. His bravoes fought desperately for some time after he had left them; but were at length thrown down from the intrenchments, and compelled to fly to their boats with the utmost precipitation. The Christians pursued them, and the batteries continued firing on them without intermission. Many of the boats were sunk; the water was covered with dead bodies, mangled limbs, shields and helmets. Of the four thousand who had been sent on this enterprise, scarcely five hundred remained, and many of these were dangerously wounded.

Hascem was not more fortunate in his assault by land, than Candelissa was by sea. After having been repulsed at one breach with great slaughter, he rallied his troops, and led them on to another, where he fought long and desperately, till most of the bravoes having fallen by his side, he was obliged, with much reluctance and sorrow, to sound a retreat.

BOOK

VI.

1565.

Hascem and

Mustapha, not unmindful of his promise to support him, no sooner perceived him beginning to retire, than he ordered the Janissaries, whom he kept under arms, to advance. The garrison had maintained an engagement with Hascem for five hours, in the middle of the day, and in the hottest season of the year; yet, as if they had not been subject to the wants and weaknesses of humanity, they advanced beyond the breach to meet the Janissaries, and fought apparently with as much vigor and fortitude as before. By the power of superior numbers, they were compelled to fall back within the breach. But there they made the most desperate resistance; and, being reinforced by de Giou and de Quiney, with the troops which had triumphed over Candelissa, they at last repulsed the Janissaries with dreadful slaughter; after having lost more than forty knights, and two hundred of the bravest of the common men.

Mustapha
repulsed.

Mustapha, enraged by this invincible obstinacy which the Christians displayed in their defence, and dreading that the Spanish succours, which had been already delayed much longer than he expected, might soon arrive, resolved now to

The siege of
Il Borgo
and St. Michael
carried on at the
same time.

B O O K

VI.

1565.

employ his whole force at once, and while he himself prosecuted the siege of fort St. Michael with one half of his troops, to employ the other, under Piali, against the town. More batteries were raised. The trenches were advanced still nearer than before. Bridges of sail-yards and masts were thrown over the ditches. Mines, notwithstanding the hard and rocky soil, were sprung. Assaults were repeated without number; and the two Baschas, emulous of one another, and each of them agitated with continual anxiety lest victory should declare first for his competitor, exhibited the most shining proofs of personal courage, and exhausted all the art of war then known in the world. Yet, through the determined bravery of the knights, conducted by the grand-master with consummate prudence and indefatigable vigilance, the Turks were baffled in every attempt, and repulsed with slaughter. Mustapha flattered himself once with the most sanguine hopes of success on his part, from a machine invented by his principal engineer, in the form of a huge cask bound strongly with iron hoops, and filled with gun-powder, nails, chains, bullets, and such other instruments of death. After setting fire to a train which was fastened to this machine, it was thrown by the force of an engine, upon a ravelin that was the principal defence of the fort. But the garrison undismayed, found means, before it caught fire, to cast it out again into the midst of the assailants. In a moment afterwards it burst with dreadful fury, and filled the Turks with consternation. The knights

then sallied out upon them sword in hand, and taking advantage of their confusion, killed many of them, and put the rest to flight.

BOOK

VI.

1565.

Piali had, on some occasions, still more reason than Mustapha to entertain the hopes of victory, although the town was much stronger than the fort, and La Valette commanded there in person. By his batteries he had demolished all the out-works of the place, and had made an immense breach in the wall. While his troops were engaged in a furious assault, that engrossed the whole attention of the besieged from morning till night, he employed a great number of pioneers in raising a cavalier or platform of earth and stones, close by the breach, and so high as to overlook the parapet. Night, in the mean time, came on, and prevented him from carrying any further this great advantage; but he doubted not that next day he should be able to make himself master of the place.

Success of
Piali against
Il Borgo.

As soon as he had drawn off his forces, a council of the Order was convened, and most of the knights were of opinion that the town was no longer tenable; that the fortifications which still remained should be blown up, and that the garrison and inhabitants should retire into the castle of St. Angelo. But the grand-master received this proposal with horror and indignation. "This would be in effect," said he, "to deliver the whole island into the hands of the infidels. Fort St. Michael, which has been so gallantly defended and which is preserved by its communication with

The wisdom
and intrepidity of the
grand-master.

B O O K

VI.

1565.

the town, would thus be soon reduced to the necessity of surrendering. There is no room in the castle of St. Angelo for the inhabitants and troops; nor, if there were room, is there water in that fort for so great a number." It was then proposed that at least the relics of the saints and the ornaments of the churches should be carried into the castle; and the knights earnestly entreated the grand-master to retire into it himself, assuring him that they would conduct the defence with the utmost vigor and vigilance. "No, my brethren," he replied, "what you propose as to the sacred things, would serve only to intimidate the soldiers. We must conceal our apprehensions. It is here we must either die or conquer. And is it possible that I, at the age of seventy-one, can end my life so honorably, as in fighting, together with my friends and brethren, against the implacable enemies of our holy faith?" He then told them what he thought proper to be done, and proceeded instantly to put it in execution. Having called all the soldiers from fort St. Angelo, except a few who were necessary for managing the artillery, he employed *them* and the inhabitants all night, in throwing up intrenchments within the breach; after which he sent out some of the bravest knights, with a select body of troops, to make an attempt on the cavalier. These men stole softly along the foot of the wall till they arrived at the place appointed; when they set up a loud shout, and attacked the guards whom Piali had left there with so much fury, that the Turks,

believing the whole garrison had fallen upon them, abandoned their post, and fled precipitately to their camp.

B O O K

VI.

1569.

The cavalier was immediately fortified, a battery of cannon planted on it, and a parapet raised on the side towards the enemy. And thus the breach was rendered impracticable; the town put in greater security than before; and a work, which had been devised for its destruction, converted into a bulwark for its defence.

The grand-master had now greater confidence than ever of being able to hold out till the Spaniards should come to his relief. In consequence of the assurances given by Philip and the Sicilian viceroy, he had, long before this time, entertained the hopes of their arrival; and had often earnestly solicited the viceroy to hasten his departure from Messina. The conduct of this nobleman was long exceedingly mysterious. The patience of the knights was worn out by his delays; and they, and many others, suspected that the real motive of his conduct was the dread of encountering with an admiral of so great a reputation as Piali. But it afterwards appeared that the viceroy had acted agreeably to his instructions from the court of Spain. For although Philip was, for the reasons above mentioned, sincerely interested in the preservation of the knights; and had amused them with the most flattering promises of assistance, yet he seems from the first to have resolved not to expose himself to danger on their account, and to avoid, if possible, a general engagement.

Ungenerous
conduct of
Philip.

Aug. 24.

BOOK

VI.

1565.

A generous and grateful prince would have acted very differently towards an ally so deserving of his support; and if either generosity or gratitude had been the leading principle of Philip's conduct, it is probable he would, on this occasion, have regarded the knights as his own subjects; and have thought it no less incumbent on him to exert himself in their defence, than if they had acknowledged him as their sovereign.

But Philip was affected by their danger only so far as it threatened the tranquillity of his own dominions. He had resolved to interpose in their behalf, rather than to suffer them to be overpowered; but he appears to have been very little touched with their calamities; and to have intended to leave them to themselves, as long as there was any prospect of their being able to make resistance; by doing which he considered, that he would not only preserve his own strength entire, but might afterwards engage with the Turks, when they were exhausted by the operations of the siege.

Philip adhered inflexibly to his plan, notwithstanding the grand-master's repeated importunities, much longer than was consistent even with his own selfish views. For, without a degree of fortitude and prowess on the part of the garrison, and a degree of wisdom, vigilance, and magnanimity, on that of the grand-master, infinitely higher than there could be reason to expect, it must have been impossible for such a handful of men to have withstood, for so long a time, so great a force, and such mighty efforts as were employed

to reduce them. Even the death of the grand-master alone, whose person was exposed to perpetual danger, would have proved fatal to the knights, long before Philip sent orders to his viceroy to give them any effectual support; and in this case, as his own dominions or his fleet would have been immediately attacked, he would probably have had little reason to be satisfied with the timid, ungenerous counsels which he pursued.

Whatever judgment may be formed on this head, the viceroy did not think himself at liberty to yield to the repeated applications of the grand-master, till the operations of the siege began to relax, and the Turkish forces were reduced from forty-five thousand to fifteen or sixteen thousand; of whom many were worn out with the fatigues which they had undergone, and others rendered unfit for action by a bloody flux, which for several weeks had raged amongst them.

In this situation of affairs, when it was probable that the knights would, without assistance, have compelled the Turks to raise the siege, the viceroy let the grand-master know that he had now received such instructions from the king, as put it in his power to show his attachment to the Order; that he was not indeed permitted to attack the Turkish fleet; but that he would immediately bring him a strong body of troops, whose commanders (as he himself must return to Sicily) were to be entirely subject to the grand-master's authority, till the enemy should be expelled.

BOOK

VI.

1565.

Arrival of
6000 Spaniards.

The viceroy, although still suspected of interposing unnecessary delays, at length fulfilled his promise; and on the seventh of September landed six thousand men, under Don Alvaro de Sande and Ascanio de la Corna, in that part of the island which lay at the greatest distance from the Turks; after which he immediately carried back the fleet to Sicily.

The Turkish Bassas had been persuaded by their spies, that the viceroy's intention was to land his troops at the castle of St. Angelo; and to prevent this, Piali had lain several days at anchor before the great port, after having blocked up the entrance into it by a chain of sail-yards, piles and boats.

The siege
raised, and
the departure
of the
Turks.

In the mean time, intelligence being brought to Mustapha that the Spaniards were landed, and marching towards him, he was thrown into the most dreadful consternation. Sensible that his soldiers were much disheartened by their ill success, he imagined that he was about to be attacked by a superior army, consisting of the bravest and best disciplined troops in Spain. Without waiting for information of their number, he forthwith raised the siege, drew his garrison out of St. Elmo, and leaving all his heavy cannon behind him, embarked his troops with as much precipitation as if the Spaniards with superior forces had been in sight. He had scarcely got on board when a

* This is the same nobleman whose valiant defence of the fort of Gerba is described, p. 127.

deserter arrived from the Spanish camp, and informed him that with fifteen or sixteen thousand men, he had fled before an army that did not exceed six thousand, having no general at their head, and commanded by officers who were independent of one another. The Bascha was overwhelmed with shame and vexation by this intelligence, and would have immediately disembarked; but this, he knew, he durst not attempt without consulting Piali, Hascem, and his other principal officers.

While he was deliberating upon it, the grand-master improved to the best advantage the leisure that was afforded him. He employed all the inhabitants, men, women, and children, as well as the soldiers, in filling up the enemy's trenches, and demolishing their works; and put a garrison without delay into fort St. Elmo; in which the Turks now beheld from their ships the standard of St. John erected where that of Mahomet had lately stood.

This demonstrated to Mustapha how much new labor awaited him in case he should return to the siege; but being enraged against himself on account of the precipitancy of his retreat, and disquieted at the thoughts of the reception which he had reason to expect from Solyman, he wished to atone for his imprudence, and to wipe off the reproach in which it had involved him, by victory or death. Piali, who from his jealousy of the Bascha's credit with the Sultan, was not sorry for the failure of his enterprise, represented in a council of war

B O O K

VI.

1565.

B O O K

VI.

1565.

The Turks
again land-
ed,

and de-
feated by
the Spa-
niards.

convened on this occasion, that as the troops were much dispirited and worn out, it would be exposing them to certain destruction, either to lead them against the enemy, or to resume the operations of the siege. But a majority of the council were of a different opinion; and it was resolved to land the forces again without delay, and to march directly against the Spaniards.

The Turkish soldiers complained bitterly of this unexpected resolution, and obeyed the orders to disembark with much reluctance. Their officers were obliged to employ threats with some, and force with others. At length the number intended was put on shore, and Mustapha set out at their head in search of the enemy.

The grand-master had not neglected to give early notice of their march to the Spanish commanders, who had intrenched their little army on a steep hill, which the Turks would have found almost inaccessible; and it was the opinion of some of the principal officers, that they should avail themselves of the advantage of their situation, and stand on their defence. But this proposal was rejected with disdain by the bold adventurous De Sande, and the greatest part of the Spanish officers; and the troops were led out of their encampment, to meet the enemy in the open field. This conduct, more fortunate perhaps than prudent, contributed to increase the dejection of the Turkish soldiers, and to facilitate their defeat. Having been dragged against their inclination to the field of battle; and being attacked by the Spaniards with
great

great fury, both in front and flank, they scarcely fought; but, being struck with a sudden panic, they fled with the utmost precipitation.

Mustapha, confounded and enraged by this pusillanimous behaviour of his troops, was hurried along by the violent tide of the fugitives. He fell twice from his horse, and would have been taken prisoner, if his officers had not rescued him. The Spaniards pursued briskly till they came to the sea-shore. There Piali had his boats ready to receive the Turks, and a number of shallops filled with musketeers drawn up to favor their escape. Without this precaution, they must all have perished; and even notwithstanding the protection which it afforded them, the number of their killed amounted to two thousand men, while the victors lost only thirteen or fourteen at most.

Such, after four months continuance, was the conclusion of the siege of Malta, which will be for ever memorable on account of that extraordinary display of the most generous and heroic valor by which the knights, so few in number, were enabled to baffle the most vigorous effort which could be made to subdue them by the most powerful monarch in the world. The news of their deliverance gave universal joy to the Christian powers; and the name of the grand-master excited every where the highest admiration and applause. Congratulations were sent him from every quarter; and in many States public rejoicings were celebrated on account of his success. The king of Spain, who derived greater advantage than any other from that

Conclusion.

B O O K

VI.

1565.

glorious defence to which La Valette had so highly contributed, sent an ambassador to present him with a sword and dagger of which the hilts were solid gold, adorned with diamonds, as a testimony of his respect; and engaged to pay him annually a sum of money to assist him in repairing his ruined fortifications ⁷.

⁷ Thuanus, lib. xxxviii. Herrera, historia general. lib. vii. Cabrera, lib. vi. Vertot, Hist. des Cheval. de Malthe.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK VII.

PHILIP, being now delivered from his apprehensions of a Turkish invasion, applied with zeal to his favorite objects, the extirpation of heresy, and the enforcing of obedience to the council of Trent. Nor in these points did he meet with much opposition, in any part of his dominions except the Netherlands; where the seeds of discord, which had been sown in the beginning of his reign, were approaching fast towards maturity. The dutchess of Parma had, soon after his departure, experienced what a difficult charge she had undertaken. The regular clergy still continued to complain as loudly as ever of the new erection of bishoprics; and contributed to the utmost of their power to foment the spirit of discontent among the people. No change, they said, could be legally

BOOK
VII.

1565.
The affairs
of the Ne-
therlands.

B O O K VII. 1565. made in the constitution of the church, without the consent of the States. The new erections were therefore a violation of a fundamental law; which was the more intolerable as the abbots, on whose ruins the bishoprics were raised, were natives of the country, and deeply interested in the public welfare; whereas the bishops would be entirely devoted to the courts of Rome and Spain. But the regent was obliged to pay a greater regard to the orders of the king, than to the complaints or remonstrances of the people. Nor did she yield to the importunities of any of the cities, into which it had been resolved that the new bishops should be introduced, except Antwerp; the citizens whereof sent deputies to Madrid, and found means to convince Philip, that this new institution, through the dread with which it would inspire foreigners, that the inquisition was about to be established, would prove destructive of their commerce¹.

While the regent was employed in settling the new bishops, she was not unmindful of the king's injunctions with respect to the execution of the edicts. They were executed with the utmost rigor, against persons of all ages and of both sexes, without distinction. And no greater regard was shown, on many occasions, to the laws of nature and humanity, than to the constitution of the provinces. The regent was not of herself inclined to those cruel measures that were pursued; but

¹ Meteren, lib. ii. p. 37. Bentivoglio. Grotius, &c.

she was directed in every thing by Granvelle², whose views, she knew, were perfectly conformable to those of the king; and whose judgment, for that reason, she often followed in contradiction to her own.

It was seldom that any matters relative to the edicts or the new bishoprics were laid before the council, and when they were brought thither, they were proposed as points already fixed, and not as subjects on which there was room to deliberate. The regent formed her resolutions privately, with the assistance of Granvelle, and there was nothing left to the council, but to give their sanction to the measures which had been resolved upon before.

It is not surprising that a conduct so extremely partial should have given umbrage to the other counsellors. The prince of Orange and the counts Egmont and Horn³ were more particularly offended with it. Their high stations, their merit and services, and the trust which had ever been reposed in them by the late emperor, entitled them to a principal share in the regent's most secret councils; and they were filled with indignation when they saw that, on every occasion, a preference was given to the cardinal. "In this," they said, "consisted the recompence of all their services, to be reduced by the king, to whose person and interest they had ever shown the most inviolable attach-

The nobility disgusted.

² Now archbishop of Mechlin, and advanced to the dignity of cardinal.

³ Admirals of the Netherlands.

B O O K
VII.
1565.

ment, under the dominion of an arrogant and haughty ecclesiastic. The dutchess of Parma had the name of regent, but the power was lodged in the hands of Granvelle. The most important affairs of the state were all determined in private by him, without the consent, or even the knowledge of the other counsellors. Their seats in the council, and their government of the provinces, were only high-sounding, empty names, which gave them the appearance of authority, whilst they did not possess any real power; but were equally subjected with others to the arbitrary will of Granvelle."

While the prince of Orange and the other discontented lords had so much reason to be dissatisfied, it could not be expected that they would be extremely active in executing the orders of the court. Notwithstanding all that had been done to suppress the new opinions in religion, these opinions were diffused wider and wider every day throughout the provinces. This Granvelle ascribed to the negligence of the magistrates in executing the edicts. The prince of Orange, on the other hand, and count Egmont, threw the blame of it on him; and said, that by pursuing measures to which the people of the Netherlands had never been accustomed, he had soured their minds, and brought the regent's government into hatred and contempt. Those complaints were often made in the presence of the regent herself; who, being pressed on the one hand by the positive orders of the king, inculcated by Granvelle, and on the other, distressed

by her apprehension of the consequences to be dreaded from so much ill-humor and discontent, could only give soothing answers to the complainers, and flatter them with some general hopes that the grounds of their complaints would be removed.

B O O K
VII.
1565.

She was still more embarrassed, when the prince of Orange proposed in the council, that, in order to remedy the present evils, she should summon a convention of the States. It could not be expected that Granvelle would relish this proposal. For he was not ignorant how ill the people stood affected to his person, and his measures of government; nor how much superior the influence of the prince of Orange would be to his, if the States were assembled. But he did not neglect the present opportunity of ingratiating himself with the king. When the regent gave Philip information of the proposal which had been made to her, and desired to receive his instructions on the subject, Granvelle took that occasion to represent to him, "That nothing could be more prejudicial to his authority than the assembling of the States: a measure which ought at all times to be avoided, as it usually produced an inclination in the people to encroach upon the prerogatives of the crown; but which there was never so much ground to dread as at present, when persons of all conditions were so deeply infected with a spirit of sedition and discontent. The abbots would come to the convention, inflamed with indignation on account of the late diminution of their revenues. The lower nobility

Their animosity against cardinal Granvelle.

B O O K and the deputies of the towns would be gained
VII. over by the prince of Orange, and the other dis-
1565. contented lords; and the people, ever fond of
 innovations, would be much more inclined to
 regard the opinion of their deputies than that of
 the regent, or the ministers of the king."

This representation was perfectly agreeable to
 Philip's views and sentiments; nor did he hesitate
 in complying with the counsel which was offered
 him. He immediately renewed his orders to the
 regent with respect to the rigorous execution of the
 edicts; and thereby let the prince of Orange and
 the other nobles see that there was nothing farther
 from his intention than to convene the States, in
 order to consider of more gentle expedients for
 preventing the growth of heresy*.

They apply
 to Philip
 for his re-
 moval.

The persecutions, therefore, were carried on as
 formerly. The compassion which all men felt for
 the unhappy sufferers, excited a general odium
 against the government. The magistrates encoun-
 tered insurmountable difficulties in executing the
 orders of the court; and the number of protestants
 increased daily, while the most vigorous efforts
 were made to extirpate them by the regent and
 her ministers. Granvelle endeavoured to con-
 vince the king, that this was chiefly owing to the
 remissness of the governors of the provinces. They
 were not ignorant of his accusation; and being
 now incensed against him more than ever, they re-
 solved to make him feel the effects of their resent-
 ment. Agreeably to this resolution, the prince of

* Bentivoglio, lib. ii. p. 15.

Orange, and the counts Egmont and Horn, wrote a letter to the king, in which they laid the blame of all the disturbances in the Netherlands upon the cardinal; who, they represented, had assumed the sole direction of affairs, and, by his imperious conduct, had rendered himself the object of universal hatred. "It was impossible for them to serve either the king or the people, whilst a person so exceedingly obnoxious possessed such unlimited influence. But the government would proceed smoothly, if Granvelle were removed; and in case the king would grant their request, there should be nothing wanting on their part, either to support his authority, or to maintain the purity of the catholic faith, to which they were not less sincerely attached than cardinal Granvelle."

To this letter Philip, after a delay of some months, made as mild a reply as could justly have been expected; but he concluded with observing, "That it was not his practice to dismiss his ministers upon the complaints of their enemies, till he had given them an opportunity of vindicating their conduct. Justice too required, that, from general accusations, they should descend to mention particular crimes or misdemeanours; and, if they did not incline to do this in writing, one of them might come to Madrid, where he would be received with every mark of distinction and respect."

Philip's reluctance.

With this answer the prince of Orange and the other lords were much dissatisfied; and they had the courage to reply, "That they were greatly

B O O K

VII.

1565.

disappointed to find so little regard paid to their remonstrance. For they had not writ their former letter, as cardinal Granvelle's accusers, but as the king's counsellors; who, by virtue of their office, were bound to inform him of whatever appeared to be of consequence to the welfare of his dominions. They did not desire that the cardinal should suffer harm; and, in any place except the Netherlands, they should be glad to hear of his prosperity; but his continuance there, they thought, was incompatible with the public peace." They added, "That they did not esteem the cardinal so highly as to undertake a journey to Spain on his account; and that since the king was pleased to repose so little confidence in their opinion, they hoped he would dispense with their further attendance in the council; where, as they could not be present without a diminution of their dignity, it was impossible for them, while the cardinal retained his influence, to be of the smallest use."

To this second letter, Philip made no other answer, but that he would consider of what they had said, and that in the mean time he expected they would continue to give their assistance as formerly in the council.

1564.
Departure of
Granvelle.

They now saw that he had no intention to comply with their request. Still however they obeyed his orders, and at times they went to the council; but there, and every where else, they treated the cardinal with so much ridicule and contempt, that being at length disgusted with his situation, he applied for liberty to retire. The king consented,

but with great reluctance: and could never forgive the prince of Orange, and the other lords, who had reduced him to this necessity¹.

B O O K

VII.

1565.

Granvelle's departure was not attended with those advantages which his enemies expected to derive from it. They had flattered themselves with the hopes of obtaining, after his removal, their just share in the administration; but Viglius², and count Barlaimont, two zealous catholics, who had concurred with Granvelle in all his arbitrary measures, were soon received by the regent into the same degree of favor which he had possessed, and were allowed to exercise the same unlimited influence in the government.

His measures
adopted by
Viglius and
Barlaimont.

A little before this time the council of Trent had published its decrees, and Philip, as mentioned above, had resolved to have them obeyed throughout all his dominions. The disturbances which subsisted in the Low Countries, ought to have deterred him from adding fuel to a flame which already burnt with so much violence. But his bigotry, together with his arbitrary maxims of government, rendered him averse to every mild expedient, and determined him to enforce obedience to the decrees in the Netherlands, as well as in Spain and Italy. When the regent laid his instructions on this head before the council of state, she found the counsellors much divided in

Publication
of the decrees
of the council
of Trent.

¹ Bentivoglio. Grotius.

² President of the privy-council, and esteemed the greatest lawyer in the Netherlands.

BOOK
VII.
1565.

their opinions. The prince of Orange maintained, "That the regent could not require the people of the Netherlands to receive the decrees, because several of them were contrary to the fundamental laws of the constitution. He represented that some catholic princes had thought proper to reject them; and proposed that a remonstrance should be made to the king on the necessity of recalling his instructions." Several other lords were of the same opinion. But Viglius, on the other hand, urged with great earnestness, the necessity of complying immediately with the king's commands. "By general councils," he said, "the church had in all ages secured the purity of its discipline and doctrines. No remedies for the disorders in the Netherlands could be devised more likely to prove effectual, than the decrees in question. If they should be found in any respect incompatible with the laws or privileges of the Netherlands, the inconveniences dreaded from thence might be prevented, by executing them with prudence and moderation. He subjoined, that it was the peculiar glory and happiness of their sovereign, that either he did not entertain the same erroneous sentiments, or lie under the same disagreeable necessity as those other catholic princes who had rejected the decrees; but held opinions, and could follow measures, which, while they were conducive to the welfare of the church, were necessary in order to secure the peace and prosperity of his subjects'."

Progress of the
reformation.

This speech of Viglius had the desired effect
Bentivoglio, lib. ii. p. 22.

upon the regent; who immediately resolved, without regard to what had been offered by the prince of Orange, to publish the decrees. But from different causes, both the number and courage of the reformers was now greatly augmented. In consequence of the civil wars in France, many protestants of that kingdom had retired into the southern provinces. And through the constant intercourse which subsisted in the way of trade between the more northern provinces and England and Germany, these provinces were filled with protestant ministers, who, being prompted by that ardent zeal which the knowledge of important truth lately discovered is calculated to inspire, exerted themselves with unceasing industry in propagating their religious tenets. The country abounded at the same time with books written against the popish rites and doctrines. Several of the nobility, and many of the magistrates, had imbibed the new opinions. The governors of the provinces were either not inclined to execute those edicts to which they had from the beginning shown themselves averse; or, as they often declared, they found it impracticable to carry them into execution, without laying the country waste, by forcing into exile great numbers of its most industrious inhabitants. In many places the edicts were not executed at all; and in others, the protestants were rescued by the people from the hands of the inquisitors, and the inquisitors themselves obliged to fly from the enraged multitude.

The regent discovered at this time great perplexity and hesitation. She was exceedingly desirous to have

B O O K

VII.

1555.

Count Egmont sent to Spain.

B O O K

VII.

1565.

her administration approved by the king, and would have gladly complied with his instructions; but she could not help being alarmed by the repeated representations which were made to her of the consequences that might arise from driving the people to despair. She therefore judged it expedient to send one of the principal nobility to Spain, to inform the king more fully than she could do by writing, of the real state of the provinces: and having made choice of count Egmont for her ambassador, as one who was equally acceptable to all parties, she employed Viglius the president to give him her instructions, in presence of the other counsellors. The prince of Orange was highly dissatisfied with the terms in which these instructions were expressed: "This representation," said he, "of the state of our affairs, is not calculated to inform the king, but to deceive him. The relation which the president has given of our calamities falls infinitely short of the truth. We must lay open from the bottom those wounds under which the country bleeds, else the king can never apply the proper cures. Let us not, by our misrepresentations, make him believe the number of heretics to be smaller than it is. Let us acquaint him, that every province, every town, every village is full of them. Let us not conceal from him how much they despise the edicts, and how little they respect the magistrates; that he may see how impracticable it is to introduce the inquisition, and be convinced that the remedy which he would have us to apply, would be infinitely worse than the disease." He added, "That although he was a

true catholic, and a faithful subject of the king, yet he thought the calamities which had been lately experienced in France and Germany, afforded a sufficient proof that the consciences of men were not to be compelled, and that heresy was not to be extirpated by fire and sword, but by reasoning and persuasion; to which it was in vain to expect that men would be brought to listen, until the present practice of butchering them like beasts was laid aside." He represented likewise the absurdity of publishing, on this occasion, the decrees of the council of Trent, and proposed that count Egmont should be instructed to request the king to suspend the publication of them till the present tumults were allayed. But the regent was either not inclined or not at liberty to follow the opinion of the prince of Orange in preference to that of Viglius. She called count Egmont apart from the council, and having given him such instructions as she thought proper, she made him set out immediately for Spain; after having flattered him with hopes that his journey thither, if he improved the opportunity afforded him, would secure him the full possession of his master's favor^{*}.

B O O K
VII.
1565.

The king received him at Madrid, and entertained him, during his stay there, with every testimony of regard. When he was about to return, he made him a present of fifty thousand florins; and, as the count had several daughters, Philip promised to dispose of them in marriages suitable to their father's rank. The cotemporary historians differ widely in

His reception
there.

^{*} Bentivoglio, lib. ii. Grotius, lib. i.

BOOK
VII.
1565.
His return.

their relations of what passed with respect to the subject of his embassy. The most probable account is, that although Philip's answer was not clear and explicit, yet that he expressed himself with so much softness in speaking of the edicts, and uttered so many strong professions of affection for the people of the Netherlands, that the count, who was in the highest degree candid and sincere, was induced to believe that the king did in reality intend to alter his measures of government. It is certain⁹, that he returned to the Low Countries highly satisfied with the court of Spain; and extolled the goodness of the king, and the love which he bore to his Flemish subjects. The prince of Orange was not so easily deceived. Count Egmont had been imposed upon, he said, by Spanish artifice. His private interest had blinded his penetration, and created in him an ill-grounded security with regard to the public good¹⁰.

In consequence of his report, a conference appointed.

But although count Egmont was not able to satisfy the prince of Orange, it should seem that his report was credited by most of the other counsellors, and even by the regent herself; who would not otherwise have agreed to a measure which, immediately after the count's arrival, was suggested in the council. It was there proposed that a certain number of divines and lawyers should meet together in Brussels, to consider of the most effectual methods of putting a stop to the growth of heresy; and the regent readily consented to this

⁹ Grotius.

¹⁰ Vid. William's Apology, p. 485.

proposal,

propofal , without inquiring , as ſhe uſed to do on other occasions , whether it would be agreeable to the king. To this conference ſhe called the biſhops of Arras , Ipres , and Namur ; Ravenſtenius and Janſenius , two eminent divines ; the two preſidents of the provincial councils of Flanders and Utrecht , and two eminent lawyers from Mechlin and Brabant.

The reſult of their deliberations was , that ſchools for inſtructing youth in the principles of the catholic faith , ſhould be erected in all the provinces ; that particular attention ſhould be given to reform the lives of the clergy ; and that in puniſhing here-tics mild chaſtiſements ſhould be adopted , in the room of thoſe ſevere ones , which upon trial had been found ſo ineffectual ¹¹.

The regent having tranſmitted to the king an account of theſe determinations , was greatly ſur-
prized when ſhe was informed , that far from approving them , he was extremely diſſatisfied with her for allowing the conference to be held. The ſub-
jects which had been conſidered in it , were points , he ſaid , already fixed by his authority ; and which , on that account , ought not to have been brought under deliberation. The diſorders which occaſioned ſo much uneaſineſs to the regent , had ariſen from the connivance or negligence of her miniſters. But if any of them were found wanting , either in courage or in zeal for the ſervice which he required , ſhe muſt immediately diſmiſs them , and ſubſtitute others in their place ; for no ſervice

July.
Philip offend-
ed with it.

¹¹ Bentivoglio , lib. ii. p. 25.

BOOK VII. 1565. which she could perform, would be either so acceptable to him, or so conducive to his glory and interest, as the extinction of heresy in the Netherlands.

The persecutions renewed

The regent had, from the beginning of her administration, been extremely solicitous to gratify the court of Spain. Nothing could have made her agree to the conference, but her conviction, founded on count Egmont's report, that it would not be unacceptable to the king. As soon as she discovered her mistake, she published an edict, confirming all the former edicts, and requiring the governors and councils to proceed in the execution of them with the utmost diligence¹².

Even Viglius¹³ hesitated as to the expediency of this measure at the present juncture; and it excited in the minds of the people universal indignation and astonishment. Those hopes of deliverance from their grievances, which they had conceived from count Egmont's journey to Spain, had, by his report of the king's disposition towards them, been raised to the greatest height. Their disappointment now was proportionably great. They did not blame count Egmont; for they were persuaded that he had been deceived; but they detested the duplicity and artifice of Philip and his ministers.

The count had too much sensibility not to be deeply affected on this occasion; and he

¹² Meursius Gul. Auriac. p. 4, 5.

¹³ Ibid.

complained bitterly that the king had acted with no other design in the studied kindness which he had shown him, but to expose him to the contempt or hatred of his countrymen, and thereby to ruin his credit and influence¹⁴.

B O O K

VII.

1565.

The prince of Orange was almost the only person in whom this unexpected measure created no surprise. When the new edict was transmitted to him, he wrote to the regent a letter; in which he represented, "That in the present temper of the people, it was impossible for the king's servants to execute the orders imposed upon them, without involving the provinces in a civil war." "But if still," he added, "your highness be determined to have the edicts carried into immediate execution, then I must desire that some more proper person may be appointed in my place, who, possessing greater authority, may be better qualified to fulfil your intention. The king is not ignorant, that on other occasions I have spared neither my person nor my fortune in his service. My present conduct proceeds not from the want of loyalty or zeal, but from a persuasion that I cannot yield the obedience required from me, without dishonor to myself, and infinite prejudice to the Netherlands¹⁵."

The prince of
Orange re-
monstrates.

Neither the prince of Orange, nor the counts Egmont and Horn, expressed their dissatisfaction with the present measures of government in any

¹⁴ Strada, lib. iv. p. 118.

¹⁵ Gen. Hist. of the Netherlands.

B O O K

VII.

1665.

other way than by making remonstrances and complaints. As it was greatly their interest, so it appears to have been their sincere desire, to avoid incurring the king's displeasure. And they studied to give him every proof of fidelity that could be reasonably expected from those who were members of a free state, and had sworn to maintain the fundamental laws of the constitution.

The compromise.

St. Aldegonde.

1566.

The conduct of many of the other nobles was not so scrupulous and reserved. They set on foot, at this time, a confederacy, by which they bound themselves to support one another, in preventing the inquisition from being established in the Netherlands. The prime mover of this expedient was Philip de Marnix, lord of St. Aldegonde, a nobleman highly distinguished for his eloquence, his address, and his political abilities, who had the merit of contributing more than any other person (the prince of Orange alone excepted) towards accomplishing that happy revolution, by which the northern provinces were rescued from the Spanish yoke. By his advice, and according to his direction, a writing was drawn up, termed the Compromise, which is here inserted, as it marks strongly the spirit by which the people of the Netherlands were animated.

“Whereas certain malicious persons, under the cloak of zeal for the catholic religion, but in reality prompted by ambition, pride, and avarice, have, by their misrepresentations, persuaded our lord the king to introduce into these provinces that

most pernicious tribunal the inquisition; which is not only contrary to all human and divine laws, but exceeds in cruelty the most barbarous institutions of the most savage tyrants in the heathen world; which subjects all authority to that of the inquisitors, reduces all men to a perpetual state of miserable slavery, and by the visitations which it appoints, exposes the best men to continual apprehensions; so that if a priest, a Spaniard, or wicked minion of power shall incline, he may, by means of this institution, accuse any man, however innocent, and cause him to be imprisoned, condemned, and put to death, without being confronted with his accusers, and without being allowed to bring evidence of his innocence, or to speak in his defence: for these reasons we whose names are here subscribed have resolved to provide for the security of our families, goods, and persons; and for this purpose we hereby enter into a sacred league with one another, promising with a solemn oath, to oppose, with all our power, the introduction of the above mentioned inquisition into these provinces; whether it shall be attempted openly or secretly, and by whatever name it shall be called, whether that of Inquisition, Visitation, Commission, or Edict: declaring at the same time, that we are far from entertaining the design of attempting any thing prejudicial to the interest of our sovereign the king; but on the contrary, that our fixed intention is, to support and defend his government, to maintain peace, and to prevent, to

B O O K the utmost of our power, all seditions, tumults,
 VII. and revolts. This agreement we have sworn;
 1565. and we hereby promise and swear to maintain it
 for ever sacred; and we call Almighty God to
 witness, that neither in word nor deed shall we
 ever weaken or counteract it.

“ We likewise promise and swear, mutually
 to defend one another, in all places, and on all
 occasions, against every attack that shall be made,
 or persecution that shall be raised, against any
 individual amongst us, on account of his concern
 in this confederacy. And we declare, that no pre-
 tence of the persecutors, who may alledge rebellion,
 insurrection, or any other plea, shall exempt us
 from this our oath and promise. No action can
 deserve the name of rebellion, that proceeds from
 opposition to the iniquitous decrees of the inquisi-
 tion; and therefore whether any of us be attacked
 directly on account of opposing these decrees, or
 under pretence of punishing rebellion or insurrec-
 tion, we hereby swear to endeavour by all lawful
 means to procure his deliverance.

“ In this and every part of our conduct regard-
 ing the inquisition, our meaning is, to submit to
 the general opinion of our confederates, or to
 that of those who shall be appointed by the rest
 to assist us with their counsel.

“ In witness of this our league, we invoke the
 holy name of the living God, as the searcher of
 our hearts; humbly beseeching him to grant us the
 grace of his holy spirit, that all our enterprises
 may be attended with success, may promote the

honor of his name, contribute to the welfare of our souls, and advance the peace and true interest of the Netherlands."

B O O K

VII.

1565.

Such were the terms of the compromise, which was quickly circulated through the provinces, and subscribed by persons of all ranks, whether catholics or protestants. Books were at the same time multiplied, in which liberty of conscience was pleaded, the absurdities in the popish doctrines and worship exposed, and hideous pictures drawn of the inquisition.

The regent felt great anxiety with regard to the consequences with which so much ill-humor and discontent were likely to be attended. She had never fully credited the representations which the prince of Orange and some of her other counsellors had often made to her. And she now complained bitterly of the situation to which she was reduced by the orders sent from Spain. "For to what purpose was it (she said) to publish edicts, when I wanted power to enforce their execution? They have served only to increase the people's audacity, and to bring my authority into contempt¹⁶."

The prince of Orange, and the counts Horn and Egmont, had, ever since the last republication of the edicts, absented themselves from the council. The regent now wrote to them in the most urgent manner, requiring their attendance. They readily complied; and the regent, after

Speech of
the prince of
Orange in the
council.

¹⁶ Bentivoglio and Strada.

B O O K having informed them of her design in calling
VII. them together, desired they would deliver their
1565. opinions without reserve. The prince of Orange
 was among the last who rose, and he spoke as
 follows ¹⁷.

“ Would to Heaven I had been so fortunate
 as to gain belief, when I ventured to foretel
 what has now happened. Desperate remedies
 would not in that case have been first applied,
 nor persons who had fallen into error been con-
 firmed in it, by the means employed to reclaim
 them. We should not certainly think favorably of
 a physician's prudence, who, in the beginning of
 a disease, when gentle remedies were likely to
 prove effectual, should propose the burning or
 cutting off the part infected.

“ There are two species of inquisition. The
 one is exercised in the name of the pope, and the
 other has been long practised by the bishops. To
 the latter, men are in some measure reconciled by
 the power of custom; and considering how well
 we are now provided with bishops in all the pro-
 vinces, it may be reasonably expected that this
 sort will alone be found sufficient. The former has
 been, and will for ever be, an object of abhor-
 rence, and ought to be abolished without delay.

“ With respect to those edicts which have been
 so often published against the innovators in religion,

¹⁷ This speech is recorded by Nicholas Burgundius, who
 compiled his history from the papers of the president Viglius.
 Vide Brandt's history of the reformation in the Netherlands.

hearken not to me, but to your own experience, which will inform you, that the persecutions to which they have given rise, have served only to increase and propagate the errors against which they have been exercised. The Netherlands have for several years been a school, in which, if we have not been extremely inattentive, we may have learned the folly of persecution. Men do not for nothing forego the advantages of life; much less do they expose themselves to torture and death for nothing. The contempt of death and pain, exhibited by heretics in suffering for their religion, is calculated to produce the most powerful effects on the minds of spectators. It works on their compassion, it excites their admiration of the sufferers, and creates in them a suspicion, that truth must certainly be found where they observe so much constancy and fortitude. Heretics have been treated with the same severity in France and England as in the Low Countries. But has it been attended there with better success? On the contrary, is there not reason, there as well as here, to say what was said of the Christians of old, That the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church. The emperor Julian, the most formidable enemy whom Christianity ever saw, was fully sensible of the truth of this. Harassing and tormenting could only serve, he knew, to inflame that ardent zeal which he wanted to extinguish. He had recourse therefore to the expedient of ridicule and contempt; and this he found to be more effectual. The Grecian empire was at different periods infected with heresies

B O O K
VII.
1565.

of various kinds. Ætius taught errors in the reign of Constance; Nestorius in that of Theodosius; Arius in that of Constantine. No such punishments were inflicted, either on the heresiarchs themselves or on their disciples, as are now practised in the Netherlands; and yet where are all those false opinions now, which the first broachers were at so much pains to propagate? Such is the nature of heresy, if it rests, it rusts; but he who rubs it, whets it. Let it be neglected and overlooked, it will soon lose the charm of novelty; and with that, it will lose the greatest part of its attractive power. But they are not the examples only of heathen princes which I would recommend to the regent's imitation. In complying with my advice, she will tread in the steps of our late glorious emperor, her father; who from experience was convinced, that gentle measures were more likely to prove effectual than severe ones; and therefore adopted the former, in preference to the latter, for several years before his resignation.

“ The king himself appeared, at a certain period, inclined to make trial of mild expedients. But, through the influence of the bishops and other ecclesiastics, he has changed his views. Let these men answer for their conduct if they can. For my own part, I am entirely satisfied that it is impossible to root out the present evils in the Netherlands by force, without shaking the state from its foundation. I conclude with reminding you of what we have all heard frequently, That the protestants in the Low Countries have opened a correspondence

with those in France. Let us beware of irritating them more than we have already done, lest, by imitating the French catholics in their severity, we, like them, involve our country in the dreadful miseries of a civil war."

This speech was not entirely without effect. It convinced the regent, that she must either make some concessions to the confederates, or have recourse to arms. She was inclined to follow the latter of these measures, because she knew it would be more agreeable to the king; and she desired count Egmont to undertake the command of some forces which she proposed to raise, in order to carry her design into execution; but the count declined accepting of it, saying, That he could not fight with honor in defence of the inquisition. The dutchess found it necessary, therefore, to embrace the other alternative, and to attempt to sooth the malecontents, by making some abatement in the rigor of the edicts¹⁸.

1566.

Meanwhile the number of those who had acceded to the compromise was become so considerable, that they thought it was now time to take some step towards fulfilling their engagements. With this view they set out for Brussels, where the court resided, and sent some of their number to desire leave of the regent, to lay before her their sentiments concerning a subject in which the interest of the king and their personal security were equally concerned. The counsellors were

¹⁸ Brandt, vol. i. p. 165.

B O O K
VII.
1566.

divided in their opinions with regard to the answer proper to be made to this request. Some of them were for rejecting it utterly; others advised to admit two or three of the confederates and no more; but the opinion of those prevailed who thought that, at present, it would be imprudent to furnish them with any just ground of offence, by denying them a privilege to which every inhabitant of the Netherlands was entitled; especially as they were without arms, and no danger could be apprehended from admitting them.

They entered Brussels in the beginning of April one thousand five hundred and sixty-six, in number between three and four hundred, on horseback. Besides count Brederode, who was descended from the ancient earls of Holland, there were the counts Colemberg and Trefenberg, the marquis of Mons, the baron of Montigny, and count Lewis of Nassau, brother to the prince of Orange; all of them persons of considerable influence in the provinces.

They went in a body, walking two by two, from the house of count Colemberg to the palace, and were received there by the regent, attended by the council of state.

Petition of
the nobles.

They began their petition with declaring, "That as hitherto they had never failed in loyalty to the king, so they were still as much as ever determined to hold fast their allegiance. They were sensible that their present conduct might be misconstrued; but they chose rather to expose themselves to this risk, than not inform the regent of what they were

convinced was of the highest consequence to the interest both of the king and the provinces. The sollicitude which the king had discovered to preserve religion pure in the Netherlands, deserved the highest praise; but experience had shown, that the remedies employed for this purpose contributed only to increase the disease. They had long flattered themselves with hopes, that the States would have been assembled, to devise means more likely to prove successful; but since this desirable event had not taken place, they thought it their duty to inform her, that if the measures of government respecting religion were not quickly altered, they were persuaded it would be impossible to prevent a general insurrection. It was therefore their earnest desire, that she would send some proper persons to the king, to acquaint him with the necessity of softening the rigor of the edicts; and they entreated her to suspend the execution of them till his pleasure should be known. But if no regard, they added, shall be paid to this our humble and most earnest prayer, we call God and the king, your highness, and these your illustrious counsellors, to witness, that we have given warning of the impending danger, and shall not be accountable for the calamities that may ensue¹⁹.

To this petition the regent gave the following answer in writing: "That she was not invested by the king with power to suspend the execution of the edicts; but that she was not averse from sending some proper person to Spain, where she would

Answer of
the regent.

¹⁹ Bentivoglio and Brandt.

B O O K

VII.

1566.

willingly employ her good offices to procure them satisfaction. That, in the mean time, she would issue orders to the inquisitors to proceed in the exercise of their office with moderation; and that, in return for her concessions, she expected that the petitioners would study carefully to avoid all occasion of offence."

The confederates, much dissatisfied with this answer, insisted earnestly upon receiving one that was more explicit; and the regent, dreading the consequences of sending them away in ill-humor, ordered her secretary to communicate to them the instructions which, after considering the matter more maturely, she had resolved to transmit to the inquisitors. These were, that henceforth they should proceed against offenders in the article of religion with the utmost gentleness; and should not punish any of them with banishment, imprisonment, or confiscation, unless they were found guilty of seditious practices. And these instructions, it was added, were to remain in force till the king's pleasure should be known. The confederates, on the other hand, engaged, not to attempt to make any innovation in religious matters, but to wait patiently for the determination of the assembly of the States; which they fondly flattered themselves would be held soon, in order to put an end to all their grievances.

The marquis
of Mons and
the baron of
Montigny
sent to Spain.

Agreeably to her first declarations, the regent immediately dispatched the marquis of Mons and the baron of Montigny, to lay the petition before the king. And these two noblemen gladly undertook

the task assigned them; little suspecting either how fruitless their journey was to prove, as to the intention of it, or how fatal to themselves. For, as will appear in the sequel, Philip did not consider them as the regent's ambassadors, but as persons who had brought her under the disagreeable necessity of clothing them with that character, and as the heads of a confederacy which had been formed against his government.

B O O K
VII.
1566.

In the mean time a report was propagated in the Netherlands, that the regent had consented to the public profession of the reformed religion. In the belief of this, the people threw off the reserve which they had hitherto maintained, and the protestant ministers preached in many places to numerous assemblies of persons, who came together in arms, with a resolution to defend themselves, in case the inquisitors should attempt to interrupt them. From these assemblies they soon passed to open violence against the churches, and despoiled them of all their costly ornaments.

The intemperate zeal of the reformers.

These outrages were first committed in the province of Flanders; and the example of the Flemings was quickly diffused throughout all the provinces. In a little time afterwards the same tumultuous spirit appeared in the great commercial towns; in which, from their frequent intercourse with foreign protestants, and from the spirit of liberty that naturally grows up in large communities, almost the whole body of the people had embraced the new opinions.

In Antwerp the reformers indulged themselves

BOOK

VII.

1566.

in the most unjustifiable extravagancies. They insulted the catholics when employed in the functions of their religion. They broke furiously into the great church, which was one of the richest edifices in Europe, overturned the altars, defaced the paintings, and destroyed all the images of the saints.

From the cathedral they flew with the same ungovernable fury to the monasteries and convents; and there, after forcing open the gates, and obliging the monks and nuns to fly into the city for shelter, it appeared that, under the cover of religious zeal, many of the most abandoned of the people had joined with the reformers, and embraced the present opportunity of gratifying their rapacity. The same riotous spirit appeared in numberless other places. It spread like a conflagration over all the provinces; meeting every where with the same combustible materials, and every where producing the same pernicious effects.

In Brussels they were overawed by the presence of the court: yet even there, they had, in some measure, thrown off their wonted reserve; and the regent, apprehensive that her person was in danger, resolved to reside in Mons. This resolution gave much uneasiness to the prince of Orange, and the counts Egmont and Horn; who saw how much dishonor it would reflect on them, to have it believed that the person of the princess was insecure, where *they* were invested with such high command, and possessed such extensive influence.

influence. They employed every argument that could prevail upon her to alter her intention. They pledged their lives and fortunes for her safety; and promised to exert their utmost power in quelling those disorders which were the cause of her inquietude. At length she yielded to their entreaties, and consented still to remain at Brussels²⁰.

B O O K
VII.
1565.

The several governors soon after set out for their respective provinces. The prince of Orange, besides being governor of Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, and Burgundy, was viscount and governor of Antwerp. And even the popish historians acknowledge, that, having often gone thither, he had exerted himself strenuously in quieting the tumults occasioned by the intemperate zeal of the reformers. At this time he ordered three of the rioters to be executed, and fined and banished several of the rest. He again opened the great church, and restored the exercise of the catholic religion.

The success
and zeal of
the prince
of Orange
in quelling
the tumults.

August.

But finding it impossible to prevent the protestants from holding their religious meetings, he entered into an agreement with the persons of the greatest influence among them, by which they were allowed to exercise their religion in churches within the city, provided that they should come together without arms; that they should give no annoyance to the catholics; and that their preachers should refrain from all invectives against the

²⁰ Bentivoglio, Brandt, &c.

B O O K VII. 1566. established church. And he consented that this agreement should remain in force till he should know the pleasure of the king; to whom the protestants engaged to submit, or immediately to leave the Netherlands.

The regent approved of every part of William's conduct on this occasion, except his allowing the reformers to hold their meetings within the town. In order to satisfy her on this head, he represented, that he had granted them this indulgence from a conviction which experience had already confirmed, that by means of it he could more easily prevent the pernicious effects of their extravagance; that when they were under his own eye, or that of the magistrates, their assemblies were not near so numerous as formerly; their preachers were not so apt to indulge their enthusiasm, or to use indecent freedoms with the government; nor the people so apt to be inflamed, as when they assembled without restraint in the open fields. This measure, he added, was not only expedient, but necessary. There was no room for authority or persuasion. The reformers had shown themselves unalterably determined to set up their worship within the city, whether he had permitted them or not. Their assemblies in the country had generally amounted to twenty-four or twenty-five thousand. Even in the town they were seldom less than ten thousand. He had no army to reduce so great a number to obedience; and not a single person among the

catholic inhabitants could be persuaded to take up arms against them ²¹.

B O O K

VII.

1566.

After quieting the disturbances in Antwerp, the prince set out for the provinces of Holland and Zeeland, where his presence was equally necessary. There too, as in Antwerp, he employed all his power and influence; and did more towards quelling the tumultuous spirit of the reformers, than any other person could have done, without an armed force to overawe them. He persuaded them to restore the churches which they had usurped; and, except in one or two places, they were satisfied with the liberty which the regent was willing to allow, of holding their assemblies for religious worship in the suburbs of the town, or in the country.

Count Egmont was no less active in his department. From natural temper, as well as from political principles, no man was more averse to harshness and severity; yet being strongly prompted on this occasion by his desire of gratifying the king, he was at the utmost pains to discover the rioters, and punished many of them with rigor. He restored the priests to their functions, opened the churches which had been shut, and reduced all the protestants within his government to the necessity of acquiescing in the conditions which the regent had prescribed.

Count Egmont's success.

Count Horn likewise acted with uncommon spirit and vigor in the city of Tournay, where

Count Horn's success.

²¹ Brandt. Van Meteren, lib. ii.

B O O K
VII.
1566.

the disorders had risen to a greater height than in other places. The inhabitants of that city, to the number of six thousand, having taken arms, laid siege to the garrison. They soon reduced it to such extremity, as obliged the commander to inform the regent, that if she did not send him immediate relief, he could not hold out longer than one day. She had not troops sufficient to oppose so great a force; nor was there any other expedient in her power, by which she could preserve the garrison from surrendering, but that of sending count Horn, their governor's ²² brother, to intercede with the inhabitants. The count forced his way, at the hazard of his life, into the midst of them; and with great address persuaded them not only to desist from the blockade, but to lay down their arms, to yield up the churches which they had usurped, and to rest satisfied with certain places of worship which he had assigned them without the city ²³.

Grounds of
Philip's
aversion
to these
noblemen.

From this representation of the conduct of the prince of Orange and the counts Horn and Egmont, they had very little reason, it should seem, to dread the king's displeasure. For they were not less active, nor less successful than the other governors ²⁴, with whom Philip is said to have been entirely satisfied. But the disapprobation which they had discovered of his measures of government

²² The Baron de Montigny, at this time in Spain.

²³ Brandt, Meteren, etc.

²⁴ The counts Aremberg and Megen.

Some years before; the objections which they had urged against his retaining the Spanish forces in the Low Countries; the necessity to which they had reduced him, of removing Granvelle; their frequent remonstrances in the council against the inquisition and edicts; and the attachment which they had ever shown to the liberty and constitutional privileges of the provinces; all these causes had alienated him entirely from them, and had begotten in his dark revengeful mind, a degree of hatred and resentment, which neither time, repentance, nor faithful services, could erase.

These noblemen had been disappointed of the private, as well as public advantages which they expected to derive from the removal of Granvelle. Viglius and count Barlaimont were equally their enemies as the cardinal, and equally disposed to put malicious interpretations on their conduct. In these they were powerfully seconded by Granvelle; who, some time after his leaving the Netherlands, had been called to Madrid, where he enjoyed his wonted influence. This he did not fail to employ against his enemies in the Netherlands; and he found it easy to persuade the king, that in secret they had been abettors of all the disturbances which had arisen. Philip was therefore fired with indignation against them, and resolved sooner or later to make them feel the weight of his resentment. At present, however, he thought it necessary to conceal his sentiments, and in his answer to the account of the late transactions transmitted to him by the regent, he expressed his gratitude for the zeal that

B O O K had been discovered in his service, and exhorted
VII. her, and the governors of the provinces, to con-
1566. tinue their endeavours to allay the tumults in the
 best manner which the present circumstances would
 permit.

**Forces levi-
 ed.**

With this answer he sent money, and an order
 for raising a body of catholie troops, upon whose
 fidelity he could depend for an absolute compliance
 with his will.

The regent was not remiss in executing this or-
 der. She immediately levied a body of cavalry,
 and five regiments of infantry; of which she gave
 the command to the counts Erbestein, Charles of
 Mansfeld, Reuls, baron Schomberg, and the Sieur
 de Hierges, son of count Barlaimont.

The prince of Orange and the counts Horn and
 Egmont could easily discern the design of this ar-
 mament; and they declared their disapprobation
 of it in the council, as a measure calculated to re-
 kindle the flames of discord and sedition.

**Discovery
 of Philip's
 design.**

They were at the same time informed by let-
 ters from the marquis of Mons, and the baron of
 Montigny, that whatever public answer had been
 sent from the court of Spain to the dutchess of
 Parma, it was known to every person at Madrid,
 that the king was highly offended at the conces-
 sions which *they* had made lately to the protestants.
 That they were considered as fomenters of the tu-
 mults, and encouragers of heresy. That the king
 and his ministers talked now more explicitly than
 they had hitherto done. The compromise had no
 other name given it but that of a conspiracy;

and the popular insurrections were never mentioned but as an open rebellion. There was no longer any room to doubt that the king, by the advice of Granvelle and Alva, was determined to wreck his resentment on all concerned, and particularly on them, whom he considered as the most guilty. And although at first domestic forces only were to be employed, yet their operations would soon be seconded by those of Spain.

The prince of Orange had several times desired leave of the regent to resign his employments; alledging, that it was impossible for him at once to discharge his duty to his country, and to satisfy the king. The regent had as often refused to consent to his request; and had accompanied her refusal with expressions of high regard, and with entreaties that he would not forsake her at a time when his assistance was more than ever necessary. On the present occasion he made the same application to the king, who gave him the same answer, and employed the same expressions of regard and confidence ²⁵.

But the prince had received intelligence of Philip's most secret councils; and he knew that his real sentiments were entirely different from those which he professed. Through a correspondence which he held in France, he had procured a

²⁵ Bentivoglio. See the letter annexed to William's Apology.

BOOK
VII.

copy of a letter to the regent, from Alava the Spanish minister at Paris, which confirmed the information that had been transmitted by the marquis of Mons and the baron of Montigny. In this letter, Alava particularly insisted on the present favorable opportunity of establishing in the Low Countries that unlimited authority which the king had long so earnestly desired. He advised the regent, as matters were not ripe for execution, to meet the smooth faces of Orange, Horn, and Egmont, with the same artifice which they had employed; and concluded with informing her, that the king, who knew them to be fomenters of all the disturbances which had happened, would soon pay them the wages of their iniquity; and had sworn to punish *them* and the other inhabitants of the Netherlands in the most exemplary manner²⁶.

1567.
Conference
at Dendre-
monde.

This letter the prince of Orange communicated to his brother count Lewis, and to the counts Egmont, Horn, Hoogstraten, and several others of the nobility; who met together in Dendremonde, to deliberate concerning the measures which it would be proper to pursue. Count Lewis, who was naturally bold and ardent, urged that they should immediately incite the people

²⁶ The concluding words of the letter are, "in a manner, that would make the ears of all Christendom tingle, even though it should put in danger all the rest of his dominions." Brandt, 216. Reidanus, p. 3. Meteren, lib. ii.

to take up arms ; but his brother the prince of Orange disapproved of this proposal , and observed , that if they should begin to wage war in the present situation of affairs , they would neither be able to carry it on with success , nor to justify their conduct in undertaking it. That the inquisition and edicts were in effect abolished ; and a reasonable liberty allowed in matters of religion. That , considering the tumults which had been excited , the regent could not be greatly blamed for raising forces ; especially since she had levied none but such as were natives of the Netherlands. At present they could not alledge any good reason for having recourse to arms ; but he believed that ere long the best and strongest reasons would not be wanting. And in the mean time his advice was , not only to be on their guard themselves , but likewise to waken in the people a sense of the danger with which they were threatened , that they might be prepared for entering upon action when the proper season should arrive.

Had count Egmont been of the same opinion with the prince of Orange on this occasion , it is not to be doubted that all who were present would have concurred in the measures which he advised ; and considering the greatness of their power and popularity , they might have induced the king to drop his plan , by making him sensible of the difficulty of carrying it into execution.

But they were all exceedingly disappointed when they heard count Egmont declare , “ That far from taking part in any measure that might be

B O O K offensive to the king, he looked upon every such
VII. measure as equally imprudent and undutiful. That
1567. from the enormities which had been committed, the king had some reason to entertain suspicions of their vigilance. That, for his own part, he was resolved, if possible, to wipe out these suspicions, by exerting himself strenuously to reduce the people to a state of perfect tranquillity and obedience; which if he and the other governors could accomplish in their respective provinces, he believed they should hear no more of the Spanish forces; for after what the king had repeatedly told him when in Spain, he could not regard what he had heard of his intention to rob the Netherlands of their liberty."

The prince of Orange and the other discontented lords spent several hours in attempting to bring him over to their opinion, but in vain. Although, as is above related, the count had received sufficient proof of Philip's insincerity in his discourse with him at Madrid, yet the concern which he had appeared to take in the interest of his family, joined to his professions of personal attachment, had imposed upon him so far as to prevent him from perceiving the danger to which he was exposed²⁷.

The nobility
 concur with
 the regent.

Thus disappointed of the assistance of a person of so great influence, the other lords saw that nothing remained for them, but to conciliate Philip's favor, by an active concurrence with the regent in the measures which she was about to employ for the perfect settlement of the country.

²⁷ Bentivoglio.

A great deal had been already done for this end by the governors of the provinces; but matters were not yet entirely upon the footing on which the regent desired to have them placed. The zeal of the reformers burnt with too much violence to be restrained by the authority of the magistrates, and still continued to discover itself in the most unjustifiable irregularities; particularly in the city of Valenciennes, where the common people had almost universally embraced the reformation. The strength and populousness of that city, its neighbourhood to France, and the correspondence which the people held with the protestants in that kingdom, were powerful motives with the regent for desiring to have a garrison placed in it, composed of those troops which had been lately raised. She wished to have had them admitted with the consent of the inhabitants; but finding that it could not be obtained, she declared them rebels to the king, and ordered the lord of Noircharmes to besiege the town. The citizens seemed at first resolved to defend themselves; but when they saw the batteries ready to play, their courage failed, and they surrendered the city at discretion. Noircharmes no sooner entered it, than he ordered the governor and his son, the protestant ministers, and several of the inhabitants who had been the most active in the late disturbances, to be put to death; after which, having prohibited the public exercise of the reformed religion, he left a strong garrison in the place, under the command of a rigid catholic.

The success of the regent's arms filled the

BOOK.

VII.

1567.

Her success
in suppressing
the reform-
ers.

BOOK
VII.
1567.

protestants with terror, and inspired the catholics with fresh courage and resolution. She was not less successful in Tournay, Bois le Duc, and many other places. She even persuaded the city of Antwerp to receive a garrison, by means of which the catholic party acquired so great authority, and the reformers were so much intimidated, that, without opposition, she banished all the protestant preachers, and abolished the exercise of their religion²⁸.

Count Brederode and some others of the confederated lords had recourse at this time to their first expedient of a petition or remonstrance. But neither the regent nor the confederates were now in the same situation as formerly. She had no longer any reason to be afraid of them, since she was so well provided with an armed force; and many of them having before this time become sensible of their weakness, had studied to convince her that they were now entirely devoted to her service.

Count Brederode desired to be admitted into her presence, but this she refused; and vouchsafed no other answer to his petition, but "That he, and those who concurred with him, had wrested her concessions into a sense which she had never meant; and, by encouraging riots and tumults, had broken their agreement with her, and thereby forfeited their title to complain²⁹."

From this answer Brederode perceived there was no other resource left him but force of arms.

²⁸ Bentivoglio. p. 47.

²⁹ Brandt and Bentivoglio.

Resolved to try his fortune in this way, he went immediately into Holland, and having drawn together a body of troops, he fortified himself in the town of Vianen. But the counts Aremberg and Megen coming suddenly upon him, he was soon reduced to the necessity of retiring into Germany. He returned to the Low Countries in the year following, and died in the town of Harnhoff³⁰. He was a person much respected by the protestants, but appears to have possessed more zeal than capacity, and to have been in no respect qualified to be the leader of a party.

B O O K

VII.

1567.

After count Brederode was expelled, the reformers had no where courage to lift their heads. The storm which had raged with so much fury was succeeded by a perfect calm. The churches were repaired, the altars restored, the images replaced, and the magistrates respected and obeyed, in the same manner as before the disturbances began; while the discontented lords seemed now to have no other ambition, but to surpass one another in giving proofs of their attachment to the regent, and of their zeal in the service of the church and of the king³¹.

Tranquillity
established.

³⁰ Brandt and Bentivoglio.

³¹ Bentivoglio, p. 48.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK VIII.

BOOK

VIII.

1567.

Deliberations
at the court of
Spain.

WHILE the dutchess of Parma was thus successfully employed in quieting the disturbances in the Netherlands, Philip was only deliberating on the subject. The regent had joined with the confederated lords in representing, that his presence would prove the most effectual remedy for the evils which prevailed; and this was the opinion too of some of his Spanish ministers. He had long talked as if he intended to comply with their counsel. He had even given orders for preparing ships for his voyage, and all Europe was in expectation of its taking place. But if he was ever serious in proposing it, he was easily induced to alter his intention, by the dread of those inconveniences or dangers with which he apprehended it might be accompanied. These inconveniences and dangers would have been disregarded by the late emperor;

who undertook a journey to the Netherlands, and put himself in the power of Francis, his rival and antagonist, in order to quell an insurrection in the city of Ghent. But Philip had neither the same personal courage and activity as Charles, nor that degree of affection for his subjects in the Low Countries, which was necessary to make him expose himself to danger on their account; and through his whole reign he chose rather to issue forth orders from his cabinet, than to execute his schemes in person¹.

BOOK
VIII.
1567.

Having therefore resolved not to go to the Netherlands himself, it remained for him to determine, whether he should send thither an army, to compel the people to submit to his will, and to punish them for their disobedience; or should listen to their remonstrances and complaints. His counsellors differed widely in their opinions from each other. The duke of Feria and the prince of Evoli advised him to abolish the inquisition and edicts, and to make trial of gentler and more indulgent methods of dealing with the reformers; since he had sufficiently experienced that severe ones were not likely to be attended with success. But the duke of Alva, on the other hand, and cardinal Granvelle, represented, that nothing but too much lenity in the treatment of the heretics in the Low Countries had been the cause of that insolence, and those enormities, in which they had discovered an equal contempt of the true religion and of the royal authority.

Philip resolves to send the duke of Alva to the Netherlands.

¹ Bentivoglio, ann. 1567. Herrera, lib. ix.

BOOK
VIII.
1567.

This was not the proper season, they alledged, for the exercise of clemency. The king had too long received laws from the Netherlands, instead of giving them. The people in these provinces had long and loudly boasted of their privileges. If they were not speedily chastised for their insolence and presumption, they would ere long dispute the king's having any right to command them, and form themselves into an independent state, in opposition to *him*, as the Swiss Cantons had done formerly in opposition to his German ancestors; or, which was still more likely, the prince of Orange, and the counts Egmont and Horn, would, under the pretence of defending the liberties of the people, reduce them under their own power, and divide the several provinces as a prey among themselves. Besides, what happier opportunity, said Alva, can be wished for than the present, for introducing an army into the Low Countries, in order to establish the royal authority there on the same desirable footing as in Spain and Italy².

No arguments could be better suited to the temper and inclinations of the king; and accordingly, without further hesitation, he resolved to send to the Netherlands a strong and well disciplined army, under the command of the duke of Alva, whom, from long experience, he knew to be qualified in every respect for executing the plan of tyranny and oppression which he was determined to pursue.

² Bentivoglio.

In the mean time the dutchefs of Parma had reduced the affairs of the Low Countries into the situation which is above described. She sent speedy information to the king of the success with which her endeavours had been accompanied; and represented to him, that there was not now the least occasion for the army which he had begun to prepare, since the tumults were allayed, the rioters punished, the heretics silenced, the church reinstated in its wonted authority, garrisons put into suspected places, and the whole country settled in a state of perfect order and tranquillity.

Had Philip been in reality influenced by the motives which he pretended, he would, on receiving this intelligence, have countermanded the orders which he had issued for the march of the troops. But in issuing these orders it is impossible to believe, that he was prompted either by zeal for religion, or concern for the welfare of his Flemish subjects; but partly by the ambition of establishing among them a despotic government on the ruins of their ancient constitution, (a measure which the distance of the Netherlands from his seat of empire must have rendered peculiarly desirable to a prince of so imperious a temper) and partly by an implacable resentment against the prince of Orange and the other lords, who had discovered a jealousy of his designs.

Philip's
motives.

Regardless therefore of the change which the affairs in the Netherlands had lately undergone, Philip persisted in his purpose. The duke of Alva went by sea for Italy, and thence, after

B O O K
VIII.
1567.

having assembled the several bodies of troops which were cantoned there, amounting to eight thousand foot and one thousand five hundred horse, he directed his march towards the Low Countries, first through the territories of the duke of Savoy, and then through Burgundy and Lorraine. His army was augmented on its march, by the addition of three hundred Burgundian cavalry, and four thousand German foot, and soon reached the province of Luxemburgh, without meeting with any molestation by the way. After putting garrisons in some of the frontier towns, he set out for Brussels, where he arrived in the month of August one thousand five hundred and sixty-seven³.

The astonishment excited by the arrival of Alva and the Spaniards.

His arrival spread great consternation and astonishment over all the provinces. Many thousand persons had before this time left the Netherlands; among whom was the prince of Orange, who, having long foreseen the impending storm, had withdrawn with his family and friends to his county of Nassau in Germany. He knew well how inveterate those prejudices were, which the king had for several years entertained against him; and could not account for his sending to the Low Countries so formidable an army, commanded by a man so tyrannical as Alva, without supposing that he was determined to rule the people with a rod of iron; and, at the same time, to wreck his vengeance upon him, and all

³ Herrera, lib. ix. c. 3.

such of the nobility as had ventured to dispute his will.

The prince would gladly have prevailed upon count Egmont to accompany him, and endeavoured to open his eyes to the approaching danger. He repeated the evidence which he had formerly laid before him of the king's intentions, and he reminded him of the imperious character of Alva; who, from being their enemy and rival, was become their master, and would not fail to employ his power to accomplish their ruin. But count Egmont was the father of a numerous family, which he could not support with dignity in any other country but the Netherlands. Conscious too of his fidelity, and of the important services which he had performed to the king, he could not be persuaded that Philip was insincere in the professions of friendship which he had made to him in Spain; nor could he believe that he would indulge his resentment any farther, than to punish those who had been concerned in the late disorders.

The prince of Orange finding the count inflexible, left him, with these words: "You are the bridge, count Egmont, by which the duke of Alva will pass into the Netherlands, and he will no sooner pass it, than he will break it down. You will repent of despising the warning which I have given you, but I dread that your repentance will be too late."

In the interval between the departure of the prince of Orange in April one thousand five hun-

B O O K

VIII.

1767.

The prince
of Orange
retires to
Germany.

BOOK
VIII.
1567.

dred and sixty-seven, and the arrival of the duke of Alva in the month of August following, count Egmont perceived his importance much diminished: but he resolved to submit to his present disagreeable situation, and even humbled himself so far as to receive and welcome Alva in the province of Luxemburgh, where he made him a present of two fine horses, as a mark of his desire to live with him on amicable terms. Alva received this present with the haughtiness that was natural to him; but in all his behaviour towards the count, he dissembled his intention, till he was prepared to put it in execution.

Imprison-
ment of the
counts Eg-
mont and
Horn.

September.

One of his first acts after he came to Brussels was, to cast both count Egmont and count Horn into prison. As the deed itself was tyrannical, so the manner of it was insidious. Count Egmont, having been first deceived himself, was employed to draw count Horn into the snare*. When Alva found that their apprehensions were laid asleep, he desired one day that they would come to his house, to give him their opinion with regard to a citadel which he proposed to build in Antwerp; and after the business for which they had been called was over, they were carried on different pretences into separate apartments, count Egmont by Alva himself, and count Horn by his son Frederic de Toledo. "Count Egmont," said Alva, "deliver your sword; it is the will of the king that you give it up, and go to prison." The count, asto-

* Strada, p. 215.

nished at this unexpected declaration, would have attempted to escape; but observing himself immediately surrounded by Alva's guards, he delivered his sword, saying, "By this sword the cause of the king has been oftener than once successfully defended". Both he and count Horn protested, that, as knights of the Golden Fleece, they could be judged only by their peers, and imprisoned only by their authority. But no regard was paid to this protestation. They were hurried away to prison, in a place at a distance from Brussels, and out of the confines of the province where they resided; in violation of a sacred privilege, which, by a fundamental law, belonged even to the lowest of the people.

Intelligence of this event (which was immediately followed by the imprisonment of count Egmont's secretary, the lord of Bickerzel, and several other persons of distinction) was soon conveyed to the remotest corners of the Netherlands, and filled the minds of the catholics as well as protestants with the most disquieting apprehensions. It was no security, they saw, against the king's resentment, to have adhered to the profession of the catholic faith, nor even to have been active in opposing the reformers. None were conscious of so much merit of this kind, and none had distinguished themselves so highly in the service of the king, as those illustrious persons who were now

B O O K

VIII.

1567.

The people
fly into foreign parts.

^s Strada, p. 215.

^e Grotius and Bentivoglio.

BOOK
VIII.
1567.

devoted to destruction. Men therefore of all ranks were greatly alarmed, and began to abandon their habitations; and it was computed that, at this time, and a little before Alva's arrival, more than a hundred thousand persons fled into foreign parts. Great numbers of these were the most industrious of the people, who transferred their knowledge of arts and manufactures into the countries which gave them refuge; and thereby enriched the dominions of Philip's enemies whilst they impoverished his own⁷.

The dutchess
of Parma
leaves the
Netherlands

The imprisonment of the counts Horn and Egmont was matter of surprise to no person so much as to the regent. Philip had assured her, that although he had conferred on Alva the command of the army, yet the authority of regent was still to remain in her hands; and the royal commission which Alva produced on his first arrival, was agreeable to this declaration. But she could not persuade herself that the duke would have presumed to make so violent an encroachment on her prerogative, by the imprisonment of two of the first persons in the state, unless he had been invested with an authority much superior to that of which she had been informed. The king had not been ingenuous, she suspected, in his conduct towards her, and had conferred powers on Alva by which her authority as regent was impaired. This she considered as a proof that Philip had listened to the calumnies of her enemies, and did not

⁷ Van Meteren, p. 80.

repose in her that trust and confidence which she was conscious her zeal to promote his interest had deserved. She judged that it would be derogatory to her honor, to remain any longer in the Netherlands: and immediately applied for liberty to retire. After repeated solicitations, she at length obtained permission, and left Brussels in the beginning of the year one thousand five hundred and sixty-eight, much regretted by all the inhabitants of the Low Countries, and particularly by the protestants, to whom her administration appeared mild and gentle, when they compared it with that which they had reason to expect under their present governor^a.

B O O K
VIII.
1567.

After the departure of the dutchess of Parma, the authority of regent remained entire in the hands of Alva; and by the royal mandate, which he published, it appeared, that Philip had vested him with higher powers than had ever been bestowed on any former governor. They were much higher than as sovereign of the Low Countries he had a right to bestow, and were utterly subversive of all the laws and privileges which at his inauguration he had solemnly sworn to maintain. But before this time he had had recourse to that method of justifying iniquity, of which the votaries of the Romish church have so often availed themselves; he had obtained from the pope a dispensation from his oath, and no longer disguised his intention to establish a despotic government in the

Alva's absolute authority.

^a Bentivoglio and Strada.

BOOK VIII. 1567. Netherlands, on the ruins of the ancient constitution. Besides the absolute command of the army, Alva's commission bore, that the king had conferred upon him the presidency of the three councils, of state, of justice, and the finances; with full power to punish or to pardon crimes of every sort, as he should judge to be expedient.

The council of tumults.

He began his administration with publishing a declaration, that a month should be allowed to the reformers for preparing to leave the country, without receiving during that space any trouble or molestation; and at the same time he issued secret orders to the inquisitors to proceed immediately in the execution of the edicts with the utmost rigor.

First deed of the council.

To assist and encourage these men in the exercise of their office, he instituted a new council, to which he gave the name of the Council of Tumults, which he appointed to take cognizance of the late disorders, and to search after and punish all those who had been concerned directly or indirectly in promoting them. This council consisted of twelve persons, the greatest part of whom were Spaniards. The duke was the president himself, and in his absence, Vargas, a Spanish lawyer distinguished above all his countrymen by his avarice and cruelty⁹.

One of the first deeds of this tribunal, which might well be called, as the Flemings termed it, the Council of Blood, was to declare, That to have presented, or subscribed any petition against the late erection of bishoprics, or against the edicts

⁹ Brandt, p. 260. 265, &c.

or inquisition, or to have permitted the exercise of the new religion under any pretence whatever; or to insinuate by word of mouth or writing, that the king has no right to abolish those pretended privileges which have been the source of so much impiety, is treason against the king, and justly merits the severest punishment he shall be pleased to inflict ¹⁰.

B O O K

VIII.

1567.

The governor had already stationed his army in such a manner as he thought would most effectually secure the execution of this cruel, undistinguishing resolution of the council. In Antwerp he built a citadel, and compelled the inhabitants to defray the expence which this instrument of their own slavery had cost him. He began to build citadels in other places; and, in the mean time, he spread his troops over the country in such formidable bodies, that the people, over whom they exercised the most oppressive tyranny, either forsook their habitations, or gave themselves up to despair. Above twenty thousand persons escaped at this time into France, England, and the protestant provinces of Germany ¹¹. Great numbers were prevented from flying, and seized whilst they were meditating flight by the cruel hand of the persecutor. The innocent were overwhelmed with horror at the sight of the dreadful punishments inflicted on the guilty; and lamented that this once flourishing country, so much distinguished for the mildness of its govern-

The persecu-
tions.

¹⁰ Van Meteren, lib. iii. p. 66. ¹¹ Brandt and Bentivoglio,

B O O K VIII. 1567. ment and the happiness of its people, should now present no other object to view, but confiscations, imprisonments, and blood ¹².

There was no distinction made of age, sex, or condition. Persons in their earliest youth; persons worn out, and ready to sink under the infirmities of age; persons of the highest rank, as well as the lowest of the people, on the slightest evidence, and sometimes even on bare suspicion, were alike sacrificed to the rapacity and cruelty of the governor and his associates.

Cruelty of
Alva and his
associates.

Although in the space of a few months upwards of eighteen hundred persons suffered by the hand of the executioner; yet the duke of Alva's thirst of blood was not satiated. Prisoners were not brought in so fast, nor seized in such considerable numbers, as he desired. The time of Carnival was approaching, when he expected that he should find the reformers off their guard. They would then leave their skulking places, he supposed, and visit their families, while the catholics were immersed in mirth and dissipation. On this occasion his foldiers, accompanied by the inquisitors, like so many wolves, were let loose among the protestants; who were seized in the middle of the night in their beds, and from thence dragged to prisons and dungeons.

Many who had been only once present at the protestant assemblies, even although they declared their faith in the catholic religion to be firm and

¹² Bentivoglio, p. 58.

unshaken, were hanged or drowned; while those who professed themselves to be protestants, or refused to abjure their religion, were put to the rack, in order to make them discover their associates; they were then dragged by horses to the place of execution, and their bodies being committed to the flames, their sufferings were prolonged with ingenious cruelty.

To prevent them from bearing testimony, in the midst of their torments, to the truth of their profession, their executioners were not satisfied with barely confining their tongues; they first scorched them with a glowing iron, and then screwed them into a machine, contrived on purpose to produce the most excruciating pain²³.

It is shocking to recount the numberless instances of inhuman cruelty perpetrated by Alva and his associates, especially when we consider that the unhappy victims were not those hardened wretches, who, by daring and bloody deeds, are guilty of violating the laws of nature and humanity, but were generally persons of the most inoffensive characters; who, having imbibed the new opinions in religion, had too much probity to disguise their sentiments; or at the worst, had been betrayed into indiscretions by their zeal for propagating truths, which they believed to be of the highest importance, to the glory of God and the happiness of men.

Alva communicated a great share of his savage

²³ Brandt and Van Meteren, p. 69.

B O O K
VIII.
1567.

spirit to the inferior magistrates; who knew that they could not recommend themselves more effectually either to the king or to the governor, than by the exercise of rigor and severity. Several of them, however, whose humanity prevailed over the considerations of safety and interest, were induced to give the protestants timely warning to withdraw. Even the members of the bloody council began to feel their hearts revolt against the reiterated instances of cruelty, to which their sanction was required. Some of them applied for dismissal; others had the courage to absent themselves; and out of the twelve, of which the council was composed, there were seldom above three or four present ¹⁴.

Alva's tyranny and arrogance.

About this time the magistrates of Antwerp, whose behaviour from the beginning of Alva's administration had been extremely obsequious, thought they might venture to interpose in favor of certain citizens whom the inquisitors had imprisoned. Their petition was conceived in the humblest terms; and they represented, that although the persons for whom they pleaded, had been present

¹⁴ This appears from the sentences which they passed. Many of these were subscribed only by two or three; as that, for instance, against Antony Van Stralen, which was signed only by Vargas and two others. Except during the first two or three months, Alva seldom attended, but all the sentences were dictated by him; and his presence was rendered unnecessary by the active and unrelenting cruelty of Vargas. Grimestone.

two or three times in the protestant assemblies, yet it was only curiosity that led them thither; they were still true sons of the church, and faithful subjects to the king; and they had remained in the country till the time of their imprisonment, on the faith of the declaration which the governor had made, that they should not receive any disturbance on account of what had passed, till the expiration of a month after his arrival in the Netherlands.

To this petition Alva haughtily replied, That he was amazed at their folly in presuming to apply to him in behalf of heretics; and they should have reason, he added, to repent bitterly of their conduct, if they did not act more prudently in future; for they might rest assured, that he would hang them all, for an example to deter others from the like presumption¹⁵.

Notwithstanding this, some of the catholic nobility, and Viglius, who had formerly concurred in all the arbitrary measures of Granvelle, but whose heart melted at the present misery of his countrymen, had the courage to remonstrate to the king against the governor's barbarity. Even the pope exhorted him to greater moderation. Philip, however, refused to countermand the orders which he had given, till he should hear from Vargas; who advised him to persevere in the plan which he had adopted, assured him of its success, and at the same time flattered him with the hopes of an inexhaustible fund of wealth that

¹⁵ Brandt, p. 265.

BOOK
VIII.
1567.

History of
Don Carlos.

would arise from confiscation. Vargas being seconded by the inquisitors at Madrid, Philip lent a deaf ear to the remonstrance which had been made to him; and the persecutions were continued with the same unrelenting fury as before ¹⁶.

The people of the Netherlands were confirmed in their despair of obtaining mercy from Philip, by the accounts transmitted to them at this time from Spain, of his cruel treatment of his son Don Carlos. Various relations are given of that tragical and mysterious affair by the contemporary historians; but the following appears the most consistent and probable. This young prince had from his earliest youth been noted for the impetuosity and violence of his temper; and though he never gave reason to think favorably of his understanding, or his capacity for government, he had discovered the most intemperate ambition to be admitted by his father to a share in the administration of his dominions. Philip, whether from jealousy or a conviction of his son's unfitness for any important trust, refused to gratify his ambition, and behaved towards him with distance and reserve; while he bestowed all his confidence on the duke of Alva, Ruy Gomez de Sylva, and the president Spinosa; against whom Don Carlos, partly on this account, and partly because he considered them as spies upon his conduct, had conceived the most irreconcilable aversion. In this disposition

¹⁶ Brandt. Thuanus, c. 43. p. 9.

he did not scruple, on different occasions, to censure the measures of his father's government, and particularly those which had been adopted in the Netherlands. He had sometimes expressed his compassion for the people there; had threatened the duke of Alva, and even made an attempt upon his life, for accepting the government; had been suspected of holding secret interviews with the marquis of Mons and the baron de Montigny; and had afterwards formed the design of retiring into the Netherlands, with an intention to put himself at the head of the malecontents.

Of this design intelligence was carried by some of the courtiers to the king; who, after having consulted with the inquisitors at Madrid, as he usually did in matters of great importance and difficulty, resolved to prevent the prince from putting his scheme in execution, by depriving him of his liberty. For this purpose he went into his chamber in the middle of the night, attended by some of his privy-counsellors and guards; and, after reproaching him with his undutiful behaviour, told him that he had come to exercise his paternal correction and chastisement. Then having dismissed all his attendants, he commanded him to be clothed in a dark-colored mourning dress, and appointed guards to watch over him, and to confine him to his chamber. The high-spirited young prince was extremely shocked at such unworthy treatment, and prayed his father and his attendants

1568.

B O O K

VIII.

1568.

to put an immediate end to his life. He threw himself headlong into the fire, and would have destroyed himself, had he not been prevented by the guards. During his confinement, his despair and anguish rose to a degree of frenzy. He would fast sometimes for whole days together, then eat voraciously, and endeavour to choke himself by swallowing his victuals without chewing. Several princes interceded for his release, as did many of the principal Spanish nobles. But the father was relentless and inexorable. After six months imprisonment, he caused the inquisition of Madrid to pass sentence against his son, and, under the cover of that sentence, ordered poison to be given him, which in a few hours put a period to his miserable life, at the age of twenty-three¹⁷.

February.

Philip had, before this time, given a proof of the cruelty of his disposition; when, as above related, he chose to be present at the execution of his protestant subjects in Spain. His singular conduct on that occasion, and the composure with which he beheld the torments of the unhappy sufferers, were ascribed by some to the power of superstition; while they were regarded by others, as the most convincing evidence of the sincerity of his zeal for the true religion. But his severity towards his son did not admit of any such interpretation. It was considered by all the

¹⁷ Compare Thuanus, lib. xliii. c. 8. with Strada, lib. vii. p. 225, &c.

world as a proof that his heart was dead to the sentiments of natural affection and humanity ; and his subjects were every where filled with astonishment. It struck terror in a particular manner into the inhabitants of the Low Countries ; who saw how vain it was to expect mercy from a prince, who had so obstinately refused to exercise it towards his own son ; whose only crime, they believed, was his attachment to them, and his compassion for their calamities.

This unhappy people had no resource left but in the wisdom, public spirit, and extensive influence of the prince of Orange. Soon after the duke of Alva's arrival in the Netherlands, William had been cited to appear before him ; and a declaration had been published by Alva, in the name of the king, that in case of his appearance, the utmost lenity would be shown him. But the prince was too sagacious to be caught in this snare. He refused to obey the citation, and assigned the following reasons for his refusal.

“ The citation was of such a nature,” he said, “ that the duke of Alva could not expect his compliance with it. It was contrary in several respects to the fundamental laws of the Netherlands ; the time allowed him to make his appearance was not what the laws prescribed ; and was so short, that, considering his distance from the place of trial, it was utterly impossible for him to appear on the day appointed. The duke of Alva was a judge, whose authority he must on every account decline ; since, as a knight of

B O O K

VIII.

1568.

The prince
of Orange
cited to
stand his
trial.

He refuses
to obey.

BOOK
VIII.
1568.

His son carried to Spain.

His estates confiscated.

the Golden Fleece, he could be judged only by his peers; and, as an inhabitant of Brabant, by his fellow-citizens. It was a breach of his privileges to commit the power of judging him to a person who was qualified in neither of these respects; and when injustice was done him in the very nomination of his judge, he had little reason to hope for justice in the decision of his cause; especially when he considered, that the duke of Alva had long been his personal enemy, and had lately without hearing what he had to say in his defence, proceeded on the supposition of his being guilty, and had seized violently, and sent to Spain, his son the count of Buren, who was pursuing his studies in the university of Louvain; trusting for the security of his person, to his unquestionable innocence, and the privileges of the place where he resided."

At the same time with the prince of Orange, the earls of Hoogstraten and Culemborg, and several other noblemen, were cited to answer for their conduct; and, as soon as the short term allowed to them for making their appearance was expired, Alva pronounced sentence against them, and confiscated their effects. He ordered the house of count Culemborg in Brussels to be pulled down, because the confederates had sometimes held their assemblies in it; and he declared all the estates of the prince of Orange, who (besides his principality in the kingdom of France) possessed several in the Low Countries, and some of great extent in Burgundy, to be forfeited to

the king; a considerable share of the profits of which, if we may credit some historians, he either applied to his own use, or bestowed on the numerous informers whom he employed.

B O O K
VIII.
1568.

The prince of Orange was too well acquainted with Philip's inflexible temper, to expect that any consideration or influence would prevail with him to redress his grievances; yet, that he might more clearly evince to the world the necessity which he lay under of having recourse to arms, he sent to the emperor Maximilian, a particular account of the treatment which he himself had received, and of the cruelty which the duke of Alva was exercising against the people of the Netherlands; and entreated him to employ his good offices in *his* and their behalf. Maximilian, a prince entirely opposite in character to Philip, readily complied with this request. To give his intercession the greater weight, he made choice of his brother Charles of Austria for his ambassador; and instructed him to represent, that in his opinion, and that of all the princes in Germany, the present conduct of the duke of Alva in the Low Countries was no less impolitic than rigid and severe.

He employs
the inter-
cession of
the em-
peror.

Philip's answer to this remonstrance was such as from his well known character there was reason to expect. The severities which had been employed, he said, had not yet been found sufficient to repress the pride and insolence of his Flemish subjects; and he hoped the emperor would take care not to permit any troops to be raised against

Philip's re-
ply to the
emperor.

B O O K him in Germany by the prince of Orange and his
VIII. associates ¹⁸.

1568.

So haughty an answer, given to a prince of the first rank in Europe, who was Philip's near relation, demonstrated that it would be vain and ineffectual to make any further attempt to divert him from his purpose. It contributed likewise to alienate Maximilian from his interest, and thereby facilitated the levies which were soon afterwards made in Germany for carrying on the war.

The prince of Orange prepares for an invasion of the Netherlands.

The prince of Orange, who for several months past had been solicited by the Flemish exiles to take up arms, would willingly have deferred complying with their request, in expectation of a more convenient season, when Philip might be involved in war with some of the neighbouring nations, and have it less in his power to bestow attention on the Netherlands. But the impatience of the exiles to return home, the great additions which the persecutions had made to their numbers, and his dread that Alva, were he suffered to proceed, would establish his power on too firm a foundation to be shaken by any force which could be brought against it; all these considerations concurred in determining him immediately to begin his preparations.

In order to raise money, he sold his jewels, plate, and furniture. His brother, count John of Nassau, supplied him with a considerable sum, and he received contributions from the Flemish exiles

¹⁸ Ferreras, 1568.

in London, Embden, Cleves, and other places, where they had taken shelter.

He was aware how unable the inhabitants of the Netherlands were, to resist the arms of Spain, unless supported by some foreign power. Philip was not however near so formidable at this time as during the life of Mary queen of England, who knew no other law but her husband's will, and never scrupled to sacrifice the interests of her people to his ambition. Had Mary been still alive, and Philip in possession of his former influence over the English councils, the inhabitants of the Netherlands would have struggled for their liberties in vain. It was fortunate for them, that the princess who sat now upon the throne of England was led, both by inclination and interest, to adopt a system of politics entirely contrary to that of Mary. For as Elizabeth had established the protestant religion in her own dominions, she had before this time shown herself determined to support the protestants of the neighbouring kingdoms. She had interested herself deeply in the civil wars of France, in favor of the Calvinists, whilst Philip gave assistance to the opposite party. And the prince of Orange had reason to entertain the most sanguine hopes, that she would not remain an idle spectator of what was passing in the Netherlands.

He had conceived expectations likewise of obtaining succour from the French protestants; and with this view had communicated all his measures to their leaders, the prince of Condé and the admiral

B O O K

VIII.

1558.

His hopes of assistance

from the queen of England,

B O O K

VIII.

1568.

de Coligni. But his chief dependance was upon the protestant princes of Germany, whom, ever since he left the Netherlands, he had strenuously endeavoured to persuade, that if they did not exert themselves with vigor, the liberties of the Netherlands would soon be entirely suppressed; and the trading cities, with the prosperity of which the interest of the higher provinces of Germany was inseparably connected, would be changed into strong holds, filled with Spanish troops, which the duke of Alva, as soon as his purposes in the Low Countries were accomplished, would not fail to employ against the neighbouring powers.

and from
the German
princes.

Prompted by these motives, and by zeal for their religion, the count palatine of the Rhine, the duke of Wurtemberg, the landgrave of Hesse, and several other princes, resolved to support William in his intended armament; and accordingly they furnished him with considerable supplies of money, promised him more, and assisted him in levying troops within their respective territories.

Count Lewis

Whilst the prince was employed in making levies in Cleves, Juliers, and other countries adjoining to Brabant and Guelderland, his brother, count Lewis, was no less active in raising forces in the more northern parts of Germany, and in gathering together the Flemish exiles.

arrives with
an army in
the Nether-
lands.

Count Lewis was much sooner ready to take the field than his brother, and he began his march in the end of April or beginning of May. He resolved first to make an attempt on Groningen; and for this purpose he pitched his camp in such a situation, that whilst he cut off that city from

all correspondence with the neighbouring country, he kept a communication open with his friends in Germany.

B O O K

VIII.

1568.

The duke of Alva sent count Aremberg, an officer of considerable reputation, to oppose him; and ordered count Megen, governor of Guelderland and Zutphen, to march as soon as possible to count Aremberg's assistance, with a regiment of German infantry that was under his command. Upon Aremberg's approach, Lewis drew off his army to a still more advantageous situation; and encamped on a rising ground with a large morass in front.

Gains a victory over the Spaniards.

The Spaniards gave at this time a striking proof of that ferocity and insolence which they afterwards discovered on numberless occasions, during the course of the present war. Having conceived the most contemptible opinion of the enemy, they were fired with impatience to engage, and as soon as they came in sight demanded the signal of battle. Aremberg endeavoured to restrain their ardor, by representing that the enemy were so strongly posted, and so much superior in number, that it would be impossible to attack them with success till count Megen should arrive. But the Spaniards were not disposed either to regard his opinion, or to respect his authority. They reproached him with infidelity to the king, and accused him of cowardice and ignorance of the art of war. Aremberg had not sufficient strength of mind to despise their reproaches. Inflamed with indignation at their unworthy treatment of

B O O K
VIII.
1568.

him, "Let us march," said he, "not to conquer, but to be overcome; and not by the arms of the enemy, but by the nature of the place. We shall be buried in the mud and water before we can reach the enemy; but it will soon appear, whether I am wanting either in courage or fidelity to the king." Saying this, he gave orders to advance. The Spaniards were in the front, the Germans in the rear, and the cavalry were distributed in different places as the ground would permit. Lewis rejoiced when he saw them approaching towards him. He had placed his cavalry, under the command of his brother count Adolphus of Nassau, on the right. On the left, his main army was covered by a hill, on which he had planted a strong band of musketeers. Behind him there was a little wood and the walls of a convent; and in his front, the morass above mentioned, which was almost impassable. Yet the Spaniards entered it without hesitation, and continued to advance till they were within reach of the enemy's fire. They came to be sensible of their folly when it was too late. Those who had first entered were prevented from returning by those who followed, and the farther they advanced, they were the more exposed to the enemy's shot, and the more entangled in the mud. When they were in this situation, Lewis attacked them vigorously in front, while his brother broke in upon their flank with the cavalry. They were cut to pieces almost without resistance. Six hundred Spaniards were killed. The Germans surrendered at discretion, and were dismissed, after taking an oath that they

would never more carry arms for the duke of Alva. Count Aremberg, finding no room to act as general, was obliged to content himself with performing the duty of a common soldier; and he and count Adolphus rushing furiously against one another, fell each of them by the other's sword. The Spaniards lost their artillery, baggage, and military chest. The battle was scarcely ended when count Megen arrived, with so strong a body of troops as would have been sufficient, if they had advanced in time to have changed the fortune of the day. But they were not able alone to face the enemy. And therefore Megen found it necessary to take shelter in Groningen, where he collected the scattered remains of the conquered army¹⁹.

BOOK

VIII.

1568.

The news of this defeat affected the duke of Alva in the most sensible manner. He knew of how much consequence it was to any cause that the first enterprize should be attended with success. He considered that Lewis had but just entered the Low Countries when he had gained a signal victory, and that the prince of Orange was ready to begin his march with a still more formidable army than that of Lewis. The neighbouring powers, he doubted not, would be animated by what had happened, to grant the prince those supplies which they had promised him; and the Flemings would be less afraid to declare in his favor. On these accounts he would have marched immediately into Friesland with his whole army, in order to cut off or scatter

Alva's inquietude on this occasion.

¹⁹ Bentivoglio, p. 67, &c.

BOOK

VIII.

1568.

The trial of
the counts
Egmont
and Horn.

the troops under Lewis before his brother should arrive. But he thought it necessary before he set out, to dispatch the trial of the counts Egmont and Horn, and some other lords, whom at his first coming into the Netherlands he had thrown into prison. Some of his friends endeavoured to divert him from his purpose, by representing that the prisoners were so many pledges in his hands for the peaceable behaviour of their adherents; and that putting them to death would only serve to embitter the resentment of the people, and make them receive the prince of Orange with open arms. But he still persisted in his resolution, prompted, if we may believe some historians, by the apprehension that during his absence the people might take up arms, and release the prisoners. But if we may credit others, he was influenced rather by revenge than prudence, and could no longer restrain his fury, which was inflamed at this time by the loss which his army had sustained in the late engagement.

In one day he ordered eighteen persons of rank, whom the council of tumults had pronounced guilty of subscribing the compromise, or of presenting remonstrances to the dutchess of Parma, to be put to death. Such of them as died catholics were beheaded, and the rest were committed to the flames. Casembrot, the lord of Bickerzel, count Egmont's secretary, who had been condemned for signing the compromise, was tortured in the most barbarous manner, to make him accuse his friend and master; and when it appeared that his exhausted body was ready to sink under the

torments which he suffered, Alva, enraged that nothing had been extorted from him which could justify the condemnation of the count, gave orders that he should be drawn afunder by horses²⁰. History scarcely furnishes an instance of so cruel a punishment inflicted for so slight an offence.

Such was the prelude to the trial of the counts Horn and Egmont, which, followed immediately after what has been just now related.

Although the conduct both of Philip and the duke of Alva, in the Netherlands, and particularly their treatment of these two noblemen, had been an open violation of the laws, yet it was thought necessary to employ the farce of a formal trial before the sentence of condemnation was pronounced. This was intended to lessen the odium which might arise from putting to death two such illustrious persons, who were so exceedingly beloved by the people, and had distinguished themselves so highly in the service of the king. But it was accompanied with the contrary effect. It afforded the two counts an opportunity of placing their innocence in the clearest light, and furnished the world with the most convincing evidence of Philip's lawless tyranny and oppression.

The general charge against them was, that in conjunction with the prince of Orange they had formed a plan to abolish the king's authority in the Netherlands; and the proofs of this charge were, first, That by their contumelious treatment of

The charge
against them.

²⁰ Grimestone and Bentivoglio.

BOOK
VIII.
1568.

cardinal Granvelle, they had obliged the king, contrary to his inclination, to remove that prelate from the Low Countries.

2. That they were privy to the confederacy which had been formed to oppose the introduction of the inquisition and edicts; and although count Egmont knew that the lord of Bickerzel had subscribed the compromise, he had still retained him in his service.

3. That they had met at Dendremonde, with the prince of Orange, count Lewis of Nassau, and several others, to deliberate about opposing the entrance of the king's army into the Netherlands. And,

4. That, instead of punishing heretics with due severity, they had in some places granted them liberty to hold openly their assemblies.

Their defences.

In answer to these accusations, the two lords, after protesting that, as knights of the Golden Fleece, they could not be tried by any other judges but the knights of their order, began with declaring, that they had never entertained a thought to the prejudice of the king's authority; and that when they urged the king to remove cardinal Granvelle from the Netherlands, they believed, and were still persuaded, that his removal was equally calculated to promote the interest of the king and of the provinces. Although they knew of the confederacy, they had neither any concern in it, nor power sufficient to prevent it; and count Egmont had continued to employ the lord of Bickerzel, after knowing that he had signed the compromise, from a conviction that he

was still unshaken in his fidelity to the church and to the king; of which that nobleman gave afterwards the strongest proof, by exerting himself, with great activity, in detecting and punishing the violaters of the churches. They had indeed been present at a conference in Dendremonde, where count Lewis of Nassau had proposed that they should unite their endeavours to prevent the entrance of the Spanish troops; but, instead of assenting to that proposal, they had disapproved and opposed it. They had done every thing in their power for the suppression of heresy; they had made diligent search for the rioters, and punished many of them with great severity; and although they had in some places granted the protestants liberty to hold their religious assemblies, yet they had done so because they could not otherwise have prevented the demolition of the churches, besides many other mischievous effects, which there was the strongest reason to apprehend from the enthusiastic rage of the reformers. At the worst, they had been guilty only of an error in judgment. They had lived, and would die in the belief and practice of the catholic religion. And as they had not been wanting in their duty to the church; so they had lately given incontestable evidence of their devotion to the king, by taking chearfully, at the dutchess of Parma's desire, an oath to obey the king in every thing; and to regard as enemies to the state, all those whom he should be pleased to condemn.

B O O K

VIII.

1568.

Intercessions
in their be-
half.

While the prisoners offered these satisfactory defences of their conduct, the most earnest solicitations were employed in their behalf.

The emperor Maximilian, agreeably to the humanity of his character, interceded with Philip in their favor, and flattered himself so strongly with the hopes of success, that, a few days before their execution, he sent to inform the countess of Egmont, that her fears for her husband's life would, he now believed, be happily disappointed.

Letter of the
countess of
Egmont.

The dutchess of Parma too, who had never suspected that the complaints which she had made against the prisoners during her regency, would have been attended with such serious consequences, transmitted to the king, and seconded a petition from the countess of Egmont; in which, after representing that her husband had distinguished himself above his equals, first in the service of the late emperor, and since in that of the king; and that he had often born a principal share in their wars and victories both in Europe and Africa, she concluded with entreating, that if, notwithstanding her husband's defence of his conduct, he should still be found obnoxious to justice; yet, on account of his former services, the king would remember him with mercy, and take into consideration the deplorable situation to which she, and her eleven helpless children, would be reduced, by the ignominious death of her husband.

But Philip, cursed with the most unfeeling heart, remained relentless and inflexible; and, conformably to his orders, Alva pronounced

sentence of death both against count Egmont and count Horn, in the beginning of June one thousand five hundred and sixty-eight, after they had suffered near nine months imprisonment. The sentence was intimated to them in the middle of the night, when they were in bed, by the bishop of Ipres. They received the intelligence with becoming fortitude and resignation. "I am not conscious," said count Egmont, "of having deserved such hard usage from the king, whose glory and interest I have sincerely studied to promote. But I will submit to my fate with patience; although my heart bleeds when I think of my wife and children."

B O O K
VIII.
1568.

A few hours before his death he wrote to the king, "That although it had pleased him to order sentence of death to be pronounced against him as a traitor, and an abettor of heretics; yet in justice to himself he must declare, that he had never failed, in word or in deed, in his duty either to *him* or to the church. I cannot therefore doubt, continued he, that when you shall receive true information of what has passed in the Low Countries, you will be sensible how unjustly I have been used; having been condemned for doing what I never did or intended; and for the truth of this, I call Almighty God to witness, before whom I shall soon appear. My last and only request is, that on account of my former services, and the integrity of my intentions, you will take compassion on my unhappy wife and children; in the hopes of which I will patiently

Letter of
count Eg-
mont to
Philip.

BOOK

VIII.

1568.

June 5th,
The execu-
tion.

submit to the execution of the sentence which has been past against me ²¹.

Both prisoners had, a few days before, been brought from Ghent to Brussels. Count Egmont was first conducted to the place of execution, with Julio Romero, camp marshal, on one hand, and the bishop of Ipres on the other. The scaffold was covered with black cloth, and surrounded by a strong guard, consisting of nineteen companies of soldiers. The count went up to the scaffold accompanied only by the bishop of Ipres; with whom, having discoursed some time, (on what subject we are not told) he kneeled down and prayed; then rose again, and throwing off his robe, he wrapped his head and face in a handkerchief, and again kneeling down, with his hands joined, he in that posture received the stroke of the executioner.

The head and body, and the blood which flowed from them, were covered with a black cloth, to hide them from the view of count Horn; who was soon after brought thither, accompanied by the same attendants. Having ascended the scaffold, he inquired whether count Egmont was already beheaded; and being told that he was, "We have not seen one another," said he, "since the day when we were cast into prison. But from our fate, my friends," addressing himself to the spectators, "learn to know the measure of obedience required by your superiors. If I have ever

²¹ Strada, &c.

offended any of you, I now ask forgiveness, and beseech you to assist me with your prayers." Then having disrobed himself, he submitted to his fate with perfect composure and tranquillity.

The heads were set up opposite to each other, on two iron poles, fastened to the sides of the scaffold; where they remained till the afternoon, when they were taken down and delivered, together with the bodies, to the friends of the deceased ²².

The unmerited death of these two great men excited universal grief and indignation. Nor could the spectators be deterred, by the numerous troops which surrounded them, from testifying their resentment. Many of them forgetting the danger to which they exposed themselves, rushed forward to the scaffold, dipt their handkerchiefs in the blood, and vowed, in the hearing of the Spaniards, that ere long the governor and his associates should have reason to repent of the cruel murder that had been committed ²³.

Count Egmont was forty-six years of age when he suffered. To the most splendid bodily accomplishments, he joined great gentleness of manners, and the most engaging affability. From his youth he had accompanied the late emperor in his military expeditions, and had on all occasions acquitted himself with the highest honor, while at the same time he rendered himself universally

Character
of count
Egmont.

²² Strada.

²³ Bentivoglio.

B O O K
VIII.
1568.

beloved. Of the two victories which Philip's armies gained over the French at St. Quentin and Gravelines, it is allowed that the one was owing in a great measure, and the other entirely, to count Egmont. As all men were acquainted with the advantages which Philip derived from these victories, they were shocked at the ungrateful return which he now made to the person by whose valor and conduct they had been obtained ²⁴.

Alva marches
against
count
Lewis.

After this dismal catastrophe, Alva having nothing to prevent him from turning his whole attention to the war with count Lewis of Nassau, ordered bridges to be thrown over the Maese, the Rhine, and the Issel, and marched directly to the enemy. He reached Deventer, where he had given orders for several bodies of troops to meet him about the middle of July; and in a few days after, he arrived with his whole army, consisting of twelve thousand foot and three thousand horse, in sight of the enemy's camp.

The army of count Lewis being much inferior both in discipline and number, that general quickly perceived the necessity of quitting his present situation. He retired, however, in good order, and with very little loss, till he arrived

²⁴ At the same time that what is above related was transacted at Brussels, orders were given at Madrid for putting to death the baron of Montigny, brother to count Horn, who had been sent by the dutchess of Parma along with the marquis of Mons (who died some months before) to present the petition of the confederates. Bentivoglio.

at the town of Gemmingen, where he pitched his camp in a place that appeared almost impregnable. Behind him lay the village of Gemmingen; on his left, the river Ems, by which he could be supplied with provisions from Embden, and other places; and on his right, a plain which he fortified with trenches and redoubts: but that which formed the chief strength of his situation was, that the enemy could not approach him but by marching in defile along the dike of the river. This dike was ten miles in length, with the river on the one side, and a morass on the other. Having planted a battery of cannon upon it, Lewis intended to open the dike and lay the morass under water. And in this encampment, he hoped it would not be difficult for him to keep the enemy at bay, till his brother should begin his operations; when he did not doubt that the duke of Alva would find it necessary to retire.

Alva was aware of Lewis's intention, and of the danger with which any considerable delay must be attended. With the utmost expedition he brought forward his best veteran troops, and arrived at the very time when the Flemings were beginning to break down the dike. Count Lewis and the other nobility were themselves employed at the work. When the enemy appeared, they betook themselves hastily to arms, but they were soon obliged to yield to the superior force of the Spaniards, and to retire behind the battery above mentioned. Here Lewis expected to maintain his

and defeats him,

B O O K
VIII.
1568.

through a
mutiny of
the Ger-
mans.

ground by the help of his artillery; but the Germans in his army, to the number of seven thousand, having been disappointed of their pay for some weeks, and believing that Lewis had money in his possession which he had delayed giving them from his dread of their desertion, resolved to embrace the present opportunity to extort from him a compliance with their demands. They rose tumultuously, and threatened that they would not fight unless he immediately paid their arrears. Intelligence of this sedition was carried by spies or deserters to the duke of Alva, who perceived that now was the time to make an attempt upon the battery. He ordered a part of his army to enter the morafs; through which, as it was the summer season, and Lewis had been disappointed in his design of laying the ground under water, the Spaniards found their way easier than they expected. They arrived in time to attack the enemy in flank, whilst the rest of the army, without shrinking, marched up to the battery in front, and made a furious assault upon it sword in hand. The Flemish exiles, with count Lewis at their head, defended themselves for some time with great bravery, but being deserted by the Germans, they were at length compelled to retreat. The Spaniards entered the camp along with them. The Germans, overwhelmed with terror, made little resistance; and, as a just punishment of their sedition at so critical a period, great numbers of them were put to the sword. Almost as many were swallowed up in attempting to swim across

the river, as fell by the hands of the enemy. On the side of the Spaniards only eighty men were killed; but of the Germans and the Flemish exiles, between six and seven thousand perished, including those who were drowned. Count Lewis, after having attempted in vain to rally his scattered troops, escaped in a small boat to the opposite side of the river; and soon afterwards set out with the earl of Hoogstraten for Germany, to join the prince of Orange²⁵.

The duke of Alva went from the field of battle to the city of Groningen, and from thence to Utrecht and Amsterdam; carrying on inquiries in these places against the protestants, and punishing with rigor all who were suspected to have been concerned in the late disorders. He would gladly have spent more time in this employment, so agreeable to the native cruelty of his disposition; but he was informed that the prince of Orange had begun to put his troops in motion, and was upon his march from Treves to the province of Guelderland, or Brabant.

Before William left Germany he published a manifesto, in which he explained the motives which induced him to have recourse to arms. "There was no other expedient left," he said, "by which he could save his countrymen from slavery and ruin; and to attempt this, he thought, was the indispensable duty of every citizen; espe-

²⁵ Strada, Bentivoglio, and Grimestone's General History of the Netherlands.

BOOK
VIII.
1568.

cially of one who, like him, had enjoyed the highest dignities of the state. The king, he hoped, would ere long be delivered from those Spanish counsellors by whom he had been led astray; but, in the mean time, he did not think it incumbent upon any inhabitant of the Low Countries to yield obedience to the king in contradiction to the laws. For Philip did not hold the same unlimited authority in the Netherlands, as in his other dominions. His right to obedience subsisted only whilst he maintained the rights of the people; and, by the constitutions of the provinces, it was expressly provided, that if the sovereign should attempt to violate any of the fundamental laws, the people should in that case be absolved from their allegiance."

In this manifesto the prince thought proper to make it known, that he had changed his sentiments in religion; and was now convinced, that the opinions of the protestants were more conformable than those of the Romish church, to the great rule of Christian faith, the sacred writings.

The prince's
army.

William's army, including horse and foot, did not exceed twenty - thousand; and the duke of Alva's, after being joined by a reinforcement which he received at this time from Spain, was equal in number, and much better furnished with military stores and provisions. The prince was sensible of the great disadvantage under which he labored in this respect; but from the pressing invitations which he received from many of the principal inhabitants in the Netherlands, and from

the repeated representations which were made to him of the universal hatred with which the people were animated against the governor, he hoped that, as soon as his army should appear, there would be an insurrection in his favor, or that some of the principal cities would open their gates to receive him.

He passed the Rhine without opposition in the end of August, a little above Cologne; and then turning to the left, he advanced towards Aix la Chapelle. About this time the duke of Alva arrived at Maestricht. The prince directed his march first towards Liege; but being disappointed in the hopes which he had conceived, of that city declaring in his favor, he turned his course northwards, with an intention to pass the Maese wherever he should find it fordable. Alva's whole attention was employed to prevent him from putting his design in execution, and with this view he planted strong guards along the banks of the river, and kept his army as nearly opposite as possible to the enemy.

Alva in
vain opposes
his passage
over the
Maese.

At last, however, after several marches and countermarches, William effected his passage in the night, opposite to a town called Stochem, where the duke believed it to have been impracticable. But the season had been remarkably dry; and the prince on this occasion imitated the conduct of Julius Cæsar in his passage of the Ligeris, by placing his cavalry a little above the ford, to break the force of the stream.

B O O K

VIII.

158.

When Alva was informed next morning of what had happened, he could not at first believe it, and scornfully asked the officer who brought the intelligence, Whether he imagined that the enemy had wings?

The prince of Orange endeavoured to persuade his troops, as soon as they had crossed the river, to march directly against the Spaniards; who, if this request had been complied with, would have been found very ill-prepared for defence; but the Germans, who, unfortunately for themselves, as well as for the cause in which they were engaged, never yielded due obedience to their commander, refused to advance till they should have a night's refreshment; and thereby lost the only opportunity which the duke of Alva ever gave them, of compelling him to fight.

Alva declines
fighting.

On the next day, when they were led forward to the Spanish camp to offer battle, they found it so strongly fortified with intrenchments and redoubts, that no attempt could be made upon it with the smallest probability of success. Chiappino Vitelli, an officer of high reputation, was of opinion, that the duke ought not to have declined an engagement, as the enemy were fatigued with their passage of the river, and had not yet made choice of a proper place for their camp, to which they could retire after battle; besides, that it was of the highest consequence, he imagined, to give an early check to their presumption, in order to prevent the fortified towns from declaring in their favor.

BOOK

VIII.

1568.

His motives.

But Alva had already formed his plan, to which he was unalterably determined to adhere. He considered that he had a great deal more at stake than the prince of Orange, and that a defeat would be attended not only with the loss of his army, but the greatest part of the provinces. He was acquainted too with the narrowness of William's finances, and knew that he must encounter the most insurmountable difficulties in supporting so numerous an army for any considerable time; especially as the winter season was fast approaching, when, unless he should get possession of some of the great towns, it would be impossible for him to remain in the Netherlands.

His prudent conduct.

With this view, as he suspected that the prince intended to lead his army into Brabant, he strengthened the garrisons of Tillemont, Louvain, and Brussels; and when William directed his march towards Tongres, the duke drew his troops so near that town, as made it impossible for the enemy to approach. Whichever way the prince of Orange turned his course, the duke of Alva accompanied him; marching sometimes behind, and sometimes on his flank; always straitening his quarters, and rendering it difficult for him to furnish his army with forage and provisions; while he intrenched his own forces with so much skill, that the prince fought in vain for an opportunity of bringing on an engagement.

Skirmishes.

In this situation frequent skirmishes between the two armies were unavoidable, and in these the

BOOK

VIII.

1568.

advantage fell sometimes on the one side and sometimes on the other; but each commander made such judicious movements, chose his ground with so much skill, and exerted such an equal degree of vigilance and attention, as effectually prevented his antagonist from obtaining any considerable advantage over him.

The only success which the duke of Alva could boast of, was at the river Geete; where, having attacked the rear-guard of the enemy's army, he killed some, and put the rest to flight.

The prince of Orange had the same ground of triumph in an action at Quesnoy; where, having come up with a detachment consisting of ten companies of German catholics, eight of Spaniards, and three troops of light-armed infantry, he put them to rout, and took ample vengeance for the loss he had sustained at Geete²⁶.

He was on his march at that time to meet the *Sieur de Genlis*, who had been sent to him by the prince of Condé, with a reinforcement of troops; which fully compensated all his losses in Brabant.

The prince
is obliged to
disband his
army.

But the causes already mentioned began to operate. The prince had been cruelly disappointed of the greatest part of the money which had been promised him. The dread which the Flemings entertained of the Spanish forces, and the prudent precautions which had been taken by the duke of Alva, had prevented William's friends

²⁶ Thuanus.

from making any effort in his behalf. His army had been often pinched for provisions. They now despaired of getting possession of any of the great towns, and they trembled at the thoughts of passing the winter in the open fields. The Germans began to desert in great numbers, and had often, before this time, shown themselves refractory and disobedient. For these reasons, the prince found it necessary to disband them; after having given them all the satisfaction in his power, by paying a part of their arrears, and giving security to their leaders for the rest on his lordship of Montfort and the principality of Orange ²⁷.

After these disasters, the prince, accompanied by his brother count Lewis, went to France, and conducted thither between a thousand and twelve hundred horse, to the assistance of the Calvinists.

Such was the conclusion of the first attempt which the prince of Orange and his brother made, to deliver the Netherlands from the Spanish yoke. It must occur to every reader, that if they had begun their operations and entered the provinces at the same time, the issue of their enterprise would probably have been extremely different. The duke of Alva would, in that case, have been obliged to divide his forces, and have probably been overpowered by numbers. But unfortunately count Lewis, who was more expeditious in making his levies than the prince of

²⁷ Thuanus, Meursius, Albanus, p. 19. Meteren, p. 79.

BOOK
VIII.
1568.

Orange, did not possess a fund sufficient to maintain them without employment, and was obliged to enter upon action before his brother was prepared to support him. And to the same cause may be ascribed both the prince's delay in putting his troops in motion, and the necessity to which he was reduced of breaking up his camp.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK IX.

PART I.

WHILE Philip's bigotry, joined to his despotic and arbitrary conduct, had engaged him in war with his subjects in the Netherlands, the same causes produced a similar effect in the province of Granada; where the Moors, who had long yielded a tame submission to the crown of Spain, were provoked by the tyranny of the present government, to throw off their allegiance and have recourse to arms. This people, who, during several centuries, had maintained possession of the greatest part of Spain, were at last totally subdued by Ferdinand the catholic, in the year one thousand four hundred and ninety-two. But although their government was abolished at that time, the people themselves remained; and were permitted to enjoy

BOOK

IX.

1568.

The war in
Granada.

History of
the More-
coes.

B O O K

IX.

1568.

not only their possessions, dress, and customs, but even their religion, as in the time of their native kings. And the politic Ferdinand scrupled not to swear solemnly, to observe this condition, in hopes of being able afterwards to devise some efficacious means of reconciling them to the Christian faith.

Being disappointed in his expectation, and finding, after a trial of several years, that the instructions of his priests were not likely to prove effectual; he resolved, without regard to the oath which he had sworn, to employ force in order to accomplish his design. He pretended, that the citizens of Granada had forfeited their title to his fulfilling the terms of peace, by an insurrection, into which some of them had been betrayed through the violent administration of cardinal Ximenes; and, on this pretence, he ordered sentence of death to be pronounced against them, and declared, that unless they would renounce their religion, it should be instantly carried into execution. By this expedient he compelled fifty thousand of the inhabitants of the city of Granada, most of whom had no concern in the insurrection, to profess themselves converts to Christianity. The inhabitants of the country, and of the smaller towns, being highly exasperated by the violent treatment of their countrymen, and dreading that they themselves would quickly experience the same injustice, began to prepare for resistance. But before they had time to put themselves in a posture of

defence, Ferdinand, who was no less provident and active, than false and faithless, came upon them with a numerous army, and after taking one of their towns, of which he put all the inhabitants to the sword, he soon obliged the rest to lay down their arms. Upon their paying him a sum of money, he permitted a certain number to transport themselves to Africa. But the greater part were compelled to remain in the kingdom, and to submit to be baptized. They were still however strongly attached to the Mahometan superstition, and although they generally conformed to the rites of the Romish church, they could not on every occasion conceal their attachment. The inquisitors were perpetually prying into their conduct; great numbers of them were condemned and burnt as heretics; and many thousands, dreading the like fate, fled over to Barbary.

Representations were often transmitted to court of the desolation that was thus produced; but these representations either did not reach the ear of Ferdinand, or they were disregarded. No remedy was ever applied, and the inquisitors continued to exercise without control their wonted cruelty and oppression.

During the latter part of the reign of Ferdinand, and the whole of that of Charles, the Moors are seldom mentioned by the Spanish historians; nor do these writers give us any other information concerning them for half a century, than that they still retained their ancient aversion to the Christian faith. But the ecclesiastics, soon after Philip's arrival in Spain, taking encouragement from that

B O O K

IX.

1568.

bigoted zeal with which they knew their prince to be so strongly actuated, revived their old complaints against that unhappy people, and made repeated representations of their obstinate and incurable infidelity.

“ They are Christians, ” said Guerrero, archbishop of Granada, “ in name only, but Mahometans in their hearts. They come to hear mass on festival days, only in order to avoid the penalties which they would otherwise incur. They work on these days with their doors shut, and feast and carouse on Fridays. They present their children to be baptized; but no sooner do they reach their own houses, than they wash them with warm water, circumcise them, and give them Moorish names. They consent to be married in the churches, because the law requires it; but when they return home, they clothe themselves in a Moorish dress, and celebrate their nuptials with dances, songs, and other species of music which are in use only among the Moors. ”

This representation was well calculated to make impression on the superstitious spirit of the king. But the archbishop knew, that political considerations were likely to have as much weight with him as those of a religious nature; and therefore he subjoined, “ That the Morescoes held a treasonable correspondence with the Turks and Corsairs, and were in the practice of carrying off the children of Christians, and either selling them for slaves, or sending them to Barbary, where they were brought up in the religion of Mahomet. ” Whether there

was

was any truth in the latter part of this accusation, does not appear with convincing evidence; but, considering the near affinity between the Morefcoes and the African Moors in respect of religion, manners, language, and descent, together with the alienation from the Spanish government, which the cruelties exercised against them by the inquisition, and their exclusion from all offices of trust, must have carried to the greatest height, it is not surprising that Philip's apprehensions were alarmed, and that he thought it necessary to make provision against the danger which seemed to threaten him.

B O O K

IX.

1568.

His first step was to strip the Morefcoes of their arms; and for this purpose he sent, on different pretences, several regiments of Castilians to quarter among them, by whom a great quantity of arms of all kinds were seized; but as their suspicions were perpetually awake, they had penetrated his design, and concealed a considerable quantity¹.

Philip dis-
arms them.

This discovery of Philip's disposition towards them served to alienate their affections more than ever from his government, and at the same time encouraged the inquisitors to multiply their complaints, and to urge at court the necessity of employing more efficacious measures than had hitherto been adopted. The king himself was far from being averse to comply with the violent counsels that were given him; and when upon consulting a theologian of the name of Oraduy,

¹ Ferreras, ann. 1562.

B O O K that ecclesiastic, in the true spirit of a Spanish
IX. inquisitor, quoted to him the proverb, that "of
1568. enemies, the fewer, the better." Philip was highly
 pleased with his reply.

His edict
 against them.

Having therefore resolved, if possible, to extirpate from his dominions the private as well as the public exercise of Mahometanism, and to wash it out with the blood of its votaries, rather than suffer it to remain, he appointed a select number of ecclesiastics to consider of the proper means by which his design might be accomplished; and agreeably to the advice of these men he soon afterwards published an edict which contained the following prohibitions, and denounced death in case of disobedience: "That henceforth the Morecoes shall lay aside their native language, dress, and peculiar customs, and in future adopt those of the inhabitants of Castile. That they shall no longer take Moorish names or surnames, but such as are generally used in Spain. That they shall bear none of those symbols about them by which the disciples of Mahomet are distinguished. That they shall discontinue the use of their baths, which shall be immediately destroyed. That their women shall not, as hitherto, appear in veils; that no persons shall marry without a dispensation from the ordinary; that none shall remove from one place to another without permission; and that they shall on no occasion wear arms, or keep them in their possession."

The exercise of the Mahometan religion having been prohibited under the severest penalties by

former princes, no mention was made of it in the edict; but the Morefcoes readily perceived the design and tendency of the present regulations, and considered, that as they must render the secret practice of their religion infinitely more difficult than formerly, they must infallibly prove ere long the cause of its extirpation. Even although they had not been apprehensive of any such serious consequence, it could not be expected they would tamely submit to those affronting rules which were now prescribed them. Men are often more powerfully attached to the external forms and modes of life, than to things that are the most essential to their happiness. With this attachment the zeal of the Morefcoes for their religion coincided. Their resentment, on account of the innumerable cruelties which had been so long exercised against them by the inquisition, added force to these incentives, and prompted them to resolve to expose themselves to the last extremities, rather than yield obedience to the edict that was now promulgated. But as they were conscious of their weakness, and could not depend upon receiving assistance from any foreign power, they agreed, before they should take up arms, to make trial, whether they could by solicitation and entreaty persuade the king to revoke his edict.

“ Their dress,” they represented, “ had surely no relation to any religion, whether the Mahometan or the Christian, since the Mahometans in Marocco, Fez, Tunis, and Turkey, dressed very differently from one another; while the dress of

Their remon-
strance.

B O O K

IX.

1568.

the Christians in Turkey was the same as that of the Turks: and to require them all to purchase Castilian habits would subject great numbers of them to an expence which they were unable to defray. It was from modesty alone their women wore veils; a practice which obtained in many places of Castile, as well as in Granada. Their music and dances were used on days of festivity, only as amusements; they had not the most remote connexion with religion, and they had been regarded as innocent by prelates the most distinguished for their sanctity and zeal.

“ Their baths were used for the purpose of cleanliness only; those of the men were separate from those of the women; and it was not in the power of those Christians to whom the care of them was committed, to alledge, that either the former or the latter had been ever applied to any use repugnant either to decency or the catholic religion. And with regard to their language, as it was difficult to conceive how the Arabic could contain any thing contrary to Christianity, so it was utterly impossible for them at once to lay aside the use of it, since great numbers among them were too far advanced in life to be able to learn a new language; and in several parts of the country there was no other tongue spoken but the Arabic, nor any means established by which the Castilian could be acquired.” They concluded with professions of loyalty to the king, and with reminding him, that in his foreign wars they had given him many proofs of their attachment and fidelity.

The Morescoes had not access, it should seem, to deliver this remonstrance to Philip himself; but it was presented to him by Deza the chancellor of Granada, who was seconded by Don John Henriquez, Don Antonio de Toledo, the prior of Leon, and the marquis of Mondejar, captain general of the province. This last mentioned nobleman spared no pains to divert Philip from his purpose, by representing, that from his knowledge of the Morescoes he was convinced, that an open rebellion would be the consequence of carrying the edict into execution. But the king having formed his resolution after mature deliberation, and by the advice of such counsellors as he most esteemed, lent a deaf ear to all the representations that were made to him, and gave orders to Mondejar immediately to set out for Granada, in order to make preparations for employing force in case he should find it necessary.

The Morescoes were no sooner informed of the ill success of their petition, than they began to meditate a revolt; and the leading men among them having met privately in Cadiar, a town situated in the entrance of the mountains of Alpuxara, they dispatched ambassadors to Fez, Algiers, and Constantinople, to solicit assistance; and at the same time spread their emissaries over the province, in order to prepare the minds of the inhabitants.

The people almost every where, except in those places where they were overawed by the

Their insurrection.

B O O K

IX.

1568.

Spanish garrison, obeyed with alacrity the invitation which they received to assert their liberty; and in a little time the whole region of Alpuxara, which contains a space of seventeen leagues in length and ten in breadth, comprehending many villages and many thousand inhabitants, was up in arms. A reinforcement of several hundred Turks, besides a quantity of military stores, arrived from Africa, and the Morefcoes flattered themselves with the hopes that much more powerful assistance would ere long be sent them by the Sultan².

They elect a
King.

Their leaders in the mean time held another assembly, in which they elected for their king Don Ferdinand de Valor, a young man of four or five-and-twenty, descended from their ancient princes, and in some measure qualified, by his intrepid courage and activity, for the dangerous pre-eminence to which he was now exalted. Having assumed the name of Aben - Humeya, which had been that of his progenitors, he was invested with the ensigns of royalty, with all the forms and ceremonies which were anciently practised at the election of the Moorish kings. He then entered upon the exercise of his new authority, appointed his ministers and officers, and sent orders to all the chiefs who were not present in the assembly, to hold themselves ready to act on the shortest notice.

Their attempt
on Granada.

His first and principal object was to get possession of the city of Granada, in which he doubted

² Their king.

not of being able to defend himself till the Turkish succours should arrive. Nor was it without some reason that he entertained hopes of succeeding in an attempt on this important city. His party had hitherto concealed their machinations with the most profound and faithful secrecy. Their several meetings had been held on pretences which deceived the penetration of the Spaniards, and their military preparations had been carried on chiefly among the mountains of Alpuxara. The marquis of Mondejar, indeed, notwithstanding these precautions, had conceived a suspicion of their designs, and had represented to Philip the necessity of sending him a much more powerful army than was at present under his command. But there subsisted at this time a violent jealousy between that nobleman and Deza the chancellor, which arose from a competition concerning the rights of their respective offices. Deza, prompted by his animosity against the marquis, endeavoured to discredit his account of the hostile intentions of the Moors, and to persuade the king that there was in reality no danger of a revolt, and that the edict lately published might be sufficiently enforced by a vigorous exercise of the civil power alone; but that Mondejar was desirous that a war should be kindled, because he expected that the whole administration of it would be committed to himself, and the count of Tendilla his son.

Philip, though naturally provident and suspicious, and more inclined to fear than hope, was by his counsellors, who were Deza's friends, led

BOOK

IX.

1568.

to believe his representation of the matter, rather than that of the marquis. And thus the march of the troops for which Mondejar had applied was delayed, and the garrison of Granada suffered to continue so weak, that had it not been for an accident which could not be foreseen, that city would have fallen into the hands of the Morelscos. Aben-Humeya having held a secret correspondence with the inhabitants of the town of Albaicin, which communicates with the city of Granada, and may be considered as a part of it, gave orders about the end of December to Aben-Farax, one of his principal officers, to march thither with a body of between six and seven thousand men. Had these troops reached Albaicin at the time expected, the inhabitants would have joined them, and thereby have made up an army by which the garrison must have been overpowered; but by a fall of snow upon a neighbouring mountain, over which they were obliged to pass, they were all prevented from advancing except about one hundred and fifty. With these Aben-Farax himself entered Albaicin in the middle of the night; and if he could have prevailed upon the inhabitants to take arms and join him, he might still have made himself master of the town; but though well affected to his cause, they were deterred from declaring in his favor by observing how small a number of troops he had brought along with him; so that after having continued in the place for some hours, he was obliged, before the approach of day, to make his escape to the mountain where

his army had been stopt. Philip's eyes were then opened; with regard to the contradictory informations which he had received, and he immediately issued orders for the march of those troops for which the marquis of Mondejar had applied.

Aben-Humeya in the mean time was employed in fortifying the narrow passes which led into the country of Alpuxara: after which he, with one body of troops, and Aben-Farax with another, went from place to place, exhorting or compelling the Morescoes to revolt; destroying the altars and images in the churches, which they converted into mosques; and putting to death, in the most barbarous manner, all the priests and other Christians who refused to embrace the Mahometan religion.

In order to check their progress, the marquis of Mondejar set out from Granada as soon as he had collected a sufficient number of troops for his intended enterprise. The Morescoes disputed with him for some time the entrance into the mountains; but they were unable to withstand long the bold intrepid efforts of the Spanish infantry. Mondejar triumphed over them at every pass; put many of them to the sword; took a great number of prisoners, and at last obliged Aben-Humeya to fly with the shattered remains of his army, to the more inaccessible parts of the mountains. In a few months almost the whole region of Alpuxara was subdued. The people, being every where intimidated by the rapidity of Mondejar's progress, laid down their arms, and either came to him in numerous bodies, or sent deputies, to sue for peace.

B O O K

IX.

1568.

Their hostilities.

They submit to the marquis of Mondejar.

BOOK

IX.

1568.

This he readily granted, on condition of their yielding obedience in future to the king's authority; and he at the same time gave them protection against (what they had but too much reason to dread) the rapine and violence of the Spanish soldiers. The marquis De los Velez, who commanded a body of troops in the neighbourhood of Almeria, was no less successful in dislodging the Morescoes, from some strong holds near the sea coasts, where they had fortified themselves with a view to favor the descent of the Moors and Turks. And now the marquis of Mondejar, believing the war to be almost entirely extinguished, and that Aben-Humeya must either soon surrender or make his escape out of the kingdom, sent intelligence of his success to Philip, and desired that a part of the troops might be recalled. He at the same time recommended the treating gently both such of the Morescoes as had submitted, and such of them as had been taken prisoners. But unfortunately this nobleman's enemies at court had much greater influence than his friends; and Philip was of himself much more inclined to harshness and severity, than to lenity and mercy. Without regard to Mondejar's representations, a royal mandate was immediately dispatched, commanding all the prisoners above eleven years of age, without distinction of sex or condition, to be sold for slaves³.

³ The effect of this barbarous treatment, says a Spanish historian (Ferreras), was, that great numbers of the Morescoe women languished in slavery for a little time, and then sunk under their calamities.

This barbarous treatment of their countrymen revived in the minds of such of the Morefcoes as had submitted, all their wonted abhorrence of the Spanish yoke; and soon afterwards they themselves were treated with equal inhumanity.

Whether Philip's exchequer was in reality drained at this time by his late expensive armaments in the Mediterranean, and his war in the Netherlands, or whether his ministers only pretended this to be the case, in order to gratify their malignity against Mondejar, does not sufficiently appear; but whatever was the cause, the arrears due to the troops were so great, that the marquis of Mondejar was unable to discharge them. The usual consequence of the ill-payment of an army quickly followed. The general lost his authority, and the soldiers, and several of the officers, deserted their stations, and spread themselves over the country; plundering, and even butchering and carrying off into slavery great numbers of those Morefcoes for whose security he had pledged his faith. Mondejar seems to have exerted himself strenuously to put a stop to these enormities, by sending out such of his troops as he could trust, to restrain or chastise the delinquents. But his endeavours were in a great measure fruitless. The Spaniards still continued to embrace every opportunity of indulging their rapacity; and afterwards left their standards, and went off to the neighbouring provinces with their prey.

The Morefcoes, highly exasperated by the multiplied oppressions which they suffered, repented

B O O K

IX.

1568.

BOOK
IX.
1568.

of their late submission; and, being now convinced that there was no safety in trusting to any treaty with an enemy so cruel and perfidious, they resumed their arms, took ample vengeance on scattered parties of the Spaniards, whom they surprised among the mountains, and again arranged themselves under the banners of their king. It happened about this time, that Aben-Humeya received from Africa a reinforcement of four hundred Turks; who, it was pretended, were soon to be followed by a powerful fleet and army. And thus the Morescoes were determined, partly by hope, and partly by vengeance and despair, to make a second trial of the fortune of war; the calamities attending which, they thought, could not exceed those which they had lately experienced in the time of peace.

The causes of this second revolt were very differently interpreted by the marquis of Mondejar's enemies and friends. By the former it was said, "that this nobleman had erred egregiously, both in his manner of conducting the war, and in his treatment of the rebels, when they laid down their arms. For it was absurd to expect that an enemy so treacherous as the Morescoes, would regard their engagements any longer than they found it necessary; and no less absurd to hope that such obstinate infidels would ever be sincere converts to the Christian faith. Their late sacrilege, and the barbarous cruelties which they had exercised against the priests, and other Christians, had called aloud for vengeance; and justice, as

well as sound policy, had required, that they should all have been put to the sword, or sold for slaves."

BOOK
IX.
1568.

But the marquis, on the other hand, and his adherents, represented. That this deluded people had been chastised with sufficient severity, for enormities into which their leaders had betrayed them. That humanity, and a regard to the interest of the king, had prevented him from sacrificing to revenge, the lives of so many thousand useful subjects, most of whom were innocent of the crimes that had been committed; and by whose destruction so great a part of the kingdom would have been rendered desolate: besides, that there was no reason to believe that the Morescoes would have violated their faith, if the troops could have been kept under proper discipline; which he had found it impossible to maintain, partly through the negligence of some of the king's ministers in making remittances for their pay; and partly through the pains which some persons in power had taken to ruin his authority.

Between these contradictory representations Philip was at a loss to determine what measures to pursue. But at last, either because he himself, and most of his counsellors, disapproved of Mondejar's lenity in so easily receiving the Morescoes into favor, or because he did not incline to subject that nobleman's enemies to the mortification of seeing him still continued in the supreme command, he resolved to bestow it upon his natural brother Don John of Austria.

Don John
of Austria
commander
in chief

B O O K

IX.

1568.

This young prince, whose mother was a German, of the name of Blomberg, a native of Ratisbon, had been educated privately by Lewis Quixada, lord of Villagarcia; for whose son he had passed, till Philip's arrival in Spain in the year one thousand five hundred and fifty-nine. Soon after this, Philip having, agreeably to his father's request, acknowledged Don John for his brother; had appointed him a household suitable to his rank, and bestowed the same attention on his education as on that of his own son.

Resembling his father in the gratefulness of his person, and in the courteousness of his manners, Don John discovered, from his youth, the love of arms; and gave many conspicuous proofs of those accomplishments by which he became afterwards one of the most illustrious personages of the age^{*}.

But as at this time he was only about twenty-two years old, and did not possess any military experience, Philip, although he conferred upon him the title of commander in chief, forbade him to take the command of the troops into his own hands, and required, that in the whole management of the war he should conform to the opinion of certain counsellors whom he appointed to assist him. These were, the archbishop of Granada, Deza the president of the chancery, the duke de Sessa, the marquis of Mondejar, and Don Lewis de Requesens, the grand commendator of Castile, whom he named for Don John's lieutenant.

^{*} Strada, ann. 1578.

The war was now prosecuted in different quarters at the same time, and a greater number of troops employed than formerly. But the success was not answerable to the expectations that had been formed. The Moreoscoes discovered on many occasions that they were not destitute of valor, and in some rencounters they came off victorious.

BOOK

IX.

1568.

Don John, in the mean time, grown extremely impatient under the restraints which had been imposed on him, endeavoured to persuade the king to permit him to command the forces in person; and he at length obtained his request. After which, having got his army reinforced, he himself marched against the Moreoscoes on one side, while Requesens and the marquis De los Velez attacked them on another. But the Moreoscoes, undisciplined, incompletely armed, and disheartened by the disappointment of their hopes of assistance from the Turks and Moors, were not a match for such numerous regular forces as were now employed to reduce them, and their ruin was hastened by the dissensions of some of their leaders, and the treachery of others. Aben-Humeya was privately murdered by the friends of his wife, whose father he had put to death on account of his secret practices with the Spaniards. Another chief, called Aben-Aboo, was elected king in his stead; and he too suffered the same fate, from the hands of some of his officers, who hoped by this sacrifice to atone for their rebellion. With the death of this leader, the

The Moreoscoes are entirely subdued.

B O O K

IX.

1568.

war, which had lasted almost two years, was concluded⁵.

Neither Don John nor Requesens acquired any glory by their conduct in this war; nor did they preserve themselves free from that imputation of inhumanity and implacable revenge, which in this age was generally cast upon the Spaniards.

No other apology can be offered for the dreadful severities which they exercised, but that their conduct was conformable to the instructions given them by the king. For Philip had disapproved of the lenity with which the Morescoes had been treated by the marquis of Mondejar, and, while he listened only to the voice of superstition or resentment, forgot what every wise king will regard as the most sacred maxim of his policy, that the strength and glory of a prince depend on the number and prosperity of his subjects.

But this bigoted monarch set no bounds to his abhorrence of those who deviated, or whom he suspected of deviating, from the catholic faith. Agreeably to his instructions, great numbers of the Morescoes living peaceably in the plains of Granada, were, upon suspicion of their corresponding with the insurgents, put to death. All

⁵ In describing this war, the Spanish historians have descended to the most minute detail. But amidst the endless multiplicity of little events and incidents which they relate, there is almost no variety, and no display either of courage or conduct that can interest a reader in the perusal. This part of the Spanish history is besides rendered peculiarly disgusting by the numerous scenes of barbarous cruelty which it presents.

the

the inhabitants of some villages and districts, men, women, and children, were extirpated. All the prisoners of both sexes were either executed or deprived of their liberty. And of those Morescoes who had refused to join in the rebellion, all but a few, without whom certain manufactures could not be carried on, were torn from their native homes, and transported into the interior provinces; where they were exposed to the injuries and insults of a haughty people, and many of them by their poverty reduced to a state of dependence on the Castilians, which differed little from the condition of such of their countrymen as had been sold for slaves.

Such was the conclusion of this war, during which, notwithstanding the great disparity between the contending parties, Philip was exposed to greater danger than at any other period of his reign. Had the Morescoes made themselves masters of the city of Granada, in their attempt on which they failed more through chance and accident, than misconduct or the want of strength; or had they prevailed with Selim the Turkish emperor, to interest himself in their behalf; several towns in Andalusia, and almost the whole kingdom of Valentia, which was mostly inhabited by Morescoes, would have joined in the revolt; and, in that case, so great an army might have been raised, as, with the assistance of the Moors in Barbary, would have furnished employment for many years to all the forces which the king, who was at the same time engaged in war with his

BOOK

IX.

1568.

subjects in the Netherlands, could have collected to oppose them.

But fortunately for Philip, and perhaps for Christendom, the Sultan, was at this time intent upon prosecuting the war of Cyprus against the Venetians, and from that war he could not be diverted, although Mahomet, his grand Vizier, and the wisest of all his courtiers, advised him earnestly to suspend the prosecution of it, and not to neglect the present happy opportunity of turning his arms against the king of Spain.

Thuanus, lib. xlviii. Ferreras, ann. 1568-9-70.
Cabrera, lib. viii.

P A R T II.

IT was not long before Selim had reason to be sorry that he had not listened to this advice, as Philip had no sooner completed the reduction of the Moreos, than he entered into an alliance against him with the republic of Venice, the pope and several others of the Italian states and princes. The papal throne was filled at this time by the celebrated Pius the fifth, who by his merit had raised himself from obscurity to the popedom, and though strongly tinctured with some of the vices which characterized the ecclesiastics of that age, was endued with certain royal virtues which rendered him worthy of the exalted station to which he had been advanced. Having been solicited by the Venetians, to employ his influence to procure assistance from the christian princes against the Sultan, who in the time of peace, and in violation of a solemn treaty, had invaded the isle of Cyprus, Pius readily consented to their request, and, with a zeal becoming the head of the church, espoused their cause.

His application however to most of the European monarchs was without effect. For besides that the season of crusades was now over, and that the most superstitious princes were, in that age, governed more by political views than religious zeal, he found almost all of them unable to grant the assistance which he solicited. The emperor Maximilian

B O O K

IX.

1571.

War with
the Turks.

B O O K

IX.

1571.

had lately concluded a truce with the Sultan, which it was greatly his interest to maintain. The attention of the French king, who had been long in alliance with the Porte, was engrossed by those inveterate factions into which his kingdom was divided. Sebastian, king of Portugal was too young; and Sigismund of Poland too much worn out with the infirmities of age to engage in any foreign enterprize. Philip was the only great prince in Europe with whom Pius had reason to expect success in his present application. That monarch's zeal, as well as his power, was greater than that of any other European prince, and from the situation of his dominions, and the enmity which had long subsisted between him and the Turkish Sultans, he had no less reason to dread the increase of the Ottoman power, than either the pope or the Venetians.

Philip's league
with the pope
and the Vene-
tians.

Without hesitation therefore he resolved to comply with the request that was now made to him, and readily entered into an alliance, by which he bound himself to pay one half of the expense of that powerful armament which it was judged necessary to employ, while the republic of Venice engaged to defray three-fourths of the other half, and the pope the remainder.

The preparations stipulated were carried on with the utmost celerity and dispatch, and about the middle of September a fleet was ready to sail from Messina, consisting of upwards of two hundred and fifty ships of war, besides ships of burden, and, if we may believe the contemporary historians,

carrying near fifty thousand men; fourteen thousand of whom were furnished by the princes and states of Italy.

B O O K

IX.

1571.

The chief command of this mighty armament was given to Don John of Austria, for whom the title of Generalissimo was invented on this occasion. The Grand Commendator Requesens was appointed his lieutenant, and under him were the marquis de Santa-Croce, Doria, M. Antony Colonna, commander of the pope's gallies, and Sebastian Veniero, who commanded those of the Venetians.

The aged pontiff, overjoyed to observe that his negociations had been attended with so great success, indulged the most sanguine hopes with regard to the issue of the war; and, as if he had received a revelation concerning it from Heaven, he exhorted Don John to embrace the first opportunity of engaging with the enemy, over whom he assured him he would obtain a complete victory. He sent him at the same time a consecrated standard, and a number of ecclesiastics to officiate in sacred things on board the ships; and ordered a fast and jubilee to be proclaimed, with an absolution from their sins, to all who should acquit themselves with honor against the infidels.

Selim, on the other hand, exerted himself strenuously in providing against so great a danger as now threatened to overwhelm him; and although a part of his troops were still employed in reducing Cyprus, he was able, through the great resources which he possessed, to equip a fleet still more

Selim's preparations.

B O O K

IX.

1571.

The battle
of Lepanto.

numerous than that of the christian allies. Hali, to whom the chief command of it was given, arrived on the western coast of Greece about the time when Don John set sail from Sicily; and the two fleets came in sight of each other, with a resolution not to decline fighting, on the seventh of October, near the gulph of Lepanto.

The battle was begun by the two admirals, and their example was followed by all the other commanders, as fast as the wind, or the general orders which they had received, would permit them to advance. Between Don John and the Basha the engagement was bloody and obstinate. After cannonading one another for some time, they came to close fight, and grappled with each other. The Spanish soldiers thrice boarded the enemy's ship, and were thrice repulsed with great slaughter. But at last Don John having received a reinforcement of two hundred men from the marquis of Santa-Croce, the Turks were overpowered. Hali himself was killed, and all on board were either put to the sword or taken prisoners. The crescent of Mahomet was then taken down, and the standard of the cross erected in its stead; after which, Don John, in order to intimidate the enemy, gave orders to have the head of the Turkish admiral fixed upon a long pole, which was fastened to the topmast; and shouts were sent from ship to ship of triumph and victory.

The contending parties were in the mean time engaged in every quarter in furious combat with each other, fighting hand to hand, as on a field

of battle , and employing not only guns and muskets , but arrows , pikes , javelins , and all the other , ancient as well as modern , weapons of war. Both Turks and Christians gave the most striking displays of prowess and intrepidity. Great numbers fell on both sides , and the sea for several miles was tinged with blood , and covered with mangled limbs and carcases. At last the christians were almost every where victorious. The christian slaves , by whom the Turkish gallies were rowed , took courage from the success with which the arms of the allies were attended , broke loose from their chains , and contributed not a little to fix the victory ; while great numbers of the Spanish and Italian galley-slaves , prompted by the hopes of recovering their liberty , having obtained permission from their officers , boarded and attacked the enemy with irresistible fury , and displayed a contempt of danger with which nothing but despair , or the abhorrence of slavery , could have inspired them. The Turks were at the same time greatly disheartened by the loss of their admiral ; and being tempted by the hopes of making their escape upon a coast inhabited by their fellow-subjects , many of them ran their ships ashore , and left them an easy prey to the enemy.

B O O K

IX.

1571.

The christian fleet was much better manned than the Turkish , and the soldiers , having been a shorter time at sea , were more fresh and vigorous. They were infinitely better furnished with mails and helmets , and made much more use of fire-arms than the enemy , many of whom were armed

Causes of the
victory.

B O O K

IX.

1571.

only with bows and arrows, the wounds inflicted by which were seldom mortal. The prows of the Turkish gallies were likewise more open and defenceless; and the wind, which at first was favorable, changed suddenly against them, and greatly facilitated the motions of the christian fleet. From these causes, added to the fortunate bravery of Don John, seconded by the prudent and intrepid conduct of Requesens, Santa-Croce, Colonna, and above all of Veniero, Barbarigo, and other noble Venetians, the allies gained the most memorable victory of which we read in the history of modern times.

The loss on
both sides.

It was not indeed obtained without considerable loss. Near ten thousand of the christians were killed in the engagement, or died afterwards of their wounds. Among these was the Venetian Proveditor, Barbarigo, a nobleman equally celebrated for his wisdom, his valor, and his moderation. His death was deeply lamented by the allies, and proved an irreparable misfortune to the common cause. But to compensate for these losses, near fifteen thousand christians were delivered from captivity; and of the Turks, above five-and-twenty thousand were killed, and ten thousand taken prisoners. A hundred and thirty of their ships fell into the enemy's hands, and all the rest were either sunk or battered to pieces, or burnt, except between thirty and forty with which Uluciali, the famous corsair, escaped to Constantinople, through his superior skill in navigation and his knowledge of the seas.

B O O K

IX.

1571.

This victory, gained over the implacable enemy of Christendom, spread universal joy throughout all Europe; and Don John, to whom as commander in chief it was principally ascribed, was celebrated every where as the greatest hero of the age. No person had more reason to rejoice than Philip, yet he received the messenger with a cold indifference; which his contemporaries were not inclined to attribute to his moderation so much as to that jealousy of his brother's fame, of which he gave afterwards a more convincing proof. "Don John," said he, "has gained the victory, but he hazarded too much: he might have lost it." The pope's joy on this occasion was more sincere. When he received the news, he cried out, in the words of sacred writ, "There was a man sent from God whose name was John."

But the fruits of this signal victory were not proportional to the joy which it excited. The several admirals differed widely from one another with regard to the measures proper to be taken in the further prosecution of the war. Although Don John had been honored with the extraordinary title of Generalissimo, yet according to the treaty of alliance no matter of importance could be determined without the consent of the other commanders. He would have sailed immediately after the battle for the Dardanelles, to intercept the remains of the Turkish fleet, and to block up the communication between Constantinople and the Mediterranean, but the Venetians and other members of the council of war refused to agree to this

The allies
return home.

B O O K
IX.
1571.

proposal. Other enterprizes were afterwards proposed, and rejected; nor could they fix on any one common measure, but that of returning home, to repair the damage which had been sustained, and to prepare for resuming their operations in the spring.

Embassy of
the Greeks to
Don John.

Not long after Don John's arrival at Messina, the christians in Albania and Macedonia, filled with admiration of his character, and believing that it must be long before the Turks could recover from the blow which they had received, sent an embassy to make him an offer of the sovereignty over them, and to assure him, that, if he would come to their assistance with a fleet and army, they would shake off the Turkish yoke, and sacrifice their lives and fortunes in his service.

Don John, whose ruling passion was ambition, would gladly have accepted this tempting offer, but was obliged to inform the ambassadors, that before he could comply with their request, the king must be consulted, and his consent obtained. He accordingly sent immediate notice to his brother of the proposal that had been made to him. And Philip, whether prompted by jealousy, as was generally believed, or by motives of prudence and policy, as he gave out, put an end at once to any hopes which Don John might have conceived, by telling him, that at present all thoughts of such an enterprize must be laid aside, lest the Venetians should take the alarm, and abandon the confederacy. This, it is not improbable, would have happened, since the Venetians had no less reason to dread the

neighbourhood of the Spaniards than of the Turks; and had besides a claim themselves to a part of those territories, to the sovereignty of which Don John aspired.

In the mean time Ulucciali, whom Selim had made commander in chief of all his naval forces, exerted himself with extraordinary vigor and activity in fitting out a new fleet, to supply the place of that which had been ruined in the battle of Lepanto; and such at this time were the resources of the Turkish empire, that he was ready by the month of April to leave Constantinople, with more than two hundred gallies, besides a great number of other ships.

Preparations
of the Turks.

With this fleet he coasted along Negropont, the Morea, and Epirus; put the maritime towns into a posture of defence; chastised with great severity many of those christians who had been concerned in the invitation given to Don John; and afterwards took his station at Modon in the Morea, with an intention to watch there the motions of the enemy.

He had full leisure to finish all the preparations which he judged to be necessary. The allies disputed long with one another concerning the plan of their future operations; and at last when, through the inactivity which their dissensions had occasioned, it was become necessary for them to drop their scheme of conquest in Greece and Africa, and to go a second time in quest of the Turkish fleet, Philip having conceived a suspicion that the court of France had, in order to gratify

Inactivity of
the allies.

BOOK
IX.

August.
1572.

They at last
set sail for
Greece.

Uluciali
declines
fighting.

the Sultan, formed the design of attacking him in Piedmont, or the Netherlands, sent instructions to Don John to delay for some time longer his departure from Messina. At this place the Spanish fleet remained till after the massacre of St. Bartholomew; when Philip, being delivered from his anxiety with regard to the intentions of the French court, gave his brother permission to join the Venetians, and to act in concert with them in prosecuting the war against the Turks.

But it was the last day of August before the allies could effectuate a junction of their forces; and it was the middle of September before they came in sight of the enemy. Immediately after their arrival on the Grecian coast, Uluciali drew out his fleet, as if he intended to offer battle; but no sooner had he made a single discharge of his artillery, in the way of bravado or defiance, than he retired under the fortifications of Modon. These he had strengthened in such a manner, as to render it extremely dangerous for the allies to approach; and he resolved to lie in wait there for some favorable opportunity of attacking them, or at least to keep his fleet in readiness to harass and interrupt them, in case they should attempt a descent.

Don John called a council of his general officers to consider of the measures proper to be pursued in case the Turkish admiral should persist in his resolution to decline fighting. It was thought impracticable to force their way into the harbour of Modon; and therefore it was resolved to put

the forces on shore, and to besiege the town by land. But from this attempt they were soon deterred, by the information which they received from some troops sent to reconnoitre the strength of the place; which was so completely fortified, that they could not expect to reduce it before the approach of winter.

B O O K

IX.

1572.

It was next agreed to attempt the reduction of Navarino, which is another town on the western coast of the Morea, not many miles from Modon. The conduct of this enterprize was committed to Alexander Farnese, prince of Parma, who some years afterwards filled all Europe with his renown, and acquired the character of one of the greatest generals of this, or perhaps of any other age. But the present undertaking did not afford him an opportunity of displaying those superior talents for which he is so justly celebrated. The garrison was powerfully reinforced by detachments sent from Modon; and so numerous an army was drawn together from the neighbouring towns, and sent by Ulucciali to attack the besiegers, that Farnese, after battering the ramparts for several days, was obliged to raise the siege, and put his forces on board the fleet; which soon afterwards set sail for Messina.

Siege of Navarino,

is raised.

Some months before this time the league had suffered an irreparable loss, by the death of the pope; whose successor Gregory the XIIIth had neither the same zeal nor the same influence and authority. Gregory, however, entered readily into his predecessor's views, and showed himself willing

Death of Pius.

B O O K

IX.

1572.

The Venetians make peace with the Turks.

to pursue the plan which Pius had adopted. And Philip, who was now entirely free from his apprehensions of a French invasion, had resolved to exert himself more than ever in the prosecution of the war. But the Venetians having been highly dissatisfied with the inactivity of the Spanish fleet in the preceding summer; and finding that after a trial of two years they had, notwithstanding the victory of Lepanto, derived little advantage from the war, to compensate for the great expense which it had cost them, they listened to proposals made them by the French ambassador, and through his intercession concluded a separate peace with the Sultan.

The pope and Don John expressed their indignation against the Venetians on this occasion without reserve. But Philip thought it beneath his dignity to discover either uneasiness or resentment; and when intelligence of the peace was brought him, he answered coolly, that he had entered into the league at the desire of the sovereign pontiff; and that, although the Venetians had thought proper to abandon it, he would still employ his fleet and army as before, for the attainment of those important ends, the humbling of the Infidels, and the security of Christendom, with a view to which the confederacy had been formed.

Agreeably to this resolution, he sent orders to Don John, to Doria, and the marquis of Santa Croce, to employ their utmost diligence in repairing and augmenting the fleet, and to hold it ready for entering upon action in the spring. These

orders were punctually executed. Ulucciali, with the Turkish fleet, advanced as far as Prevesa in Epirus. But neither he nor the Spanish commanders thought it expedient to try their force in a general engagement. At length Ulucciali, after reinforcing the garrisons of the maritime towns, dismissed the corsairs who had come to his assistance, and about the end of summer set sail for Constantinople. After, which Don John, agreeably to his instructions from the king, passed over to Africa, with an intention to undertake the reduction of Tunis; carrying with him for this purpose a fleet of two thousand sail, having twenty thousand foot on board, besides four hundred light horse, seven hundred pioneers, and a numerous train of heavy artillery.

Tunis was at this time in the hands of the Turks, commanded by Heder Basha, whom Selim had lately sent to govern the town and kingdom. Heder, seized with consternation at the approach of the Spanish fleet, left Tunis with his troops and a great number of the inhabitants, and Don John took possession of the place, without meeting with the smallest opposition.

Philip had instructed his brother, when he sent him on this expedition, to destroy Tunis, and to strengthen the fortifications of the isle and fortress of Goletta⁷. But instead of complying with these

⁷ The Goletta, which is situated at the entrance of the bay of Tunis, had been in the hands of the Spaniards ever since it was conquered by the emperor Charles.

BOOK

IX.

1572.

instructions, Don John resolved to fortify the town more strongly than ever; and having laid the foundations of a new fort, or citadel, he treated all the inhabitants who remained with lenity and indulgence; and engaged many of those who had fled, to return and submit to the Spanish government; after which he carried back his fleet to Sicily.

He soon discovered his intention in acting a part so contrary to the orders of the king. His success in an enterprise in which the late emperor had failed, though entirely owing to the cowardice of the Turkish governor, had inflamed his ambition; and he had conceived the hopes that his brother would be persuaded to grant him the title and dignity of king of Tunis, in compensation for the sovereignty of Greece, which he had prevented him from accepting. The pope, it is said, had disapproved of Philip's resolution to demolish Tunis; and had secretly encouraged Don John to venture upon disobeying him; from an opinion that the erecting a christian kingdom in Barbary, would prove the most effectual means of extirpating the piratical states. It is certain that Gregory warmly solicited Philip to confer upon his brother the sovereignty of his new conquest, and represented that all Christendom, and especially Spain and Italy, would from thence derive the most substantial advantages.

Philip was conscious that, notwithstanding his copious resources, it was beyond his power, while the war in the Netherlands subsisted, to effectuate the establishment of a new kingdom in opposition

to

to so potent an enemy as the Turkish Sultan. And he had desired the fortifications of Tunis to be dismantled, in order to save the expense of a numerous garrison, which would be necessary for its defence. He did not, however, express great resentment against his brother for counteracting his instructions. But when the pope interceded with him to confer the sovereignty on Don John, he replied, "That, although no person could be more sincerely concerned than himself, for his brother's honor and interest; yet there was much ground to doubt, whether either the one or the other would be advanced by his complying with the pope's request; and that he could not grant it, till he should know whether he was able to maintain the acquisition which had been made, against the formidable armament the Sultan was preparing for its recovery." The prudence of this reply, whether it did, or did not proceed from some secret motive of jealousy against his brother, was fully justified by the issue.

B O O K

IX.

1572.

In the summer following, Selim sent Uluciali against Tunis, with a fleet consisting of three hundred ships, having about forty thousand troops on board, under the command of his son-in-law Sinan Basha. The new fort which Don John had begun to build, was not yet complete. Nor was the garrison which he had left strong enough to hold out long against so great a force. Don John labored with much zeal and anxiety in assembling the Spanish fleet, with an intention to raise the siege, but he was detained for several weeks, first

Tunis and
the Goletta
taken by
the Turks.

BOOK in one harbour, and afterwards in another, by
IX. tempestuous weather and contrary winds. The
1572. Turks in the mean time being powerfully second-
ed by many thousand Moors, under the governor
of Tripoli and the viceroy of Algiers, pushed for-
ward their operations at the same time against Tu-
nis and the Goletta. The garrisons defended
themselves long with the utmost bravery; but at
last they were overpowered by numbers, and both
the Goletta and the town were taken by assault.

Don John was affected in the most sensible man-
ner by this disaster; which showed him the folly of
his late presumption, and extinguished those flat-
tering hopes which he had long indulged of attain-
ing some regal or sovereign establishment. And
his mortification on this occasion was the greater,
because, after his most vigorous efforts, the Spanish
fleet was still too weak to enable him to take venge-
ance on the enemy. Philip, for the same reason,
dreaded that the Turkish commanders would pur-
sue their conquests, and either attack his other pos-
sessions in Africa, or attempt a descent in Naples
or Sicily; and it is probable that his apprehensions
would have proved but too well founded, had not
Selim died about this time, and left his throne to
his son Amurath the Third; who devoted the be-
ginning of his reign to the arts of peace^{*}.

^{*} Prince Cantemir's Hist. of the Ottoman Empire. Antonio
Herrera; & Ferreras in hoc anno. Miniana, lib. vii.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK X.

DURING the course of the transactions related in the preceding book, a variety of important events happened in the Netherlands, which require a more circumstantial narration.

In opposing the prince of Orange and count Lewis of Nassau, it was confessed even by the duke of Alva's enemies, that he acted with the most consummate prudence; and if his conduct afterwards had been equally prudent, he might, notwithstanding the general odium which his tyranny had excited against him, have preserved the Netherlands in obedience to his authority. For if such of the people as were disaffected to his government remained quiet while the prince of Orange was at hand to favor their attempts, it cannot be supposed, that, after all their hopes of assistance were extinguished, they would have ever dared to dispute

BOOK
X.

1568.
Affairs of the
Netherlands.

B O O K his will. And indeed the spirits of this unhappy
 X. people, at the present period, seem to have been
 1568. so entirely broken, and their minds so deeply
 impressed with awe and terror, that nothing could
 have inspired them with the courage which they
 afterwards displayed, but insolence and oppression
 carried to the most enormous height.

Alva's vani-
 ty and arro-
 gance.

As soon as the army of the prince of Orange was
 disbanded, Alva dismissed his German cavalry,
 and having distributed the greatest part of his
 infantry into winter quarters, he set out himself
 with the remainder for Brussels; where, after a
 triumphant entry, he ordered his victory to be
 celebrated with every species of rejoicing. He
 then commanded a solemn thanksgiving for the suc-
 cess which had attended his arms to be observed
 through all the provinces; and ordered a statue of
 himself to be formed in brass, and medals to be
 struck, which, while they served to perpetuate
 the memory of his exploits, gave proof of a de-
 gree of vanity and arrogance, which put his friends
 to the blush, and made the world unwilling to
 yield him that praise which his vigor and abilities
 would have procured him¹. One of the first acts

¹ In one of the medals he was represented riding in a
 triumphal chariot, with a Victory behind him putting a
 crown upon his head. In his right hand he held a sword,
 to signify that he had conquered count Lewis by open
 force; and in the left, an Ægis, to express that
 wisdom of which he had availed himself against the prince
 of Orange: and as a farther emblem of his wisdom, the
 chariot was drawn by owls, which in the ancient heathen
 superstition were sacred to Minerva.

of his administration after his return to Brussels, was to determine the fate of the prisoners whom he had taken during the campaign; and all such of them as were inhabitants of the Netherlands were treated as rebels, and put to death.

A strict inquiry was set on foot, to discover those who had, either by word or deed, whilst the war subsisted, shown their inclinations favorable to the prince of Orange. And as the issue of the war had remained uncertain, and fortune had

His tyranny.

But his statue, which was made at this time, and afterwards placed in the citadel of Antwerp, afforded a still more striking proof of his vanity and arrogance. It was the workmanship of Jockeling, a German artist, the most celebrated sculptor of the age. The governor was represented trampling under his feet the figure of a monster, having certain emblematical signs in different parts, which denoted the petition which had been presented to the dutchess of Parma, the compromise, and the insurrection and tumults which ensued. The base of the work was a square pillar of marble, containing on one side the artist's name, and on the other three sides an encomium of the duke of Alva; who is there said to have extinguished heresy and rebellion, to have saved the church from destruction, and restored justice and tranquillity to the Netherlands. This monument of Alva's vanity was far from being acceptable to the king; it was a subject of derision among his enemies at the court of Spain; and in the Flemings, it excited the highest resentment and indignation *.

It appears from Grotius, that about this time the duke made several useful regulations with regard to trade, the coin, and the liberty of the press; but they failed in promoting the purposes for which they were intended, and even the memory of them was soon effaced by the violence of the measures which he afterwards pursued.

* Bentivoglio, p. 86. Van Loon, tom. i. p. 135. Strada, p. 250.

B O O K

X.

1568.

sometimes favored one side and sometimes another, many persons had unwarily given vent both to their hopes and to their fears; little suspecting that they were to be called to so rigorous an account for unguarded expressions, uttered among their friends and neighbours, which were now imputed to them as the most atrocious crimes. The people of the Low Countries had long enjoyed the privilege of not being tried by any judges, but those of the city or district to which they belonged; and no citizen could be put to death who had not confessed his crime. No regard was paid to either of these privileges. Persons of all ranks were hurried from the places of their residence, and carried to so great a distance as made it impossible for them to disprove the accusations brought against them, however groundless. Great numbers were seized on bare suspicion; many suffered death on the slightest evidence; and others were harassed with prosecutions, by which they were reduced to the utmost poverty and distress².

² The negligence which the judges discovered in the sentences which they passed against the unhappy victims delivered over to them by the inquisitors, and in the warrants which they signed for their execution, would be incredible, if the many instances recorded by the contemporary historians did not put it beyond all doubt. An order was issued at this time for executing several of the prisoners who had been condemned. In the list of their names the name of one man was inserted whose cause had not been tried, and he too was led to execution. Some time after, the judges gave orders to have this man brought before them for his trial. They were informed, that, in obedience to their former command, he had already suffered death; and proof was at the same time laid before them of his innocence.

The iniquity and unrelenting cruelty exercised by the inquisitors diffused an universal terror over all the provinces. Not only the protestants, but likewise all who had ever shown themselves attached to the liberty of their country, saw, that nothing less would satisfy the governor than their utter ruin. It would not avail them, they perceived, to conceal their sentiments, nor even to disclaim them; since many of those who had done so, had been punished with death and confiscation; and had received no other favor from the judges, but that of having suffered by the sword or halter, instead of being committed to the flames. Determined by these considerations, great numbers of both sexes abandoned their habitations, and withdrew into foreign parts. We ought not perhaps to believe what some historians relate, that no less than a hundred thousand houses were forsaken by the inhabitants. It is however certain that several of the principal cities were sensibly thinner, and some whole villages and smaller towns were rendered almost desolate. Many of those who left the Netherlands went over to England, where they were well received by Elizabeth. And as in that country they enjoyed the free exercise of their religion, they fixed their residence in it; and amply rewarded the English for the protection afforded them, by introducing among that people various branches

Most of the judges expressed on this occasion great uneasiness; but Vargas, the Spanish lawyer, observed, that what had happened, if rightly considered, ought not to give them much concern, since it was happy for the man's soul that he died innocent.

B O O K

X.

1568.

The Netherlands deserted by great numbers of the people.

B O O K of manufacture, with which they had before been
X. unacquainted.

1568.

The Low-Countries suffered extremely from this emigration of the inhabitants. But the duke of Alva, far from being deterred by this consideration from the prosecution of his plan, was at pains to prevent the return of the exiles, and even prohibited from returning all such of their friends as had gone to visit them, by publishing an edict, setting forth, that they should be considered as holding intercourse with rebels, and should be liable to the punishment due to those who gave assistance to the enemies of the king.

The governor's vanity was flattered about this time, by an embassy which came from the pope, to present him a consecrated hat and sword. This sort of present, which used to be bestowed only upon princes, was conferred on the duke of Alva, as an illustrious defender of the popish faith; and it contributed to confirm him in the pursuit of those sanguinary measures, which had procured him such a distinguished honor.

The rest entirely sub-
dued.

But there was now almost no occasion for employing measures of this kind in his government of the Netherlands. All persons who had rendered themselves obnoxious to his displeasure, had either been put to death, or had gone into a voluntary banishment; while those who remained had shown themselves ready to yield an implicit and entire obedience to his will. The new bishops, the decrees of the council of Trent, the rites and ceremonies of the Romish church, were received and established throughout all the provinces.

B O O K

X.

1568.

Anxiety of
the Queen of
England.

This success of the duke of Alva's arms and counsels gave great uneasiness to some of the neighbouring princes, and particularly to the queen of England. That wise princess, had from the beginning of her reign beheld with anxiety the growing power of the Spanish monarchy. She knew how much Philip was inclined to disturb her government, and was sensible of the advantage which the vicinity of his dominions in the Netherlands afforded him, for carrying any scheme which he might form against her into execution; especially at the present period, when, instead of the limited prerogative which he had hitherto enjoyed in these provinces, he had acquired an absolute or despotic power, and established a military force, which was formidable to the neighbouring nations, as well as to the people whom it had been employed to subdue. Prompted by these considerations, Elizabeth had granted her protection to the Flemish exiles; and, if we may credit some historians, she had given secret assistance in money to the prince of Orange. The situation of her affairs at home, where she was disquieted by the machinations of the partisans of the queen of Scots, rendered it inexpedient for her to come to an open breach with the Spanish monarch; but notwithstanding this she had resolved to lay hold of the first proper opportunity that should occur of counteracting his designs.

It was not long before an occasion of this kind offered, which she readily embraced. Some merchants of Genoa having engaged to transmit certain

She seizes
money be-
longing to
Philip.

B O O K

X.

1568.

sums of money for Philip's use into the Netherlands, had put four hundred thousand crowns on board five small vessels, which, being attacked on their way to Antwerp by privateers belonging to the prince of Condé, were obliged to take shelter in the harbours of Plymouth and Southampton. The Spanish ambassador at the court of London immediately applied for a safe-conduct, that he might send the money by the nearest way to the Low-Countries; and at first Elizabeth seemed willing to grant his request; but afterwards she ordered the ambassador to be told, that, as she understood that the money was the property of the Italian merchants, she had resolved to detain it for some time in her own hands, and would take care that the owners should not have any reason to complain. The ambassador endeavoured to make it appear, that the money belonged to the king his master; and he was seconded in his applications for it by letters addressed to the queen from the duke of Alva. Elizabeth lent a deaf ear to their remonstrances, and discovered plainly, that she had resolved to keep the money. Alva was not of a temper to bear patiently this insult. It was ever more agreeable to his nature, to conquer difficulties, than to attempt, by negociation, to elude them. Without regard to the treaties subsisting between the English and the Flemings, and without consulting either the States or council of the Netherlands, he ordered all the English merchants at Antwerp to be cast into prison, and their effects to be confiscated. He did not consider, or

he was not moved by the consideration, that the Flemings had at that time a much greater quantity of goods in England, than the English possessed in Flanders. Elizabeth had no reason therefore to be sorry for what had happened. But she dispatched an ambassador to Philip, to complain of the injury done to her; and not receiving satisfaction, she proceeded to make reprisals, and seized effects, belonging to Spanish and Flemish merchants, by which her subjects were more than compensated for all the losses which they had sustained in Flanders. Alva came at last to perceive his error, and sent over Christopher Assonville to England, to negotiate an agreement with the queen. Elizabeth, who took pleasure to mortify the pride of Alva, refused to admit Assonville into her presence, because he had not credentials from Philip. Alva, more enraged than ever by this affront, prohibited the people in the Low Countries from holding any commercial intercourse with the English; but at last, after various negotiations, the matter was adjusted by treaty, and the trade put upon its former footing, in the year one thousand five hundred and seventy-four³.

In the mean time Elizabeth gained her end, and did a most material prejudice to Philip's interest in the Netherlands. This prejudice was indeed much greater than she intended, and was accompanied with more important consequences than she could possibly foresee. Great arrears were

B O O K

X.

1568.

³ Meteren, p. 80. Strada, p. 252. Bentivoglio, p. 80.

B O O K

X.

1568.

due to the Spanish troops, and Alva had contracted a considerable debt by building citadels. Philip's treasury, although the richest in Europe, was exhausted by the expensive wars in which he had been engaged against the Turks and Moors; nor could he at present afford the money requisite for the maintenance of his forces in Flanders. In this situation, the governor found it necessary to have recourse to the Flemings, whom he believed to be so thoroughly subdued, that they would not refuse to comply with any demand which he could make upon them.

The taxes
of the 10th
and 20th
pennies.

The absurdity and folly, added to the oppression and tyranny, into which his arrogance, together with his ignorance of the interests of a commercial people, betrayed him on this occasion, may justly be regarded as the chief cause of all the difficulties which he afterwards encountered, and of all those astonishing exertions which the people made to free themselves from the Spanish yoke. It may appear surprising, that the imposing of taxes, however burdensome, should have wrought more powerfully on their minds, than the cruel persecutions which had been exercised with such unrelenting fury on account of religion. But the reason is obvious. The persecutions extended only to a certain number of individuals; whereas the taxes affected all men alike, and must have proved the source of universal and perpetual oppression.

The people in the Low-Countries had in no period been accustomed to be taxed by their princes. The power of imposing taxes belonged, by the

constitution and constant practice, to the assembly of the States. And when the prince had occasion for money, he had been accustomed, from the earliest times, to petition the States for a supply, which they either granted or refused, as they were satisfied or displeased with the reasons for demanding it. At certain periods, and particularly in the beginning of the present reign, they had carried their jealousy of this important privilege so far, as to appoint commissioners of their own to receive the money from the people, and to see it applied to the purposes for which it had been granted. The duke of Alva paid no greater regard to this than he had done to their other privileges. He resolved by his own authority, to establish such taxes as would not only supply his present necessity, but serve as a perpetual fund for defraying all the expenses of his government.

The manner in which these taxes were imposed was not more arbitrary, than the taxes themselves were oppressive. They were three in number. The first was a tax of one *per cent.* on all goods, whether moveable or immoveable. The second, of twenty *per cent.* to be paid annually, of all immoveable goods, or heritage. And the third, of ten *per cent.* of all moveable goods, to be paid on every sale. It was enacted, that the first of these taxes should be paid only once; but it was ordained, that the other two should continue as long as the public exigencies should require.

Intimation was made of these demands, in the name of the king, to an assembly of the States; and it is impossible to describe the astonish-

B O O K

X.

1569.

Excite universal discontent.

B O O K

X.

1569.

ment which they excited. The deputies knew not what answer to return; and therefore desired time to consider of the governor's requisitions, and to transmit an account of them to their constituents. They were received every where with grief and indignation; and there was nothing to be heard but the bitterest lamentations over all the provinces.

“ It was not enough, they complained, for the king to have stripped the country of infinite numbers of the people; to have filled the provinces with foreign soldiers, and to have wreathed the yoke about the necks of the inhabitants, by garri-fons and citadels; but they must likewise bear the charge of supporting those instruments of their oppression; and for this purpose, instead of the voluntary and moderate contributions which they had been wont to pay under former princes, be laden for ever with the most violent and oppressive taxes. Notwithstanding the injustice with which they had been treated from the beginning of the governor's administration, yet, during his contest with the princes of Nassau, they had remained unshaken in their fidelity to the king, and even co-operated with his forces against the enemy; but it now appeared that their most implacable enemy was the king himself; who seemed to desire nothing so much, as to reduce them to a state of the most wretched slavery; and in order to accomplish an end so cruel and inglorious, had sent among them the duke of Alva, whose conduct seemed rather as if he had come to extirpate the inhabitants, than to govern or protect them. But they had

already borne too much. It was time to show that they had not been insensible of the treatment which they had received, and that they were not altogether unworthy of their illustrious ancestors, to whose wisdom and valor they were indebted for those invaluable privileges, of which the king, and the odious instruments of his tyranny, now wanted to deprive them⁴.”

B O O K
X.
1569.

When the States found that the new taxes were so universally disagreeable to their constituents, they took courage, and represented their own sentiments concerning them to the governor. They reminded him of the disturbances which had arisen from an attempt to establish the tax of the hundredth penny, in the year one thousand five hundred and fifty-six; when persons of all ranks discovered an irreconcilable aversion to it, not only on account of the exorbitancy of the tax itself, but because it reduced them to the disagreeable necessity of laying open their private affairs. There was still greater reason, they observed, for being dissatisfied with the other taxes; and especially that of the tenth part of moveable goods, to be paid at every sale. This was not only such a tax as had been never known in the Low-Countries; but would prove a burden which it would be utterly impossible to support. It would amount, in many cases, nearly to the value of the commodities themselves; since the same commodities were often transferred from one person to another, and from

Opposition
of the as-
sembly of
the States.

⁴ Bentivoglio, p. 82.

B O O K

X.

1569.

him to a third, a fourth, a fifth, a sixth, before they came into the hands of the consumer. In woollen manufactures this was unavoidable; the wool was purchased by one set of manufacturers; the yarn by another; the cloth, before it was died, by a third; then it was sold to the merchant; by him, to the retailer; and by the retailer to his customers for use; and thus the tax proposed would amount to six or seven tenths of the full value of the commodity. Several consequences, fatal to the prosperity of the people, would ensue. Foreigners would no longer purchase their manufactures, because they could not sell them at the usual prices. The manufacturers and merchants would fly from a country where they were so grievously oppressed; and the Flemings would be obliged to have recourse to foreign nations for those commodities with which foreigners had hitherto been supplied by them. Thus the sources of their wealth would in a little time be dried up; and, as they would not have any manufactures of their own, so they could not long possess the means of purchasing them from others. To these reasons they added another, taken from the great expense and difficulty with which the collection of the tax proposed must be attended. A multitude of tax-gatherers must be employed; the people would still find it practicable, in numberless cases, to elude the tax; and the tranquillity of the provinces would be continually disturbed with altercations and disputes.

In answer to this remonstrance, Alva, with
much

much ignorance and haughtiness, replied, that nothing could convince him that the taxes required would be so oppressive as had been represented; since it was evident, that he demanded only one part of ten for the king, and left the remaining parts to the people. That in his town of Alva in Spain, the tax of the tenth penny was actually paid, and yielded him a yearly rent of between forty and fifty thousand ducats. That if such a revenue as he expected should arise from it in the Netherlands, he would deliver the people from all their other taxes. That he had often heard the late emperor complain of the difficulty of procuring money from his subjects in the Low Countries; and that, in order to obtain it, he had been constrained to grant them privileges greatly prejudicial to his authority. But at present there was no room for remonstrances. Great arrears were due to his troops; several new forts must be built without delay for the security of the country; money for these purposes must be immediately procured, and he could not devise any more effectual means of raising it, than the taxes which were proposed^s.

Such was the governor's reply to the assembly of the States; but being sensible of the difficulties which attended his plan, he laid it before the council, and desired the counsellors to consider of the most effectual method of carrying it into execution. There were some of them, who, in

^s Meteren, p. 89.

B O O K order to ingratiate themselves with the duke, exhort-
 X. ed him to persist in his design. And these men
 1569. advised him to endeavour first to gain over such
 of the provinces as had distinguished themselves
 by their loyalty; saying, that *their* example
 would soon be followed by the other provinces,
 who would dread incurring the imputation of
 disaffection.

But most of the counsellors were of a contrary
 opinion, and particularly the president Viglius; a
 minister of long experience in the Netherlands,
 and of undoubted fidelity to the king. "The ob-
 jections," he said, "which had been urged
 against the taxes were unanswerable; for there
 was the widest difference between the kingdom of
 Spain, and the Low Country provinces. The
 wealth of Spain consisted in the great extent of its
 territory and the fertility of its soil. It was divid-
 ed from other kingdoms, either by inaccessible
 mountains, or by the ocean. It was complete
 within itself, and independent of any connexion
 with other countries. Whereas the Netherlands
 were of such small extent, as to be utterly insuffi-
 cient to support the inhabitants. They were situ-
 ated in the heart of Europe, and had so many
 different nations bordering upon them, that, if
 trade were discouraged or oppressed, the manu-
 facturers and merchants could easily, and would
 certainly, transplant themselves, together with
 their arts, to the countries which lay around them.
 This consequence was to be dreaded from much
 less burdensome impositions than those that were

proposed; which were such as had never taken place in any commercial state, and to which, he was confident, the people of the Low Countries wuld never be persuaded to submit. I speak thus (continued he) prompted by a concern for the interest of the king, as well as by a regard to the prosperity of the Netherlands, for there is the greatest reason to apprehend, that if the governor shall not depart from his resolution, trade will soon be reduced so low, that the people will be disabled from furnishing the supplies requisite for the purposes of government *."

B O O K

X.

1569.

This speech of Viglius served rather to incense the duke of Alva than to convince him. Without regarding either the dignity of the speaker, or the strength of his arguments, he vouchsafed to make no other answer, but that, long before this time, he had resolved upon the taxes in dispute, and had communicated his resolution to the counts Barlaimont and Noircharmes, before he came into the Low Countries. His purpose was unalterably fixed, and those who were friends to the king must, without any further altercation, exert their endeavours to bring the States to a compliance with his will.

When the States found that the governor was equally deaf to the remonstrances of the president, as he had been to theirs, they began to dread the effects of his displeasure; and in order to sooth his resentment, they gave their consent to the tax of

* Meursii Auriacus, p. 35. Bentivoglio, p. 83.

B O O K
X.

the hundredth penny; entreating him, at the same time, to pass from the other taxes, and representing again, in the strongest terms, the ruinous consequences which would attend them. But he was still as inexorable as ever; although he condescended on this occasion to make a trial of some softer expedients, before he should have recourse to those of a more violent nature, which, in case of necessity, he was determined to employ.

1570.
Act of Indemnity.

In the beginning of the year one thousand five hundred and sixty-eight, Philip, with the advice of the inquisitors at Madrid, had pronounced a general sentence against his subjects in the Netherlands, finding them obnoxious to justice, and depriving them of their fortunes, rights, and privileges. By this extraordinary sentence, which, from the nature of it, was incapable of being executed, he had kept this unhappy people in perpetual anxiety; but at last, believing their spirits to be thoroughly subdued, and dreading the utter desolation of the provinces, he had resolved to publish a general indemnity; and, some months before the present period had transmitted it to the duke of Alva, together with a confirmation of it by the pope. The duke thought that he could not publish this indemnity at a more seasonable juncture; and he flattered himself, that it would serve to conciliate the favor of the people, and make it easier for him to overcome their aversion to the taxes. It was first made public in the city of Antwerp; where the governor, seated on a lofty throne, surrounded with a degree of pomp which no former

governor had assumed, ordered it to be read in the presence of a prodigious concourse of people, who had come from all quarters to hear it, full of the most anxious expectation. It was afterwards printed and dispersed over all the provinces. But it was extremely ill-calculated to promote the purpose designed; and was clogged with such a number of exceptions, as tended rather to awaken the fears of the people, than to allay or remove them.

B O O K

X.

1570.

From the benefit of it were excluded, not only all the preachers of the reformed religion, but likewise all those who had ever lodged or entertained them in their houses; all who had been concerned in breaking the images, or in violating the monasteries and churches; all who had subscribed the compromise, the petition of the nobles, or any other such bond of association; and lastly, all those who had given assistance, or shown favor, by word, deed, or writing, to the enemies of the king. Such were the exceptions that regarded individuals; and with respect to cities and communities, it was declared, that if any of them should be found to have been accessory to the late disorders, on the pretence of maintaining their privileges, the king reserved to himself the power of punishing or forgiving them, as he should judge expedient.

It is not surprising that an act of indemnity such as this, should have failed to produce any salutary effect. Persons of all ranks were highly offended with that open declaration which it contained,

How received.

BOOK X.
1570. that they had forfeited their privileges. Besides, there were many who, although they themselves had ever been zealously attached to the Catholic religion, were connected by the most endearing ties with those who had forsaken it. Prompted by natural affection, gratitude, or humanity, they had done offices of kindness to their friends and neighbours, for which they were now made equally liable to punishment, as if they had been guilty of the most enormous crimes. Their minds therefore were thrown into a greater ferment than ever; and they were disposed to regard the pardon which had been proclaimed, rather as an insult added to the injuries which they had received, than as an act of clemency and mercy⁷.

The duke of Alva considered it in a light extremely different, and soon afterwards resolved to make trial, whether it had produced the desired effect. With this view he ordered the several governors to inform the States of their respective provinces, that the situation of his affairs required an immediate and large supply, and that they must proceed to the raising of the tax of the tenth penny, without any further remonstrance or delay. With the different provinces, however, he thought proper to employ very different means of persuasion. As the inhabitants of Namur, Artois, and Hainault, had, from the beginning, been extremely submissive to his will, he desired the counts Barlaimont and Noircharmes to acquaint them, that

⁷ Meteren, p. 84. Bentivoglio, p. 85.

he wished to obtain their consent to the tax, more for an example of obedience to the other provinces, than from any intention to levy it upon *them*; who had deserved so well of him by their fidelity. But he delivered his orders in a much more peremptory tone to the other provinces. He would take care, he said, in levying the tax, to prevent the consequences which they apprehended might arise from it; and would abolish it, if he found it hurtful to their trade. In the mean time it was the will of the king that it should be imposed. The king had invested him with power to exact it; and he was unalterably determined to employ that power for the purpose for which it had been conferred. He concluded with reminding them of the guilt which they had contracted during the late commotions; and bid them esteem it a happiness that they were now allowed to atone for their folly, by giving a *part* of their substance, when the king might in justice have seized the *whole*.

By these promises and threats an assent was at last extorted; but it was given upon two conditions, that all the provinces, without exception, should agree to the taxes; and that the governor should, according to his promise, moderate them in such a manner, that no prejudice could arise from them to the trade or manufactures of the Netherlands. The only provinces which rejected these conditions were those of Utrecht and Brabant. And the former of these discovered, in the

The General
States
intimidated.

B O O K progress of this affair, a firmness and intrepidity
X. that deserves to be recorded.

1670.
 The resolute
 conduct of
 the States of
 Utrecht.

Soon after the governor's orders were communicated to the States of Utrecht, they sent ambassadors to represent, that having taken his demand under their most serious consideration, they were unable to conceive how it could possibly be granted. The territory of Utrecht, they said, was small; the inland parts of it were barren, and the other parts were preserved from the fury of the waters at an immense expense. Although they had but lately become subject to the house of Austria, yet, in order to raise the tributes imposed upon them by the late emperor and the present king, they had been obliged to contract a very large debt, which they had never been able to repay. During the late disturbances, they had suffered more than the other provinces; their city had been forsaken by its most industrious inhabitants, and their trade, which was never great, almost annihilated. But as they knew the necessity of the governor's affairs, and were sensible how much they had been indebted to him for restoring tranquillity to the Netherlands, they were willing to assist him to the utmost extent of their ability, and would engage to pay him yearly a hundred thousand florins for six years; provided they were freed from all other burdens during that time.

This offer the governor rejected with scorn and indignation. The States then sent another embassy, to inform him, that they had considered fully of what they could afford; they had flattered

themselves that their offer would have met with a favorable acceptance ; they were conscious of having given the strongest proof of an inclination to comply with his desire ; but , whatever should be the consequence , they must now declare , that it was beyond their power to offer more. And in this declaration , the presidents of the five churches concurred ; protesting , that they could not agree to the taxes proposed , without incurring the censure of excommunication , which was denounced in the pope's bull ⁸ , *in cœna Domini* , not only against those who imposed taxes on the revenues of the church , but against those likewise who submitted to them. But the governor paid no greater regard to this protestation of the ecclesiastics , than to the remonstrances of the States. It provoked him exceedingly , to meet with such obstinate resistance from so inconsiderable a province as Utrecht. He had threatened to employ force , and he now resolved to put his threat in execution.

He began with sending to the city of Utrecht a regiment of infantry , consisting of two thousand four hundred men ; who besides exacting the same number of florins a week for their pay , lived at free quarters in the houses of the inhabitants , and knowing the governor's design in placing them there , indulged themselves in every species of outrage. He summoned the magistrates of the city , and the States of the province , to appear before the council of tumults , to answer for their conduct in

⁸ Published by Pius V. ann. 1568.

B O O K

X.

1570.

the year one thousand five hundred and fifty-six, when they ceded to the protestants one of the churches of the city for their religious assemblies. It did not avail them to alledge in their defence, that only a few individuals were concerned in this deed; that these few had acted with the best intention towards the king and the Catholic religion, and had made that concession, of which the whole city was now accused, in order to prevent the most unhappy consequences, which would otherwise have arisen from the intemperate zeal of the reformers. These defences made no impression on the duke, or on the council. And sentence was passed with very little hesitation, at the same time, against the ecclesiastics, the nobles, and the several cities of the province. The ecclesiastics were deprived of their right of voting in the assembly of the States; the nobles were stript of all their honors and immunities; the cities of Utrecht, Amersfort, Wyck, and Rhenen, were declared to have forfeited their privileges; and, as Utrecht was supposed to have been more particularly guilty, it was enacted, that all the territory and revenues belonging to the city and corporations should be confiscated.

The States were so far intimidated by this iniquitous sentence, and their patience so much exhausted by the oppressive rapacity of the soldiers, that they were induced to raise the offer which they had made of one hundred thousand florins, to one hundred and eighty thousand. But neither what they had already suffered, nor what they dreaded from the governor's resentment, could induce them to

yield their consent to the taxes of the tenth and twentieth penny. B O O K
X.
1570.

This resolute conduct of the people of Utrecht was attended with the most important consequences. It annulled the obligation under which the other States had come, when they consented to the taxes, on condition that all the provinces should concur; and it confirmed the people in their resolution strenuously to oppose the levying of the taxes.

The governor was aware how difficult it would have been, in their present temper, to carry his plan into immediate execution; and although it does not appear that he ever entertained the remotest thoughts of dropping it, yet, as his occasions for money were extremely pressing, he called an assembly of the States to Brussels, and demanded, that, besides the hundredth penny, to which they had formerly consented⁹, they should, in place of the other taxes, pay two millions of guilders yearly, for six years. The States endeavoured to make him sensible of the exorbitancy of this demand, but in vain. He gave them a month to consider of it; and at last, from their dread of his tyranny, they agreed to his request.

The prince of Orange was not an unconcerned spectator of these transactions. He had gone, as was mentioned before, at the end of the year one thousand five hundred and sixty-eight, to join the protestants in France. He was present, and had a

Conduct of
the prince
of Orange.

⁹ This amounted to 4,000,000 of guilders.

BOOK

X.

1570.

considerable share in the several actions which passed between the Calvinists, and Catholics, at la Charité, Roche-la-ville, and Poitiers. But being too deeply interested in the affairs of the Netherlands to remain long at so great a distance from them, he had left his brother count Lewis to command the German forces in France; and having returned in September one thousand five hundred and sixty-nine, to his county of Nassau in Germany, he had been employed for some time in making preparations for trying his fortune once more against the Spaniards.

In Germany he received particular intelligence of every thing that had happened in the Low-Countries since his departure. He was informed how much the duke of Alva had increased the hatred which the people entertained against his person and government. He received the strongest assurances of their disposition to revolt; and was solicited by the catholics, as well as protestants, by those who still remained in the country, as well as those who had been forced to leave it, to take up arms in their defence. But he had not forgot the cause of the failure of his first attempt; and he resolved not to begin any military operations, nor even to levy forces, till he should be better provided than formerly with the means of their support.

The exiles
at sea ac-
knowledge
his authority.

Soon after Alva's arrival in the Netherlands, many of those who had left the country on account of the persecutions, had united together, and fitted out a great number of armed vessels,

B O O K

X.

1570.

with which they seized all the Spanish ships which they could meet with on the Flemish or English coast. These adventurers had lately, through the violence of Alva's administration, received a great increase of number; and had been joined by many persons of rank, who had acquired an ascendant over them. They were all strongly attached to the prince of Orange, from whose wisdom alone they had any hopes of being restored to their native country; and they desired nothing so much as that he would undertake the direction of their affairs. They agreed therefore, as soon as it was proposed by their leaders, to receive commissions from him, and to pay a fifth part of the value of all their prizes to certain officers, to be appointed by him to receive it.

As their fleet was greatly superior to any which the duke of Alva possessed, they did incredible mischief to the Spanish, and sometimes too to the Flemish merchants; and if their prizes had been sold to advantage, the proportion which they allowed to the prince of Orange would have amounted to a considerable sum.

William had recourse, at the same time, to another method of improving his finances. He empowered some of the inferior nobility to grant commissions in his name, to the protestant preachers, who went throughout the provinces in disguise, and procured contributions from all those who were disaffected either to the Catholic religion or the Spanish government. These men not only knew better to whom it was proper to apply, but,

Intrigues of
the prince
of Orange.

B O O K

X.

1570.

by their piety and eloquence, they had greater influence over the people, than any other persons whom the prince could have employed. By their means too, he acquired a thorough knowledge of the disposition of the people, and formed a correspondence with many of the principal inhabitants, which contributed not a little to advance his views. These transactions were carried on chiefly in Holland and Zealand, where the reformed religion had made greater progress than in the southern provinces; and where, from the nature and situation of the country, intersected by navigable rivers, canals, and branches of the sea, the people dreaded less, and were in reality less exposed to, the power of the Spaniards. It was in these provinces, formed both by nature and art to be the seat of liberty, that the prince of Orange had wisely resolved to make his first attempt to gain a footing in the Netherlands. And, accordingly, intrigues were formed, and plans concerted, between his agents and some of the principal inhabitants, for delivering the maritime towns into the hands of the protestant exiles. Attempts were made to get possession of Enchuyfen, and other cities in North Holland; but from different causes they proved abortive at this time, and were laid aside till fortune should be more propitious. The persons concerned in them had little reason, it may be thought, to flatter themselves with the hopes of secrecy; yet so universally odious was the Spanish government become, to the catholics as well as the reformers, that none, even of those by whose means the plots

of the Orange party were defeated, could resolve to give information of them to the governor. They were averse from gratifying a man whom they had so much reason to detest; and abhorred the thoughts of that cruelty, which they knew would, in case of a discovery, be exercised against the guilty.

BOOK

X.

1571.

The duke of Alva therefore remained entirely ignorant of all that passed; nor does it appear that he entertained the least suspicion of the machinations of his enemies, till the taking of the fort of Louvestein. This fort stands in the island called Bommel, which is formed by the Maese and the Waal; and, though weakly fortified, was of great importance on account of its situation. It was taken by surprise at this time, by Herman de Ryter, a native of Bois-le-Duc, who wished to signalize himself by some gallant exploit in the service of the prince of Orange. He had carried with him no more than fifty men, and with this small number he hoped to be able to defend the fort till his associates should arrive, but unfortunately they were prevented from advancing by some unforeseen accident; and in the mean time the fort was invested by a superior force, which had been sent against him, from Bois-le-Duc, by Roderigo de Toledo. The besieged defended themselves long with the most obstinate valor; but they were at last overpowered by numbers, and De Ryter himself was slain ¹⁰.

Surprise of
the fort of
Louvestein.

¹⁰ Meteren, p. 86. Bentivoglio, p. 87.

B O O K

X.

1576.

Indignation
of the duke
of Alva.

The duke of Alva was greatly alarmed by this event. He considered the cause more than the effect, and apprehended that this first enterprize of his enemies, which had been so easily frustrated would ere long be followed by other attempts in different parts of the provinces. It excited in his fiery temper a degree of rage and indignation equal to his anxiety. And his resentment was inflamed by the opposition which the people had made to his raising the tax of the hundredth penny; especially in the maritime provinces, where he had never been able either to levy that tax, or their proportion of the two millions of guilders, which the General States had consented to pay him yearly. This opposition might have opened his eyes, and shown him the necessity of embracing milder expedients, than he had hitherto employed; but instead of this, it served only to fix him in his first purpose of having recourse to open force and violence. And he was resolved, whatever should be the consequences, to compel the people to submit, not only to the tax of the hundredth penny, to which the States had given their consent, but likewise to that of the tenth and twentieth, to which they had refused it¹¹. To give a color to his conduct, he asserted in the council, that the States had consented to the two latter taxes as well as the former. Viglius, and some others of the counsellors, reminded him, that the consent obtained had been granted upon a

¹¹ Bentivoglio, p. 87.

condition

condition which did not yet subsist. But Alva was not in a temper of mind, at this time, in which he could either listen to the truth, or bear with contradiction. They were no better than rebels, he said, who durst affirm, that the States had not consented. The king's honor, as well as his interest, required, that the taxes should be levied without delay; and he would suffer himself to be cut in pieces, rather than allow the States to break the promise which they had given him.

He accordingly issued an edict, requiring all the inhabitants of the Low-Countries to make immediate payment of the tenth and twentieth, as well as of the hundredth penny, to the officers appointed to receive them. But, as he had promised to moderate the two former taxes in such a manner as to prevent the pernicious consequences that were apprehended, an immunity from the tenth penny was granted to foreign merchants, on the first sale of goods imported; and they were permitted to export them again, without paying this tax, provided the goods had not been transferred from one person to another during their continuance in the country. The same immunity was likewise granted on the first sale of cattle, corn, and fruits, the produce of the Netherlands.

These immunities, which the governor considered as proofs on his part of the greatest condescension, had no effect towards reconciling the people to the taxes, which they believed would, notwithstanding these concessions, be attended with the ruin of their commerce and manufactures.

B O O K
X.
1571.

His edict
requiring
payment of
the taxes.

The conse-
quences of
this mea-
sure.

BOOK

X.

1571.

Their aversion to them, and their resolution to oppose the levying of them, were as strong as ever. In many towns the people began, almost as soon as the edict was published, to feel a scarcity of the common necessities of life. Provisions were not brought to market; nor did the merchants expose their goods to sale as formerly¹². These inconveniences were felt in no place more than in Brussels, where the governor resided. There was an entire stagnation in that city of every species of commercial intercourse. Neither food nor drink could be purchased in it. The shops and workhouses were shut up. The lower sort of people were reduced to despair; and the whole city was overwhelmed with grief and consternation.

His barbarity.

The Brille taken by the Exiles.

In this situation, Alva formed the barbarous resolution of putting to death, before their own houses, seventeen of the principal inhabitants. His soldiers were under arms; the gibbets, the ropes, and the executioners, were prepared, when happily, only a few hours before the time fixed for the execution, a messenger arrived with information that the exiles had made a descent on the island of Vorn, and got possession of the Brille.

Alva, thunderstruck with this intelligence, recalled his bloody orders; and resolved, though with much reluctance, to suspend for a time the levying of the taxes. He was deeply sensible of the advantages which the exiles might derive from their acquisition of a place, which, on account of

¹² Bentivoglio, p. 87.

its situation at the mouth of a great river, and in the neighbourhood of many important cities, had always been considered as one of the chief keys of the Netherlands. He knew likewise how extremely disaffected the people in the maritime provinces were to his person and government; and he dreaded that other places would follow the example of the Brille, and open their gates to the enemy.

He had the greater reason to be uneasy at this event, as he had not exerted himself with proper vigor to prevent it. He had neglected to form a naval force sufficient to contend with the exiles; and had thereby not only suffered the trade of the Netherlands to be ruined, but had left his government almost defenceless on that side, where, from the nature of the power which the protestant exiles possessed, it was in the greatest danger of being attacked. He had not even put garrisons into the cities that were most exposed; but, at the very time when the exiles were hovering on the coast, kept a numerous body of troops quartered in Utrecht; which, if they had been distributed among the sea coast towns, might have baffled all the attempts of the enemy. Of this supine negligence, in a person of so great vigor and abilities as Alva, no account can be given, but the extreme contempt in which he held the protestant exiles; whom he considered as fit only to exercise piracy upon merchant ships, but utterly incapable of conducting any important enterprise.

But although he had not taken the necessary precaution to secure himself against their attempts,

B O O K
X.
1571.

he had not been altogether inattentive to their motions. He had complained to the queen of England, of her permitting them to sell openly in her dominions, the goods of which they had robbed the subjects of the king his master. This was in effect giving assistance, he said, to the king's rebellious subjects, and was a violation of the treaties which subsisted between the Spanish and English crowns. Elizabeth was secretly a friend to the Flemish exiles; and she had little reason, and as little inclination, to gratify the desires of Philip, or the duke of Alva. She knew that, for some time past, they had maintained a correspondence with her catholic subjects, and had used their endeavours to disturb her government. But she did not judge it proper at this time to come to an open rupture with Philip. She therefore complied with Alva's request; ordered all ships belonging to such of the inhabitants of the Low Countries, as had withdrawn their allegiance from the king of Spain, to leave her harbours; and forbade her subjects to furnish them with shelter or provisions.

This unlooked-for compliance of Elizabeth, which was matter of great triumph to the duke of Alva, and of equal mortification to the exiles, was attended, in the issue, with consequences very different from those which were expected. It reduced the exiles to despair; and as they were now thrown off by the only foreign power from which they had received protection, they resolved, if possible, to acquire possession of some place of strength in their native country. Having with this

view assembled at Dover, they set sail with twenty-five ships, under William de Lumey count de la Marck, who had the chief command among them, by commission from the prince of Orange. In their voyage they had the good fortune to meet with two Spanish vessels richly laden, which was no small consolation to them in their present forlorn situation. They intended to have made an attempt upon Enchuyfen, in North Holland; but the wind being contrary, they were obliged to put into the Maese, where they cast anchor before the town of Brille, on the first of April one thousand five hundred and seventy-two. The count De la Marck immediately landed his troops, and sent a messenger to summon the inhabitants, in the name of the prince of Orange, to surrender. But as they hesitated for some time what answer they should return, he began to suspect that they were preparing to make resistance, and therefore ordered the gates on the north side to be burnt down. This was done accordingly; and he entered, and took possession of the town without opposition, at the head of only two hundred and fifty men.

So accidental and so easily accomplished was the first event of that war, which rendered the Netherlands a scene of horror and devastation for more than thirty years; but which, whilst it proved the source, on many occasions, of extreme distress to the people, called forth an exertion of virtue, spirit, and intrepidity, which seldom occurs in the annals of history. Never was there a more unequal

B O O K

X.

1572.

contest than this which was now begun between the inhabitants of the Low-Countries and the Spanish monarch; and never was the issue of any dispute more contrary to what the parties had reason to expect. On the one side, a people, consisting chiefly of manufacturers and merchants, inhabiting a country of small extent, and already much exhausted by a long continued exercise of tyranny and oppression: on the other, the richest monarch of the age, who was master of the most numerous and best disciplined forces, commanded by generals distinguished above their contemporaries by their consummate skill in the art of war. Nothing but despair could have made the people of the Low-Countries enter the lists with an adversary so much superior to them. And it could hardly be supposed that they would not be quickly overwhelmed. But, from the sequel it will appear, how rash it is to conclude with confidence, that because an event is improbable, therefore it will not happen.

On the next day, after the protestants had made themselves masters of the Brille, they began to convey their booty on board their ships, with the design of proceeding on their voyage to West Friesland; but one of their number, a native of the place²³, having represented that they could not reasonably expect to find a more commodious settlement elsewhere, the count de la Marck, and all the rest entered readily into his opinion; and they

²³ Tresslong.

resolved without delay to fortify the town with the cannon belonging to the fleet.

They had just time to put themselves into a posture of defence, when the count de Bossut¹², to whom the duke of Alva had given orders to attack them, arrived in the island with a body of Spanish troops, collected from Utrecht and other places in the neighbourhood. The count de la Marck, whose forces were much inferior in number to the enemy, remained within the town, with a resolution to defend it to the last. The Spaniards advanced to the walls, and began to batter them with their artillery; when one of the townsmen leapt into a canal, and swimming a little way till he came to a sluice, which Bossut had neglected to secure, he broke it down, and let in such a quantity of water, that, in a few hours, a great part of the country was overflowed. This did not deter Bossut from the prosecution of his enterprise; although it obliged him to remove his forces to the south side of the town, where the ground which led to the principal gate was still uncovered by the water. La Marck had planted there his heaviest cannon; and the Spaniards had little prospect of being able to carry their point soon. In the meantime, two of the boldest leaders of the exiles sallied out with a part of the soldiers from the opposite gate, and marching along the dikes to the place where Bossut had left his ships, they burnt some of them, sunk others, set the rest adrift, and

B O O K

X.

1572.

Fruitless
attempt to
recover the
Brille.

¹² Governor of Holland.

B O O K

X.

1572.

then returned safe to the city. When the Spaniards were advertised of this disaster, and perceived the water round them rising higher and higher, they were struck with a sudden panic, and betook themselves with the utmost precipitation to the shore. Most of them made their escape to the opposite coast in some vessels, which the enemy had not time either to let loose or to destroy; and others, by swimming till they reached the ships that had been set adrift; while a considerable number was swallowed up in the mud and water. Had they been pursued by the enemy, they must all have perished. But La Marck, who was doubtful of the affections of the citizens, thought it dangerous to quit the town, lest they should shut the gates, and turn his own artillery against him.

From this success, the protestants derived an increase both of strength and courage. The citizens declared openly in their favor, and they were immediately joined by numbers who flocked to them from all parts of the island. The names of the inhabitants were registered; and they all swore allegiance to the prince of Orange, as the only legal governor of Holland; engaging to defend the town and island in *his* name, and that of the king, against the duke of Alva and the Spaniards¹⁵.

¹⁵ This first victory of the protestants was sullied by that savage ferocity, of which there are many instances in the present war. The Monks knowing how obnoxious they were to the conquerors, endeavoured to make their escape from the island; but they were seized in their flight, treated in the most cruel and contumelious manner, and afterwards

Their example quickly diffused the spirit by which they were actuated, and served as a signal of revolt to other places. Of this the count De Bossut soon received a convincing proof. Having with great difficulty passed over from Vorn to Beyerland, he led his troops towards Dort, where he intended to refresh them after the fatigue which they had undergone. But the inhabitants having heard of his repulse at the Brille, and dreading, that he might compel them to pay the taxes, they resolved, whatever should be the consequence, to refuse him admittance into the city. As he was not in a condition to employ force, he marched directly to Rotterdam.

There too he found the people equally averse to the admission of the Spaniards; but after assuring the magistrates that he meant only to lead them through the town, and not to lodge them in it, he persuaded them to suffer the several companies to pass through it, one by one. The magistrates had reason quickly to repent of this concession. No sooner had the first company entered the city, than Bossut, without regard to his engagement, ordered them to keep the gates open, till the other companies should arrive. The citizens reproached him with his treachery, and put to death. The exiles were too much inflamed by the barbarous treatment which they themselves had received, to distinguish between the innocent and the guilty, or to listen either to the dictates of humanity, or of that religion for which they professed such ardent zeal. Having been treated as wild beasts by their enemies, they had now become such, and tore in pieces every thing that fell in their way.

B O O K

X.

1572

Bossut's
massacre of
the people
of Rotter-
dam.

B O O K

X.

1572.

attempted to shut the gates by force. He had hitherto been held in esteem for his moderation; but, being chagrined on this occasion, by the miscarriage of his attempt against the protestants at the Brille, and incensed by the affront which had been offered him, first by the people of Dort, and since by those of Rotterdam, he resolved to wreak his vengeance upon the latter, and showed his soldiers what he wished them to do, by killing with his own hand one of the citizens, who was endeavouring to shut the gate. His troops, eager to follow his example, drew their swords, attacked the city-guards, slew some of them, and drove the rest out of the city; then giving a loose to their fury, they spread themselves over the town, and butchered more than three hundred of the inhabitants¹⁶.

This shocking deed was no less impolitic, than it was savage and barbarous; and added fuel to that flame which Bossut, as governor of the province, ought to have been at the utmost pains to extinguish. It required but little discernment to perceive the necessity of employing the mildest expedients with the maritime provinces. There were no citadels or Spanish garrisons in the towns of these provinces. The soldiers who had been quartered in them, had been drawn off at different times, for the punishment of the people of Utrecht. The situation of most of the towns, surrounded by the sea, or by the rivers and canals, rendered it extremely difficult to besiege them; and the pro-

¹⁶ Meursii Auriacus, p. 75. Bentivoglio, p. 91.

testants, who could have easy access by water to every part of the country, were greatly superior to the Spaniards in naval force. The people were not ignorant of these advantages; and they resolved to avail themselves of them on the present occasion. The massacre at Rotterdam made them regard Bossut and the Spaniards with horror; and even those who wished to maintain their allegiance to the king of Spain, were determined to guard against the entrance of his troops within their walls, with the same vigilance which they would have employed against an open foe.

This spirit appeared first at Flushing; which, on account of its situation near the mouth of the Scheld, has long been reckoned one of the most important towns in the Netherlands. Among the last instructions which the emperor delivered to his son, when he resigned his dominions, he advised him to make this place an object of his particular care, and to spare no expense to secure it against the attempts of his enemies. Alva had not bestowed that attention on it, which a place of so much consequence deserved. He had weakened the garrison, by ordering all of them but eighty Walloon soldiers, to take up their quarters in Utrecht. The loss of the Brille, which was owing to the same cause, had made him sensible of his error. He now therefore resolved to finish a citadel at Flushing, of which he had laid the foundation some time before; and with this view he ordered eight companies of Spaniards to go there, under the command of an experienced officer. The citizens

B O O K

X.

1572.

Revolt of
Flushing.

B O O K

X.

1572.

beheld the chains which were thus forging for them, with deep concern. They dreaded the consequences which might arise to their trade. They were not entirely free from apprehensions of being treated in the same manner as the people of Utrecht and Rotterdam. They doubted not that, sooner or later, the garrison, which was about to be stationed in the town, would be employed to compel them to make payment of the taxes; and they were emboldened by the success of the protestants in the isle of Vorn. While their minds were in this agitation, there arrived among them some partisans of the prince of Orange, who had come on purpose to exhort them to assert their liberty. Instigated by these men, the populace ran to arms, and obliged the feeble remains of the garrison to quit the city.

On the next day, the Spanish forces arrived in the harbour. The people were assembled in the streets, and upon the walls; and were still in some measure unresolved as to their future conduct. The protestants, and other friends of the prince of Orange, remonstrated to them on the absurdity of hesitating, after they had begun hostilities. "By expelling the garrison," cried one of them, "you have already done what the Spaniards will undoubtedly interpret to be high treason against their king. Consider well to whose mercy you expose yourselves. Remember the fate of the counts Horn and Egmont, and consider whether either your merit or your innocence has equalled theirs." The protestants employed another method to

impress the minds of the vulgar. They caused proclamation to be made by sound of trumpet, that the Spanish garrison was at hand, and that all the citizens must hold their effects, their wives and daughters, in readiness for their use¹⁷.

B O O K

X.

1572.

When men are balancing between contrary resolutions, the smallest weight is sufficient sometimes to turn the scale. A man in liquor, who had mingled with the crowd, offered for a small reward to fire one of the great guns upon the Spaniards; and he did it accordingly, on receiving three guilders from one of the protestants who stood near him. From that instant, the people were fixed in their purpose. The Spaniards, astonished at their reception, and utterly unprepared to employ force, let slip their cables, and sailed for Middleburgh.

In that city resided Anthony de Burgoine, lord of Wackené, the governor of the province; who, as soon as he was informed of what had happened, set out for Flushing, and on his arrival there, having called together all the inhabitants into the most public part of the town, he employed every argument addressed to their hopes and fears, to persuade them to return to their allegiance. But they could not listen now to any thing but the passions by which they were inflamed. Their abhorrence of the Spanish tyranny was now wrought up to the greatest height; and the governor, apprehensive of danger from their unbridled fury, immediately left the town.

¹⁷ Reidanus, p. 10.

B O O K

X.

1572.

Soon after his departure they pulled up the foundations of the new citadel, and drove out the persons to whom the charge of building it had been committed. In a few days afterwards they gave a still stronger proof of their resolution never to return under the Spanish government. Don Pedro Pacheco, who had been appointed governor of Flushing, having been detained some days behind the troops, was ignorant of what had passed, and entered the harbour under a belief that his soldiers were in the town to receive him. The people ran to arms, and having seized and plundered his ship, they cast him and his attendants into prison. Among papers which were found in his possession, it is said, that they met with evidence of his having come with a design to exercise in Flushing the wonted tyranny of the Spaniards; and this discovery, added to the circumstance of his being nearly related to the duke of Alva, prompted them to form the barbarous resolution of putting him to death. He offered to pay them a rich ransom for his life, and to remain their prisoner; but they rejected his proposal. He then begged that they would respect the nobility of his birth, and put him to death by the sword, rather than by the halter. Even this request was denied him. Their minds were grown savage, from the bloody scenes which had of late been so often acted before them; and they rejoiced in the opportunity which they possessed of wreaking their vengeance on the duke of Alva, by inflicting a disgraceful punishment on his kinsman.

They were aware of the consequences with which this conduct, so violent and hostile, must be attended; and, as they knew that it would quickly draw upon them the whole weight of the governor's resentment, they omitted nothing in their power to secure themselves against it. They labored incessantly to strengthen their fortifications. They imported privately from Antwerp, ammunition and provisions, which they laid up in store; and they applied to the prince of Orange, and to the protestants in France and England for assistance. Some troops were immediately sent them from France, by count Lewis of Nassau; and five hundred Flemish exiles came from England, who were soon afterwards followed by two hundred Scotch and English volunteers, under the command of two adventurers, Morgan and Balfour. Their fleet received an augmentation where they did not expect it. The duke of Alva having, some months before, fitted out a number of vessels to cruise upon the coast, the commanders of these vessels now declared in favor of the party which they had hitherto opposed; and, setting sail for Flushing, enlisted under the banners of the count de Tserart, to whom the prince of Orange had given the chief command of all the forces in the province.

Tserart soon found himself possessed of sufficient strength, not only to defend Flushing, but likewise to attempt the reduction of the other towns in Zealand. With most of these towns, there was very little occasion for employing force. The inhabitants of Campvere, Armuyden, and some

B O O K

X.

1572.

Revolt of
other towns
in Zealand,

B O O K

X.

1572.

The siege of
Middleburgh.

other places, were no less inclined to revolt than the people of Flushing; and in a few days the whole province, except Middleburgh and the castle of Rammekins, declared against the Spanish government, and received garrisons from Tserart.

In Middleburgh too, the greatest part of the inhabitants would gladly have followed the example of the other towns; but they were over-awed by the garrison. Tserart laid siege to this city, and expected soon to have got possession of it. The garrison was weak, and as the exiles were masters at sea, he hoped, by their means, to intercept any reinforcement which might be sent from the continent. The duke of Alva was sensible of the great importance of the place, and resolved, if possible, to relieve it. For this purpose, he ordered Sancho D'Avila, one of his bravest officers, to carry thither a thousand select soldiers, partly Walloons and partly Spaniards, whom he mingled together, as he did on many occasions afterwards, that he might the more effectually excite their emulation; and to these a great number of officers and persons of rank joined as volunteers, that they might partake of the glory of so dangerous an enterprise.

D'Avila left Bergen-op-zoom in the end of April, and had a prosperous navigation down the Scheld. He was desirous to land his troops on the nearest part of the island, as from thence he would have had the shortest march to Middleburgh. But the enemy having received intelligence of his design, had drawn together a powerful fleet to oppose him.

him. He was obliged therefore to keep out to sea on the north side of the island, and to fetch a compass round, till he came to that part of it which is washed by the ocean. The landing there was difficult by reason of the flats and shallows, which made it necessary for him to march a great way in the water; but, as he met with no opposition from the enemy, he at last brought his men all safe on shore. Then having immediately set out with a chosen band, to examine the situation of the enemy, and having found that, trusting to the fleet, they had taken no precaution for their defence, he ordered all his forces to advance. They ran forward to the attack with the utmost impetuosity. The besiegers were overwhelmed with astonishment. The garrison at the same time sallied out upon them from the city. They abandoned their trenches almost without resistance; and being hemmed in on every side, all of them, except a few, who escaped to Flushing and Campvere, were put to the sword²³.

B O O K

X.

1572.

In this manner was the siege of Middleburgh raised. But as the protestants still retained their superiority at sea, they hoped, that by surrounding the island with their ships, and intercepting the supplies which might be sent to it, they should soon be able to compel the garrison to surrender. Their fleet consisted of no less than one hundred and fifty armed vessels, manned with sailors who were much more expert than any

Raised by
D'Avila.

²³ Bentivoglio, p. 93.

BOOK

X.

1572.

whom the duke of Alva could procure. Their maritime enterprizes were for this reason almost always attended with success, and they did incredible mischief to the Spaniards at sea; while at land, having only raw troops to oppose to regular and well-disciplined forces, they were seldom able to look them in the face.

Success of the
exiles at sea.
July 10th.

At this time, when the sea was covered with their ships, and almost every entrance to the ports of the Low Countries blocked up, the duke of Medina-Cœli arrived upon the coast. This nobleman had been sent by Philip to succeed the duke of Alva, who, on account of his health, had applied for liberty to return to Spain. Medina-Cœli had brought with him fifty ships, having two thousand Spanish soldiers on board, but as he knew nothing of the late transactions in the maritime provinces, and had no suspicion that the protestants possessed such a considerable naval force, he fell unawares into the midst of their fleet. Twenty-five of the largest of his ships were taken. Some of them escaped to Rammekins and Middleburgh, and he himself got with difficulty into Sluys, in Flanders. The exiles found on board the ships which they took, two hundred thousand guilders in specie; and the ships, with the effects which they contained, were valued at five hundred thousand¹⁹.

Their next success was in an attack upon a fleet of twenty ships, which the duke of Alva

¹⁹ Meursii Auriacus, p. 88.

intended to send to Middleburgh, with troops, ordnance, pikes, and gunpowder, for the use of the garrison. The exiles attacked these ships before they had left the harbour, and having taken them all, they carried them, together with the military stores, to Flushing.

B O O K

X.

1572.

Another fleet, fitted out for the same purpose at Sluys, was equally unfortunate. The Zealanders being informed by their partisans of the destination of this fleet, and of the time fixed for its departure, took three ships, in the short run betwixt Sluys and the isle of Walcheren, and had the courage to pursue the rest into the harbour of Rammekins, where, notwithstanding the fire of the garrison, they took some, and burnt the rest.

They were not so successful in their next adventure. It had been the chief object of their desire for some time, to make themselves masters of Middleburgh; because, while that city remained in the hands of the Spaniards, the whole island was subject to perpetual alarm. They had, as we have just now seen, defeated several attempts which the duke of Alva made to introduce supplies, and now the town of Tergoes was the only channel by which they could be conveyed. Tergoes is the capital of South Beveland, and was defended at this time by a garrison of eight hundred Walloons and Spaniards, under the command of Isidore Pacheco, a Spanish officer.

To this town Tserart, general of the Zealanders,

Siege of
Tergoes

B O O K

X.

1572.

towards the
end of sum-
mer.

had, some time after his repulse from Middleburgh, laid siege; but upon a false report of the approach of the Spaniards, he had hastily raised the siege, and left the island. He now returned to it, with an army of near eight thousand men, most of whom were German, French, and English protestants.

As the garrison was no match in the field for so great a force, Tserart had landed in the island without opposition, and, having immediately invested the town, he pressed forward the siege with great vigor. The besieged made several brisk sallies to retard his approach; but notwithstanding their most vigorous efforts, Tserart had opened his batteries, and made some breaches in the wall. The siege had lasted for several weeks, and Pacheco began to perceive that it would not be possible for him to hold out much longer.

Of this he had given early notice to the duke of Alva; nor was the duke less intent upon relieving him, than he had reason to expect. The distinguished bravery of the garrison and their commander; the reproach which would accompany the suffering them to fall a prey to the enemy; above all, the great importance of the place, the loss of which would draw after it that of Middleburgh, and the whole province of Zealand; these considerations excited all the governor's attention, and determined him to apply with ardor to prepare the succour which Pacheco had solicited. He ordered several regiments of his best troops to assemble from different

quarters at Bergen-op-zoom, from whence there is a short run down the Scheld to Beveland. He likewise sent thither a sufficient number of transports with stores of ammunition and provisions; and appointed D'Avila and Mondragone²⁰ to conduct them to the garrison of Tergoes.

These men exerted themselves strenuously in the execution of the trust that was committed to them; and attempted several times to force their way through the enemy's fleet. But the Zealanders watched their motions so attentively, were so much more expert in sailing, and possessed a naval force so much superior to theirs, that all their attempts were baffled; and, to save their ships from being sunk, they were frequently obliged to return, without being able to effectuate their purpose. D'Avila once flattered himself that he had discovered an expedient that would prove successful. He planted batteries of cannon along the banks of the Scheld; hoping to keep the enemy at a distance from the shore, and thus to give Mondragone, with the troops, an opportunity of passing. But the event did not answer his expectation. The banks were wet, and did not allow of his coming near enough to annoy the enemy.

The Spanish generals began to despair of being able to execute their design, when Plumart, a native of the province, but zealously attached to the Spanish interest, proposed another method

Plumart's
proposal for
raising the
siege.

²⁰ Two of his most experienced officers.

B O O K

X.

1572.

of transporting the forces, which at first appeared impracticable, although it was afterwards embraced. In order to form a clear conception of Plumart's proposal, it is necessary to attend to the situation of the country, and the change which some years before it had undergone. The isle of South Beveland, to which the Spanish general found it so difficult to transport their troops, is only seven miles distant from a tract of land, to which they could have had easy access from Bergen-op-zoom. This tract of land, which is divided from Brabant by the Easter Scheld and from Flanders by the Hondt, or Wester Scheld, was once a part of Beveland, and was separated from it by a dreadful inundation in the year one thousand, five hundred and thirty-two; when the sea broke down the dikes, and burst violently across the island, cutting off from it the corner which lay nearest to Brabant, and covering it from north to south, that is from the Easter to the Wester Scheld, with water, which the inhabitants were never able to exclude. The space overflowed was, at the narrowest, seven Italian miles broad. It could not be crossed in boats even at high-water, by reason of the flats and shallows; and at low water it was thought unfordable, on account of the miry bottom, and the channels of several rivulets, which many persons still remember to have seen in it, before it was overflowed.

It was there, however, that Plumart thought it practicable for the troops to pass over on foot,

to the relief of the garrison of Tergoes; and he offered to lead the way, and conduct them in their passage. The character of the man, whose prudence and fidelity were well-known to the commanders, was the only circumstance that prevented them from regarding his proposal as chimerical. No person had ever attempted to pass that way before. They themselves were unacquainted with the face of the country before the inundation. They only knew the length of space over which the troops must pass; and no troops, they believed, would be able to support the fatigue of so long a march in water, and perhaps too in mud and clay. Besides, that, by accidents which could not be foreseen, they might be retarded in their passage, till they were overtaken by the rising tide, and buried in the waves; and, even although this should not happen, yet the enemy might be apprized of their design, and be ready to fall upon them, as soon as they should reach the land.

Plumart was not discouraged by these objections. He desired that no mention might be made of his proposal, till he should know with certainty whether there was not in reality such a ford as he imagined. He then went to make the trial, accompanied by two Spaniards, and a peasant who was well acquainted with the face of the country before the inundation. He found the ford which he sought for; arrived safe on the other side, and returned, without encountering any greater difficulties than he expected.

BOOK

X.

1572.

D'Avila and Mondragone did not hesitate after this to comply with his advice. They immediately prepared a number of small bags, which they filled with biscuit, gunpowder and matches; and transported three thousand of the best troops, Germans, Walloons, and Spaniards, from Bergen-op-zoom to Agger, a village which lies near the entrance of the ford. Mondragone took upon himself the conducting of this extraordinary expedition. When the time proper for entering upon it was arrived, he ordered the troops to advance towards the ford; and having distributed the bags among them, he then disclosed his intention; gave them an account of the discovery which had been made by Plumart and his companions; and represented the glory which they would acquire by performing, in the service of the church and of the king, such an exploit as had never been achieved by any army in the world before. The soldiers, full of that intrepid spirit by which the Spanish troops were so highly distinguished in the present war, and proud of being selected from their companions for so dangerous an enterprise, received this unexpected information with every symptom of joy, and called out to Mondragone to lead them forward without delay.

That they might have the more time for their passage, they began to enter the water when the sea was going back. The Spaniards, with Plumart and Mondragone at their head, marched first, the Germans next, and last of all the Walloons. They were ordered to keep as close

as possible to each other, that they might the more easily succour one another, if any of them should fall into deeper water, or be entangled in the mud. They were not without apprehensions of the tide returning upon them, and therefore they moved forward as fast as the surrounding element and the slimy bottom would allow. Nine men only perished through fatigue, or their neglect of the order which had been given them to keep close to their companions. All the rest arrived safe at the dike of Yersicken, a village only four miles distant from Tergoes. There Mondragone ordered them to repose themselves during the night, and resolved to lead them, at break of day, to the relief of the besieged.

But he had already done all that was necessary for this purpose, and had no occasion to expose either himself or his men to further danger. When the besiegers were informed of his arrival, they were filled with consternation. Under that amazement into which they were thrown by so unexpected an event, they regarded the Spaniards as more than men. They did not take time to inquire into their number; but having immediately raised the siege, they left their baggage and artillery behind them, and betook themselves precipitately to the shore. Eight hundred were killed in their flight by the garrison, and many more perished in the water, in attempting to get on board their ships. Mondragone then entered Tergoes; where he was received by the garrison, with every demonstration

BOOK of gratitude for their deliverance ; and, having
X. remained there till he had given directions for
1572. strengthening the fortifications of the place, he
left a part of his troops with the governor, and
returned with the rest to Brabant, to join the duke
of Alva ²¹.

²¹ Bentivoglio, p. 110. Meursii Auriacus, p. 89.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

x (1-3) II. 87



Watson, Robert, 1730-1781

The History of the Reign of Philip II. King of Spain

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